




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THE VIEW FROM SOUTH LAWN

The conclusion of our twenty-fifth year of publication invites reflection on the past and future of the *Journal of Politics & Society*. As I am confident you will agree, this edition demonstrates that we have not yet lost our youthful vigor.

The Fall 2013 journal is among the most interdisciplinary in our long history. Evoking the early days of *Helvidius*, the guest essay is a piece of legal scholarship coauthored by Roberta Kaplan, counsel to the plaintiff in *United States v. Windsor*. In among the most important Supreme Court decisions in recent memory, the Court found unconstitutional provisions in the Defense of Marriage Act that prevented married same-sex couples from enjoying some of the benefits of marriage guaranteed by federal law. The essay analyzes some of the central points of Ms. Kaplan's argument and contends that proof must outweigh prejudice in the court of law.

Yet diverging from our traditional focus on law, political science, history, and economics, the student articles in this edition exemplify the impressive and important undergraduate research taking place in a wide variety of social science disciplines.

We begin, as always, with this semester's recipient of the Peter and Katherine Tomassi Prize for outstanding undergraduate research: *To Construct a Riot*, written by Simone Zhang. Rather than seeking to understand the causes of the 2011 London Riots, as in most prior scholarship on the topic, Ms. Zhang analyzes the discourse surrounding them and the political and social consequences of this framing. Her essay exemplifies the innovative and timely undergraduate research that the *Journal* prides itself in publishing.

The next paper takes us to the other side of the globe. In *Design Politics*, Ryan Lee investigates the strengthening relationship between South Korean politics and design. Though often considered inherently disparate, Mr. Lee builds an insightful bridge between the two fields, reinforcing the value of interdisciplinary scholarship.

Shiva Kooragayala furthers the discussion of physical environment and urbanity by investigating suburban poverty in the context of a housing voucher program in Atlanta. In doing so, Mr. Kooragayala reaffirms the value of theory-based empirical evaluation of public programs. Sweta Maturu enriches this affirmation in her quantitative investigation of the influence of UN peacekeeping troops on rule of law. While Ms. Maturu is unable to offer conclusive statistical results, her article is representative of the unflinching dedication to methodological rigor and scientific investigation that serves as the foundation of our work at the *Journal of Politics & Society*.

Continuing in the global context, Emily Arsen presents her research on the so-called 'immigrant paradox.' Previous public health scholarship reveals the curious phenomenon that immigrant families in the United States tend to have better health than native families, despite unequal access to resources associated with physical wellbeing. Ms. Arsen finds evidence that this paradox is also present in France, extending the boundaries of our understanding and opening new territories for empirical research. And finally, Marita Wright shares the results of her ethnographic investigation of an environmental organization's anti-fracking campaign. In doing so, Ms. Wright invites us to reflect on how messages are crafted and disseminated to the public.

Marking the end of our first twenty-five years, this edition also introduces a new cover design. With this refresh, we sought to highlight the content of the *Journal* in a creative and dynamic way. The graphic depicts the relative frequency of words that appear in the articles through color, size, and centrality. At a glance, the viewer is instantly immersed in the substance of the *Journal*, removing abstraction and offering a direct window into its content. The words in the cloud, of course, will change with each edition.

And finally, this journal is the first in our new size format. It is tremendously important to us to accommodate the scholarly vision of our authors. Doubling the page size allows us to include important tables and figures and to publish longer works without compromising the complexities and subtleties of the discussion. This transformation provides a platform to continue extending the scope of our mission long into the future.

None of these changes would have been possible without the tremendous enthusiasm of the Executive and Editorial Boards. As my time as Editor in Chief draws to a close, words cannot express my gratitude towards those who have given their time and energy to the *Journal of Politics & Society*. Over the past twenty-five years, we have established a well-deserved reputation as one of the premier journals of undergraduate social science research. Although we have changed in many ways since the first editions of *Helvidius*, we remain—and always will remain—motivated by a genuine, passionate curiosity and excitement towards understanding the social world.

And I, for one, cannot wait to see what is to come in the next twenty-five years.

Jonah Smith
Editor in Chief

New York City
December 2013

PROOF VS. PREJUDICE

ROBERTA KAPLAN AND JAREN JANGHORBANI*

We trust courts to resolve disputes over everything from whether the light was red to whether children experience better educational outcomes in diverse classrooms. As a general matter, such disputes are resolved through hard-fought adversarial testing of an evidentiary record because the American judicial system is premised on the assumption that such testing is the most effective means of reaching the truth. Nowhere is this premise more evident than in cases like those about marriage between same-sex couples, cases that inherently touch on beliefs about the nature of human identity, value judgments about human psychology and behavior, and what is in the best interest for children. Moreover, each of these is a topic on which most people, including most judges, have long-held views that (consciously or not) are based on their own personal experiences. For this reason, a careful, thorough evidentiary record, subject to cross-examination, is particularly important to help assure that a court's decision will not be grounded on assumptions or prejudice. *Perry v. Brown* exemplifies this.¹ In *Perry*, the opponents of Proposition 8 put forward testimony from eight lay witnesses and nine expert witnesses, which the court credited extensively in its analysis. The Proposition 8 proponents, on the other hand, were able to offer only two trial witnesses to support their position that the statute had rationally furthered a legitimate governmental objective.²

Guided in part by the record in *Perry*, and in representing Edith (“Edie”) Windsor in her challenge to

* Roberta Kaplan and Jaren Janghorbani are attorneys at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP who, together with the ACLU, represented Edith Windsor in her successful constitutional challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act. The Authors would like to extend their gratitude to Zachary Dietart and Nila Merola for their invaluable assistance with this article, and to the entire Windsor team.

This piece originally appeared in the N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change.

1 See *Perry v. Schwarznegger*, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 938-944 (N.D. Cal. 2010), *aff'd sub nom. Perry v. Brown*, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), *cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry*, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144).

2 *Id.* at 944-45. One of those two witnesses was David Blankenhorn, who has since changed his position, stating in a *New York Times* op-ed “that the time for denigrating or stigmatizing same-sex relationships is over” and that “the time has come for me to accept gay marriage and emphasize the good that it can do.” David Blankenhorn, *How My View on Gay Marriage Changed*, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how-my-view-on-gay-marriage-changed.html>.

the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) in the Southern District of New York, we focused on amassing the best evidence for our client. IN connection with expert discovery, we put forth affidavits from five experts, many of whom overlapped with the experts in *Perry*, each of whom was then subject to deposition. Each expert offered competent expert testimony concerning the factors that courts evaluate in applying heightened judicial scrutiny under equal protection analysis or whether the discrimination at issue in this case passes constitutional muster; their academic disciplines ranged from adult and child psychology and social psychology to history and political science.

By contrast, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”), which is defending DOMA, offered no affirmative witnesses at all. Thus, the evidentiary record in *Windsor* was devoid of any admissible evidence of several points BLAG hoped to prove: that gays and lesbians are not as effective at parenting as straight people; that there is some advantage to children to being raised by a male and female biological parent; that homosexuality is a choice; and that gays and lesbians have meaningful political power. Although the court's scheduling order gave BLAG a full and fair opportunity to submit testimony or other competent evidence to support its assertions, it elected not to do so.

Both parties in *Windsor* moved for summary judgment and, under court rules, we and BLAG were required to submit statements of the undisputed facts in support of our motions. Because they had offered no witnesses, BLAG was faced with the unsavory prospect of relying on a record overwhelmingly against it. Instead, BLAG chose to go outside of the record. In its statement of facts, BLAG referenced a dozen assorted books and articles about technical matters of psychology and sociology. These documents alleged flaws in studies of gay and lesbian parents, discussed whether a person's sexual orientation frequently changes, and argued that children should have male and female parents who assume traditional gender roles. These are matters about which it is clearly appropriate for a court to hear expert testimony, subject to cross-examination.

One example of this documentary evidence was a book written by David Popenoe, offered in an at-

tempt to establish that it is better for children to have both male and female parents in the home who assume traditional gender roles.³ According to a web search (since BLAG provided no information sufficient to qualify Mr. Popoenoe as an expert pursuant to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence),⁴ David Popenoe was a professor of sociology at Rutgers University. Presumably, BLAG could have submitted Mr. Popenoe's testimony in an admissible format, as opposed to simply referencing his book. Mr. Popenoe clearly supports BLAG's position and he could have been contacted so that he could have submitted an expert affidavit and have been made available for deposition, as contemplated by the scheduling order in this case. Yet BLAG did not make Mr. Popenoe or any of the other authors it referenced available for testimony. The potential danger from this is obvious—not only was Ms. Windsor denied the opportunity to challenge Mr. Popenoe's premises and conclusions, but BLAG was free to take his work out of context or misinterpret it.

In fact, BLAG did just that with another expert's work. In support of its claim that sexual orientation is not an immutable characteristic,⁵ BLAG cited an article by Professor Lisa Diamond, a professor at the University of Utah and a leading expert on the nature and development of same-sex sexuality.⁶ We reached out to Professor Diamond, and—for no compensation—Professor Diamond agreed to submit an affidavit in our case. In that affidavit, she stated unequivocally that “BLAG misconstrues and distorts my research findings,” and that the research cited did not relate to the immutability of sexuality.⁷

Moreover, it is far from clear that several of the individual hearsay declarants BLAG relied upon would even have qualified as experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.⁸ For instance, one of the documents cited by BLAG in opposition to Ms. Windsor's

motion for summary judgment was a then-forthcoming law review article in the *Ave Maria Law Review* purportedly criticizing the methodology of the social science studies that have been done on gay and lesbian parents.⁹ The article was written by a law professor at Case Western Law School who, according to the law school's website, teaches classes at the law school on Business Associations, Mergers & Acquisitions, and Business Planning.¹⁰ BLAG also relied upon a 2004 article from the online magazine *Slate* to support its contention that the consensus opinion seven years ago, among both those who supported marriage equality and those who opposed it, was that the “existing science is methodologically flawed and ideologically skewed.”¹¹ The author of this article on *Slate*, Ann Hulbert—although she is a successful contributor to publications such as *New Republic* and *New York Review of Books*—likely does not have the requisite scientific background and training to be qualified as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to testify about such matters.¹²

As a general matter, it is black-letter law that a party contesting summary judgment cannot rely on hearsay materials like these that are not otherwise admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. And BLAG did not dispute that the documents it sought to rely upon were inadmissible hearsay.¹³ Instead, BLAG argued that the court should disregard the time-tested rules of evidence because *Windsor* is a case that presented an issue of constitutional law (which it surely is).

To the lay person, or even most practicing lawyers, this might seem remarkable. However, under

3 DAVID POPOENOE, *LIFE WITHOUT FATHER: COMPELLING NEW EVIDENCE THAT FATHERHOOD AND MARRIAGE ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR THE GOOD OF CHILDREN AND SOCIETY* (1996).

4 FED. R. EVID. 706 (“Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses”).

5 This inquiry is relevant because in assessing whether discrimination against a group is subject to heightened scrutiny, courts sometimes consider whether the characteristic defining the group is immutable or “so integral in an aspect of one's identity [that] it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change [it] . . . in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.” *In re Marriage Cases*, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008).

6 See Lisa M. Diamond, *New Paradigms for Research on Heterosexual and Sexual Minority Development*, 32 J. CLINICAL CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHOL. 492 (2003).

7 Declaration of Lisa M. Diamond at ¶ 4-5, *Windsor v. United States*, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, No. 10-CIV-8435 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), ECF No. 74.

8 FED. R. EVID. 702 (“Testimony of Expert Witnesses”).

9 Intervenor-Defendant's Local Rule 56.1 Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material of Facts at 7, *Windsor*, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10-CV-8435); Memorandum of Law in Support of Intervenor-Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 24, *Windsor*, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10-CV-8435).

10 George W. Dent, Jr., *No Difference?: An Analysis of Same-Sex Parenting*, *Ave Maria L. Rev.* (forthcoming 2011) (cited in Memorandum of Law in Support of Intervenor-Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 24, *Windsor*, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10-CV-8435)).

11 Ann Hulbert, *The Gay Science: What Do We Know About the Effects of Same-Sex Parenting?*, *SLATE* (Mar. 12, 2004), <http://www.slate.com/id/2097048/> (cited in Intervenor-Defendant's Local Rule 56.1 Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts at 7, *Windsor*, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10-CV-8435)).

12 FED. R. EVID. 702 (discussing the admission of opinions by an individual who is “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education”). Nor were the hearsay materials admissible under the learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. 803(18). BLAG failed to even attempt to show as to the hearsay materials “a proper foundation as to the authoritative nature of the text . . . laid by expert witness.” *Schneider v. Revici*, 817 F.2d 987, 991 (2d Cir. 1987). See also *Tart v. McGann*, 697 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1982); *United States v. Mangan*, 575 F.2d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 1978).

13 See Intervenor-Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Strike, *Windsor*, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, ECF No. 69.

the doctrine of “legislative” or “constitutional facts,” a court is permitted to rely on facts outside the record in certain circumstances. As the Second Circuit has observed, the “so-called ‘constitutional facts,’ [are] a concept that has confounded courts and commentators alike.”¹⁴

Loosely defined, because the courts and commentators have reached no consensus as to what these concepts mean, the doctrine distinguishes between “adjudicative” facts, which are those relevant to only the dispute between two adverse parties, and “legislative” or “constitutional” facts which help a court make decisions about the broader application of legal doctrine.¹⁵ Pursuant to this doctrine, a court, while confined by evidentiary rules as to adjudicative facts, is freed from them when determining legislative or constitutional facts. Thus, under the doctrine, when determining issues of broad applicability – such as whether homosexuality is an innate characteristic which thus supports strict scrutiny of any classifications on this basis—a court is not confined to the record before it.

On its fact, this is more than a little troubling. Where a court is tasked with making a factual determination of indisputably broad impact, the court is freed from the traditional constraints of the time-tested rules of evidence and procedure, which have been developed over the centuries for good reason—to assure that the facts on which courts rely permit them to ascertain the truth and make just determinations.¹⁶ Moreover, the court need not have the benefit of adversarial testing of any material on which it relies. As a general rule, Americans do not rely on the courts to make policy determinations. Yet when, in the course of their duties, courts are called upon to do so in constitutional cases, they are freed from doing that which they are most institutionally situated to do—adjudicate a record fully fought by adverse parties.

It is thus perhaps surprising that the “constitutional facts” doctrine developed in a context wholly

apart from its current incarnation, judicial review of administrative action.¹⁷ The doctrine originally sought to ensure that courts reviewing agency action could go beyond the agency record so as to satisfy Article III. Nothing in these early cases suggests that a federal court was freed from the traditional rules that would govern its own record. And even as to the review of agency fact-finding, the doctrine of legislative and constitutional facts has been largely abrogated.¹⁸

To the extent there is any continuing legitimate purpose to the “constitutional facts” doctrine, it is to assure that where a lower court evidentiary record is infirm, an appellate court reviewing that record is not constrained to that record in making determinations of policy that would have impact beyond the resolution of the case at bar. One can certainly imagine instances in which it would be laudable, necessary even, for a court to reach beyond the available record to render its judgment. But it is clearly preferable that rather than leaving the court to itself find factual support for its conclusions the parties build a complete record that can be tested through the traditional processes.¹⁹

It was with this in mind that we built the evidentiary record in *Windsor*. Particularly as to issues about which passions can run high, and reasonable people can reach intuitive conclusions that are in fact belied by scientific or historical evidence, it is critical that courts be given cognizable evidence from which to render a judgment. The one alternative—for the court to undertake its own independent research—is obviously not ideal.²⁰ Even worse, a court may rely on its own pre-existing notions, however, accurate or inaccurate they may be. In litigating issues like marriage for same sex couples it is only through offering proof that lawyers can mitigate past such pitfalls.

14 *United States v. Cutler*, 58 F.3d 825, 834 (2d Cir. 1995). See Henry P. Monaghan, *Constitutional Fact Review*, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 238 (1985). See also *Siderius v. M.V. Amilla*, 880 F.2d 662, 666 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The federal rules give no guidance on how to distinguish law from adjudicative fact for purposes of judicial notice, and noted commentators have called the question ‘baffling.’”) (quoting 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, *FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE* § 5103 (2d ed. 1977)).

15 See FED. R. EVID. 201(a) (articulating in the notes that “adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case. Legislative facts, on the other hand, are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court in the enactment of a legislative body.”).

16 FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”)

17 See, e.g., *Crowell v. Benson*, 285 U.S. 22, 64 (1932) (holding that as to constitutional rights “the federal court should determine . . . an issue [of agency jurisdiction] upon its own record and the facts elicited before it”); Monaghan, *supra* note 14, at 247–63 (summarizing development of doctrine).

18 See *N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.*, 458 U.S. 50, 82 n.34 (1982) (“*Crowell’s* precise holding, with respect to the review of ‘jurisdictional’ and ‘constitutional’ facts that arise within ordinary administrative proceedings, has been undermined by later cases.”).

19 See John F. Jackson, *The Brandeis Brief—Too Little Too Late: The Trial Court As a Superior Forum for Presenting Legislative Facts*, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1 (1993); Kenneth Karst, *Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation*, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75, at 96, 102 (noting fear that “the trial of legislative facts would hamper [the court’s] own investigation” and concluding such fear is “unfounded” in part because of “obvious value of cross-examination” of “live testimony by [an] expert”).

20 See Karst, *supra* note 19, at 95 (describing the Supreme Court’s deciding of cases “on the basis of its own research” as unhappily typical, and noting preferred approach of “remand for further consideration of the legislative facts in the lower courts”).

Past victories well illustrate the advisability of this approach. For instance, in *Romer v. Evans*, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's holding that an amendment which prohibited any governmental action taken to protect individuals on the basis of their "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct practices or relationships" was unconstitutional.²¹ Specifically, the Court held that the law was "a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests."²² This was based on an extensive record below. The trial court heard numerous witnesses as to the question of whether the amendment served a compelling state interest, including testimony as to "the 'homosexual agenda' and the homosexual push for 'protected status'" who "urged that this Amendment protected Colorado's political functions from being overrun by such groups."²³ Similarly, witnesses testified as to whether the amendment would lead to "dilution of protections afforded to existing suspect classes," whether the amendment furthered "the prevention of governmental interference with personal, familial and religious privacy," and whether the amendment would promote "the physical and psychological well-being of children."²⁴ As to each of these, the court heard competing (admissible) evidence and found that the government could not meet its burden.

In *Perry*, "[t]he parties were given a full opportunity to present evidence in support of their positions" and "engaged in significant discovery, including third-party discovery, to build an evidentiary record."²⁵ The court noted that "Plaintiffs presented eight lay witnesses . . . and nine expert witnesses . . . Proponents presented two expert witnesses and conducted lengthy and thorough cross-examinations of plaintiffs' expert witnesses but failed to build a credible factual record to support their claim that Proposition 8 served a legitimate government interest."²⁶ This record thus led the court to its conclusion that Proposition 8 could not stand.

In *Windsor*, we argued that the district court should strike the hearsay materials put forward by BLAG.²⁷ While the court declined to do so, the court did grant our alternative request to put forth additional affidavits and rebuttal evidence in response to BLAG's hearsay.²⁸ Based on the record, then, the court declared DOMA unconstitutional. By stipulation, the same record was used in two other challenges to DOMA, *Golinski* and *Pedersen*. In both cases, the courts also declared DOMA unconstitutional.²⁹ In *Pedersen* in particular, the court relied heavily on the evidentiary record. For example, the court relied on the expert testimony of historian George Chauncey to conclude that lesbians and gay men "have suffered a long history of discrimination," an important factor in the court's decision to apply heightened scrutiny in its analysis of DOMA's constitutionality.³⁰ The expert affidavit and deposition testimony of psychologist Letitia Anne Peplau, including her synthesis of the relevant academic literature and studies, similarly assisted the court in determining that sexual orientation is an enduring characteristic fundamental to a person's identity, not something that a person should be required to suppress or attempt to change to escape discrimination.³¹

These decisions are all powerful evidence of the power of evidence. But the real test of the evidence in these cases is yet to come. When the Supreme Court considers the constitutionality of discrimination against married same-sex couples, it will face a thorough, well-tested record supporting the invalidation of such laws. Evidence in support of the constitutionality of these laws is, as courts across the country have now found, scant at best. Faced with these lower court records, when the Supreme Court renders a decision, proof, not prejudice, should carry the day.

21 *Romer v. Evans*, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996).

22 *Id.* at 635.

23 *Evans v. Romer*, No. 92-7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *4 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993).

24 *Id.* at *5–6, 9.

25 *Perry*, *supra* note 1, at 932. *See also Perry*, *supra* note 1, Transcript of Oral Argument, at 81, *Perry* (Oct. 14 2009) (No. 09-2292) ("[E]mbedded within such a legislative fact are certain assumptions about human behavior and relationships" and "the presentation of evidence . . . is essential to the resolution of the issues").

26 *Perry*, *supra* note 1, at 932.

27 *See Motion to Strike Documents Referenced by Defendant-Intervenor in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment*, *Windsor*, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, ECF No. 66.

28 *Order*, *Windsor*, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, ECF No. 75.

29 *Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt.*, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2012); *Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.*, No. 3:10-cv-1750 (VLB), 2012 WL 3113883, *48–*49 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012).

30 *Pederson*, 2012 WL 3113883, at *18.

31 *Id.* at *24–*27.

TO CONSTRUCT A RIOT: INTERPRETATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2011 ENGLISH RIOTS

SIMONE ZHANG, HARVARD UNIVERSITY (2012)

ABSTRACT

Over the course of five days in August 2011, destructive riots spread throughout England. This paper examines the political consequences of these riots. It investigates how the riots opened up a space for political debate and action, exploring how actors in journalism, research, and policymaking interacted to construct the meaning of the public disruption and direct the government's response. It finds that a dominant frame emerged early in the debate, constructing the rioters and the community in opposition and establishing the riots as apolitical. In this context, politicians were able to define the riots in terms of two crises: a crisis of public order and a crisis of social breakdown. These early framing activities shaped subsequent research on the causes of the riots and enabled politicians to use the events to advance policy issues of interest to them. This paper suggests that governments do not respond mechanistically to public disruptions. Instead, governments participate actively in a meaning making process and the outcome of this process helps steer the course of political action.

On August 4, 2011, Mark Duggan, a twenty-nine-year-old black father of four, was shot and killed by police in Tottenham, north London. Duggan died near the Broadwater Farm Estate, the public housing development that was his childhood home. In 1985, when Duggan was a child, Broadwater Farm had gained notoriety as the site of riots fueled by resident antagonisms toward the police. After his death, Broadwater Farm served as a gathering spot for Duggan's neighbors and loved ones, who marched to the local police station demanding answers. The crowd outside the Tottenham police station waited for a satisfactory response for several hours before violence broke out, triggering a chain of events that led to images of England burning being transmitted around the globe.

Between August 6 and 10, 2011, England experienced its worst rioting in recent history. Violence outside the Tottenham police station grew into widespread unrest in London and across England in cities like Birmingham, Manchester, Nottingham, and Liverpool. The scale of violence and destruction was massive; the total cost of the riots was officially estimated to exceed 500 million pounds.¹ Five people lost their lives, hundreds were injured, and numerous homes and businesses were destroyed. More than 3,000 peo-

ple have been charged in connection to the riots, with over 2,000 found guilty.²

The riots necessitated a political response, but what form that response should take was not immediately obvious. To sell and pursue a convincing course of action, political actors needed to identify the nature of the event and offer a compelling diagnosis of its causes. Yet riots are ambiguous and defy easy explanation. Rioters do not hold up signs detailing their motives, nor do they risk arrest to speak up after the event. Spontaneous and lacking formal organization, riots are typically not represented by organizations that continue to exist after they end.

Because of this ambiguity, riots serve as strong cases to study how political actors behave when a space for contention opens, and how they can leverage events to secure desired objectives. The dynamics of early political discourse can constrain later debates and influence what policy issues become more salient after a major shock to the political system. Riots offer a chance to study how some voices are enabled to steer political conversation, while others are precluded from participating.

The 2011 English riots offer an especially favorable opportunity to pursue these goals because they were particularly tricky for political actors to inter-

pret. Literature on the political consequences of riots has been largely based on U.S. urban riots in the 1960s and 1970s. While not planned or guided by civil rights groups during the Civil Rights Movement, those riots were used rhetorically by those groups and considered a form of protest within the African-American community.³ The 2011 English riots, by contrast, did not appear connected to any larger social movement. They took place in poor and middle class neighborhoods alike, and drew participants of all races.⁴ The rioters did not constitute a defined group and no movement appropriated the riots after the fact.⁵ Consequently, there was no clear authority figure available to explain the events. The riots thus opened a wide space for debate, allowing people uninvolved with the action to construct their meaning and direct their impact.

Without an easily evident course of action, how do governments respond to instances of public unrest? Scholarship in the social sciences has been focused on identifying the causes of riots, but relatively little work has studied their political consequences.⁶ This paper builds on existing theories that posit causal relationships between riots and political outcomes. It begins to unpack the mechanisms behind these relationships by examining how the process of interpreting the riots mediated between the event and its consequences. To do this, it investigates the roles of politicians, the news media, and researchers in shaping the discourse on the riots, filling a gap in research on the 2011 English riots.⁷ This paper focuses on the five months between August and December 2011. The concepts of frames and framing processes guide the analysis of primary documents and interviews with actors in politics, policymaking, journalism, and research.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

In 2011, the United Kingdom was governed by a coalition between the Conservative Party, under Prime Minister David Cameron, and the Liberal Democrats, under Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg. The Labour Party formed the Official Opposition. Prior to the 2010 election, the Conservative Party had suffered three successive general election defeats to Labour. These losses led the Conservatives to realize they needed to move past Margaret Thatcher's legacy on conservatism.⁸ Seeking to shed their image as "the nasty party,"⁹ the Conservatives moved toward a new "compassionate conservatism," combining a commitment to a strong economy with an interest in social inclusion.

Two aspects of Cameron's vision for social policy reflect this shift. One aspect was the Broken Britain thesis, which claimed that British society was decaying, harming citizens and endangering young people. This view marked a step away from the individualistic explanations for bad behavior and the punitive stance traditionally associated with the Conservatives. It drew from the work of the Centre for Social Justice, a think tank that presented a narrative of a broken society involving multiple pathways to poverty: family breakdown, educational failure, worklessness and economic dependence, addictions, and indebtedness.¹⁰ A second central concept that undergirded Cameron's social policy was the "Big Society," the flagship policy idea of the 2010 Conservative Party Election Manifesto.¹¹ Big Society set out a vision for a smaller state supported by greater civil society engagement. Under Big Society, government would give power back to communities to make decisions and achieve shared goals. By promoting volunteerism and entrepreneurship, Big Society would help reinstate a culture of responsibility.

PERSPECTIVES LINKING RIOTS TO POLITICAL OUTCOMES

Literature connecting riots and political outcomes can be sorted into two main perspectives. The first perspective conceives of riots as a form of protest, with most work motivated by an interest in assessing how effective riots are for achieving the political aims of rioters. Scholars have typically assigned state responses to riots into one of two categories: conciliatory actions to appease rioters and repressive actions to quell unrest through coercion.¹² Imputing political goals to rioters, these scholars consider conciliatory action a success and repressive action a failure. The second perspective connecting riots to political consequences considers the role of disruption in generating a perceived crisis that opens a window for political actors to advance reforms.¹³

The Protest Perspective

Under the protest perspective, Cloward and Piven have advanced a theory identifying the conditions under which governments are more likely to respond to public disruption with conciliatory or repressive action.¹⁴ Cloward and Piven conceive of public disruption as the withdrawal of a contribution to critical institutions. For Cloward and Piven, riots are a last-

resort tactic for marginalized groups. Because marginalized groups are often excluded from mainstream institutions, the only contribution to society they can withhold is their “quiescence in civil life.”¹⁵

When choosing between courses of action to respond to public disruption, governments face different risks and costs. Employing solely repressive, coercive action is an option during periods of electoral stability, but it is difficult for governments to predict whether such action may agitate outside groups. Unless political actors can cast rioters as outsiders and mobilize popular hatred against them, political actors face uncertain repercussions for the use of force.

The other option available to governments is appeasing and disarming rioters. According to Cloward and Piven, this can occur in three main ways. First, governments may make symbolic or tangible concessions to alleviate grievances thought to motivate rioting. Second, governments may channel the energies of rioters into less disruptive forms of behavior, such as by coopting riot leaders into more established political processes. Third, governments may take action that appears to meet the moral demands of the collective action, but which intentionally undermines the public’s sympathy for the rioters. By giving themselves the appearance of being balanced and judicious, governments neutralize rioters by making them appear unreasonable, clearing the path for repressive action. Cloward and Piven argue that expanding government benefits can be a useful social control mechanism to neutralize riots and prevent rioting.¹⁶ A number of empirical studies support this social control thesis, finding that riots tend to prompt short-term expansions of government relief, including increased levels of welfare spending¹⁷ and the expansion of welfare rolls.¹⁸

Cloward and Piven’s theory suggests that the public’s perception of rioters influences the government’s choice to take either repressive or conciliatory action. At the same time, political actors can play a role in undermining rioters and manipulating perceptions of events to strategic ends. This paper explores more broadly how political actors construct riots and rioters to facilitate some forms of action and to block others.

Recognizing that riots can be subject to varying interpretations highlights a limitation in Cloward and Piven’s theory, as well as in the broader literature. This limitation stems from the assumption that riots necessarily embody a set of political goals and that it is

theoretically possible to determine what actions truly count as conciliatory. In the case of the 2011 English riots, the very existence of political grievances was a point of contention. The U.S. riots of the 1960s and 1970s may be considered a special case, in which certain actors were especially well positioned to lay claims to the existence and substance of political grievance, so much so that social scientists took their claims as assumptions in their analyses.

Arriving at a more generalizable understanding of how riots exert influence requires moving past the notion that riots embody political goals against which we can adjudicate their success. It requires first investigating how political actors arrive at an official account of the political motivations of rioters and how these actors determine if, indeed, such motivations exist at all. This is not to claim that all riots are apolitical, but rather to argue that the consequences of riots operate through the constructed meaning of riots.

The Crisis Perspective

A second perspective, advanced by John Keeler, links crises to political impact through his concept of “windows for reform.”¹⁹ Keeler defines a crisis as “a situation of large-scale public dissatisfaction or even fear stemming from wide-ranging economic problems and/or an unusual degree of social unrest and/or threats to national security.”²⁰ He suggests that windows may open as electoral mandates interact with crisis situations. He identifies three causal mechanisms through which crises can promote political change. Through the crisis-mandate mechanism, a crisis can undermine the incumbent political regime and empower a new government to press for reform. Through the urgency mechanism, government officials become less cautious or concerned about procedure, as there is a perceived need to act quickly to prevent the crisis from escalating. Through the fear mechanism, states are compelled to immediate action by the endangerment of life and property.

This paper contributes to Keeler’s crisis perspective by examining how the interpretive process shapes what type of crisis riots are said to represent. Additionally, it explores how politicians contribute to the fear and urgency mechanisms as they debate the meaning of the riots. It demonstrates how the construction of the riots and rioters by politicians, the news media, and researchers built a crisis of public order and a crisis of social breakdown, leading to specific policy prescriptions.

FRAMES AND FRAMING PROCESSES

This study's analytical approach is centered on the concept of a frame. Frames are "schemata of interpretation" that allow people to "locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large."²¹ Frames are the lenses we use to see the world, helping to organize experience and guide action.²² Because frames filter what we see, they contain "little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters."²³ They can thus "promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation."²⁴ The process of framing refers to the active, dynamic processes of meaning construction.²⁵ The product of framing is a collective action frame, which is "intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists."²⁶

The collective action framing literature has focused on framing from the perspective of social movement organizations. In the case of the 2011 English riots, there was no movement representing the rioters to strategically generate frames for understanding the riots. Instead, external actors articulated frames. The theoretical concepts advanced in the literature, however, remain relevant when adapted to this case. One central difference is that political actors responding to the riots may advance competing frames that aim to block or deflect politically disadvantageous action. Thus, a frame may be articulated to maintain the status quo rather than promote social change.

Snow and Benford discuss three "core framing tasks" for collective action frames: diagnostic framing (identifying the problem and attributing responsibility for it), prognostic framing (articulating a solution to the problem), and motivational framing (providing a call to arms for collective action).²⁷ In response to riots, these tasks may be complicated if we consider, for example, the potential interest of groups to neutralize the event if it threatens to undermine their power or harm their electoral chances. As such, motivational framing need not necessarily be a desired task for all frames.

Social movement scholars have further identified two interacting factors that influence a frame's mobilizing potency: the credibility of the frame and its relative salience.²⁸ A frame is credible to the extent that empirical evidence is accepted as "true," it is internally consistent, and its articulators are perceived as

credible sources.²⁹ Its salience, on the other hand, is influenced by the congruence between the frame and its targets' experiences, the centrality of the features of the frame to its targets' lives, and the frame's narrative fidelity with the prevailing cultural narrative.

This paper considers the roles of actors in news media, research, politics, and policy-making in the debate on what the riots represented and how best to respond to them. The media can play a role in producing and disseminating frames through its reporting and editorial decisions. It mediates political messaging and legitimizes asymmetrical power relations by establishing elite views as commonsensical views.³⁰ At the same time, it may constrain discourse by shaping public opinion. Researchers can also influence the framing of events, as their claims to knowledge and expertise are bolstered by their professional status, amplifying their voices.³¹

All actors are embedded in fields with rules that structure what frames they are more likely to produce and how likely those frames are to be disseminated.³² These fields, however, overlap. News publications and think tanks in England, for example, often have institutional ties to particular politicians or parties. These ties may shape how much these bodies communicate with the government and how likely politicians are to accept or make use of their work.

Drawing on the concept of frames, this paper addresses the following questions:

- 1) What frames were advanced to explain the riots? Who produced them, how were they disseminated, and how did they interact with each other? Did a dominant discourse emerge?
- 2) Did early framing activities constrain subsequent steps in the interpretive process? How did they influence the dynamics of research into the riots? How did new information about the riots interact with existing accounts?
- 3) Did the framing of the riots contribute to defining a crisis or multiple crises? How did it structure political action?

DATA AND METHODS

I analyzed primary documents and conducted twelve interviews with actors in politics, journalism, and research. Texts examined include a sample of 325 newspaper articles on the riots published in seven of the most widely circulated national newspapers in Britain between August 6 and December 31, 2011. I

also examined three major research reports published on the riots: *Reading the Riots* by The Guardian and the London School of Economics, *The August Riots in England* by the National Centre for Social Research (commissioned by the Cabinet Office), and *5 Days in August* by the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel, a five-member panel appointed by the government. To study the political rhetoric of the government's response, I also analyzed House of Commons debates conducted between August and December of 2011, along with government reports cited or presented in Parliament. As follow-up, I analyzed the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel's final report and the government's official response to the panel's policy recommendations. Analyses proceeded inductively, following the approach for grounded theory.³³ I paid particular attention to who was enabled to speak, what they said, and how others responded to the frames they articulated.

EARLY FRAMINGS

Duggan's death, the first domino to fall in the 2011 English riots, played a central role in the news media's initial framing of the riots. In the first days of the disorder, rioting in Tottenham was framed as an expression of the community's frustration with the police. The news media linked the peaceful march on the Tottenham police station to the subsequent violence. News reports emphasized that many of the rioters targeted the police and contextualized the events in historical examples of riots fuelled by tensions with the police. Nods to the 1985 riots at Broadwater Farm, commonly understood as a signifier of strain between the predominantly white police force and the black youth in the area at the time, suggested that historically rooted issues in community-police relations may help explain the rioting.

News reports also furthered the view that the riots represented a community's fury overflowing into violence through quotations attributed to community members and Duggan's family. In *The Sunday Times*, a friend of Duggan is quoted saying, "There's hostility here, there might even be an uprising, you don't know. Mark held Broadwater Farm together."³⁴ On the same day, *The Guardian* reported that community leaders with knowledge of Tottenham had warned police that there would be "significant' community reaction to Duggan's death," and that the protest "could get out of control."³⁵ Both *The Mirror* and *The Sun* also

cite Duggan's brother: "I know people are frustrated. They are angry at the moment, but I would say please try and hold it down."³⁶ Although Duggan's brother seeks to distance the family from the violence, these articles establish the riots as an unauthorized extension of the earlier protest and establish Duggan's family members as rightful authorities on the events.

However, concern about Duggan quickly eroded. In the newspaper sample for this study, Duggan's death is most discussed between August 7 and August 9. Duggan's death was cited in 80 percent of articles published on August 7, 60 percent of articles on August 8, and 41 percent of articles on August 9. But early interest declined sharply. By the tenth and eleventh, that figure dropped to 15 percent and 20 percent respectively and never rose above 6 percent in the months that followed. By the end, articles typically included only a single sentence identifying Duggan's death as the riots' initial spark.

Declining interest in Duggan's death was accompanied by a pivotal shift in how newspapers and politicians framed the relationship between the rioters and the community. Whereas the community was initially framed as an aggrieved party lashing out in violence, it was later extricated from the rioters and presented as the "peaceful majority"³⁷ of "innocent local residents."³⁸ Grievances related to Duggan's death were relegated to "anger felt by some."³⁹ The Labour MP for Tottenham, David Lammy, was particularly influential in disseminating this view. Lammy penned editorials in *The Guardian*⁴⁰ and *The Times*⁴¹ and was widely quoted declaring that the violence was not perpetrated on behalf of the community but rather against it—that it had "ripped the heart out" of the community. In a statement praised in *The Daily Telegraph*, Lammy said:

The vast majority of people in Tottenham reject what happened here.... This is nothing like the sorts of scenes we saw in Tottenham 25 years ago. Then, there was a particular relationship with the police. This is an attack on ordinary people, shopkeepers, women, children....⁴²

In this statement, Lammy disassociates the riots from historical examples of disorder caused by grievances with the police. He attributes the riots to people outside of the true Tottenham community and identifies members of the community as victims.

Constructing a dichotomy between the community and the rioters allowed politicians and the news media to also construct a dichotomy between the pro-

test and the violence. These moves allowed those who marched on the police station to still be considered part of the community while the rioters were cast out and isolated as a distinct Other.⁴³

RIOTERS AND THE COMMUNITY

Rioters were portrayed with some diversity across different news sources and over time. They were initially depicted as mobs of masked and hooded young men. The Guardian was atypical among newspapers for providing detailed and personal descriptions of rioters. It reported things rioters said, including insults rioters yelled at the police. It also described rioters' actions. In some cases, Guardian writers attributed motivations to rioters' seemingly self-interested actions, maintaining that "early rioting was not without some social symbolism."⁴⁴

The bulk of later coverage, however, particularly from conservative news outlets, generally negated the possibility that the rioters could be politically aggrieved community members. Instead, the coverage adopted multiple approaches to portray rioters as apolitical, self-interested aggressors. First, newspapers selected anecdotes that suggested rioters were cavalier and brazen in their illegal actions. Frequently cited examples include rioters taking time to carefully pick what to steal and pretending to help others while robbing them. Second, newspapers depicted rioters as indiscriminately violent, offering examples of unwarranted violence against innocent and unlikely targets. Stressing the randomness of the rioters' actions, such examples suggested that rioters threatened all. Third, newspapers cast rioters as inscrutable, describing rioters harming others without securing any clear personal gains. One often cited example was the theft of an elderly barber's old teakettle. Victims of the rioters' actions were often called on to diagnose the rioters' motivations. Consistently, victims claimed that rioters were motivated by simple criminality. Fourth, newspapers suggested rioters were driven by material gain. Descriptions focused on details about the types of stores looted, the brands of the clothing stolen, and the electronics carted off.

Intermingled throughout news pieces and editorials was a concern with gangs, which seemed to be taken for granted as the groups responsible for the violence. Some editorials lamented that the riots displayed the perniciousness of gangs, as though it were self-evident that gangs caused the rioting. Rioters were

most frequently referred to, in order from greatest to least frequency, as looters, thugs, yobs, hooligans, and anarchists. Rioters were also frequently identified as youth. News articles often claimed that gangs controlled the majority of these youth involved.

While rioters were framed as hostile, alien aggressors motivated by greed and opportunism, the community members came to be framed as victims and defenders of society. As victims, community members bore the heavy costs of the riots. They witnessed the rioters destroying the products of their community's past accomplishments and damaging their community's future prospects. Throughout the newspaper coverage pervades a sense of injustice. The innocent community, framed to stand in direct contrast to the guilty rioters, did not deserve to suffer the costs. This sense of injustice is heightened in news accounts that highlight individual sympathetic victims. Unlike the rioters, who were described as a mob, community members were distinguished as distinct human beings with histories, families, and occupations. Featured individuals often included small business owners and immigrant families with narratives about businesses and homes that rioters destroyed overnight.

Community members were framed as defenders of their neighborhoods and, more broadly, of British society in three ways. First, newspapers described community members physically defending community property from attack. Protecting hospitals and schools, these community members were portrayed as heroic crusaders fending off destructive invaders. Second, newspapers described community members stepping up to help maintain public order by creating websites "to catch a looter" and reporting suspected rioters.

Third, post-riot coverage highlighted community-initiated cleanup efforts. Descriptions of these efforts featured militaristic imagery, including the "mobilization" of volunteers "armed with brooms."⁴⁵ Cleanup events were infused with meaning on two levels. On one level, cleanup events constituted literally taking the streets back from the rioters. On another level, cleanup events reclaimed the community spiritually and symbolically. They reassembled the community and reasserted the true meaning of community. According to editorial writers and politicians, cleanup events also reclaimed British identity.⁴⁶ The model citizens who participated in the cleanup events were said to constitute the decisive majority of British

society, while the rioters were said to constitute only a small minority. Only the actions of the rule-abiding, community-minded majority accurately exemplified the British spirit.

EMERGENCY PARLIAMENTARY SESSION

David Cameron called an emergency session of Parliament on August 11, 2011, initiating the first major structured political debate on the meaning, causes, and implications of the riots. The debate served as an important discursive moment in which influential elected officials laid claims to appropriate interpretations of the riots. In the debate, politicians reinforced existing frames advanced in the media. The debate elucidated discursive rules that stipulated what terms could not be applied to the riots and offered politicians tools for gaining legitimacy in the debate.

The debate demonstrated how much Duggan's death had been marginalized and reinforced the view that Duggan's death could not explain the riots. Duggan's sidelining took with it concerns over relations between communities and the police. While the media identified the issue early on as a possible cause of the riots, politicians in Parliament dismissed it. In his opening statement, the prime minister stated:

It is completely wrong to say there is any justifiable causal link [between the demonstrations and the actions of 'opportunistic thugs in gangs']. It is simply preposterous for anyone to suggest that people looting in Tottenham at the weekend, still less three days later in Salford, were in any way doing so because of the death of Mark Duggan. Young people stealing flat-screen televisions and burning shops—that was not about politics or protest, it was about theft.⁴⁷

Cameron appealed to common sense by using the term "simply preposterous" and established his account as factually indisputable. He reinforced that the riots were apolitical three more times in the debate, stating, "Of course one should not jump to conclusions.... This was not political protest, or a riot about protest or politics — it was common garden thieving, robbing, and looting, and we do not need an inquiry to tell us that."⁴⁸ The prime minister maintained that the riots represent "criminality, pure and simple."⁴⁹

The debate is constrained against framing the riots in terms of political grievance. As MPs raised competing explanations for the riots, no one referred to the riots as protest. The term "protest" used in reference to anything other than the initial demonstration

was delegitimized by the prime minister's remarks, which from the outset limited what could be considered reasonable and acceptable. This injunction was reinforced by other MPs, most strongly by Conservatives but also by members of the other two major parties.

Inextricably linked with this injunction was the assertion that participating in the riots was a criminal act. This assertion implicated several further ideas that served as tools in discursive practice for political actors to demonstrate literacy in the mainstream discourse. Because the actions consisted of criminality, those who performed them were criminals. Being a criminal is then stated to be a matter of choice. This element of choice is of paramount importance because it means that the actions are a matter of individual initiative and the weight of blame should accordingly be placed on the individual. It then follows that the appropriate institution to which the rioters should be diverted is the criminal justice system. Fragments of this reasoning were reproduced as refrains throughout the debate, most notably in repeated statements that there could be no excuses for the rioters' actions.

REACHING FOR CAUSES, DEFINING CRISES

During the debate, politicians aiming to pinpoint the causes of the riots defined what crises the riots represented. Politicians established two crises: one of public order and one of social breakdown. The former was mapped onto issues with police tactics and the latter was mapped onto issues with gangs.

Crisis of Public Order

In the debate, politicians were most urgently concerned about preventing rioting in the immediate future. It was said that the riots represented and were caused by a public order crisis, a breakdown in respect for the law and in the law's ability to prevent crime.

While politicians argued that courts would need to play an important role in making it clear that crime does not pay, they most frequently raised concerns about policing. Politicians criticized the police for allowing the streets to descend into lawlessness, having diagnosed the crisis of public order as a policing problem. Politicians questioned police tactics and powers and cited concerns about police numbers and resources.

Notably missing from the debate was substantive engagement with questions on relations between the police and communities. The interest in policing was

largely limited to concerns about the police's ability to maintain order, with the implicit assumption that had policing been more effective during the disorder, the riots would never have grown. There was no real interest in how police operations prior to the riots may have created background conditions that fuelled the riots.

Crisis of Social Breakdown

In trying to explain what motivated individuals to riot, politicians performed a careful balancing act of affirming their view that the riots represented criminality while grasping at the social context that promoted the violence. The focus on criminality limited the scope of the debate on social context. It centered the conversation on trying to understand how society could have allowed so many people to become criminals. Politicians repeatedly emphasized that social conditions did not motivate rioters to consciously react in protest. They argued that rioters were instead motivated by greed, materialism, and criminality. Society was too permissive, eroding personal responsibility.

Echoing the Broken Britain thesis, David Cameron, Theresa May, and several MPs stated that the riots represented a crisis of social breakdown, that a broad swath of British society was sick. As Theresa May stated:

No one doubts that the violence that we have seen over the past five days is a symptom of something very deeply wrong with our society. Children celebrated as they smashed their way into shops. Men in sports cars arrived at stores to steal goods. Women tried on trainers before they stole them. A teaching assistant was caught looting. Thugs pretended to help an injured young man but robbed him. They are shocking images, but they are in fact symbols of a deeper malaise in our society.⁵⁰

Politicians identified a variety of factors that may have contributed to a broad crisis of social breakdown, including a lack of parental responsibility, unemployment, and failures in the education system. Yet all these factors were mapped onto one specific set of people: gangs. Conservatives discussed gangs most frequently, though Labour MPs, including Opposition Leader Ed Miliband, also agreed that "at the heart of all the violence [sat] the issue of the street gangs."⁵¹ In the debate, politicians mapped the broad social breakdown crisis onto gangs, a defined, narrow segment of society commonly associated with crime.

ARTICULATING AND ENFORCING RULES

Public critiques of media and political figures that strayed too far from the accepted narrative of the riots served to articulate and enforce discursive rules. An example was made of the Labour-affiliated former mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, when he published a brief statement opining on the causes behind the riots early on in the debate. Newspapers and politicians condensed his argument and declared that Livingstone blamed the events on government spending cuts.⁵² Conservative papers blasted Livingstone for trying to score points in the upcoming mayoral race, wrongfully making excuses, and shifting the blame away from the rioters. Livingstone's statement was used as a foil for favored interpretations that highlighted the criminality of the rioters.

The injunction against using the term "protest" was reinforced by articles criticizing the BBC. The Daily Telegraph printed a news piece that questioned the "political correctness" of "senior BBC presenters and reporters on the ground" who "continually [referred] to the yobs rioting across London as 'protesters.'"⁵³ The Sun also published an article which paraphrased the mayor of London as "blasting" the BBC and included the quote: "To call them protesters is insulting to people who have a legitimate political protest. The fundamental motive was crime."⁵⁴ These articles broadly publicized infractions and raised the stakes for misspeaking.

Ultimately, the left also appeared to accept the norm that the riots could not be interpreted as protest. The BBC apologized publicly for referring to rioters as protesters. This apology was covered not only by The Telegraph but also the left-leaning Guardian, which appeared to support the BBC's apology as the right thing to do.⁵⁵ Using the term protest was thus broadly accepted as prohibited practice.

CONTENTION IN RESEARCH

In the five months following the riots, three major research projects were launched to understand the nature and causes of the riots. These projects served as important opportunities to generate new frames and enhance the credibility of existing frames. Early constructions of the rioters and the community shaped the dynamics of this knowledge production activity following the riots. The early delegitimization of the rioters and elevation of the community conditioned the design, findings, and impact of these projects by

shaping who was considered a legitimate voice. Only strategically positioned actors could overcome these constraints and expand the bounds of conversation in meaningful, though limited ways.

Research Backdrop and Research Design

Interviews with individuals involved in each of the projects highlighted that a project's research design influenced what kind of research findings emerged as most salient. Research design decisions were not sterile exercises in determining the most scientifically rigorous way to arrive at the truth. Rather, they embodied assumptions about what voices should be privileged over others. They constituted decisions as to whose version of the truth should be taken as the authoritative account.

The Riots, Victims and Communities Panel's creation was a compromise between the three main political parties. Labour was keen on a review, but the Conservatives were not. The Conservatives were compelled to agree to a cross-party review because "it would be more embarrassing to have a review they couldn't control ... they'd rather be in the tent than outside the tent."⁵⁶ Advisers within each of the parties mapped out the study's research questions and design. The project was mandated to gather a broad range of perspectives, though with a focus on listening to the community.

The heavier weighting afforded to the views of community members influenced the results published in the report. According to an adviser to the panel, community members were more likely to offer short-term explanations for the riots (that rioters wanted to steal and saw an opportunity to do so, that some were criminals in the past and had no real reservations about exploiting the chance), while the rioters expressed longer-term reservations ("antipathy to place, a sense of hopelessness, no respect").⁵⁷ Asked why he felt this difference existed, the adviser expressed skepticism about the reliability of rioters. He said that rioters were more likely to make up justifications because saying they stole for personal gain would be frowned upon. The panel accordingly subjected the rioters' responses to greater scrutiny. Claims from rioters that deviated from the explanation that they were criminals motivated by material self-interest were automatically deemed suspect against the dominant narrative.

The panel received some publicity prior to the publication of *Five Days* in August, though much of

the publicity was negative. An editorial published in *The Guardian* in October suggested that "if the panel is just a sounding board it should not pretend to be more than that and come clean about its inability to effect change."⁵⁸ Another editorial, published in *The Telegraph*, echoed the sentiment that the panel was politically impotent.⁵⁹ The government inquiry is described as "in progress—not that anyone has noticed" and "a pretty low-quality investigation that is expected to add nothing to our general understanding."

Yet, the very fact that the panel received attention at all indicates that it was on the political radar. The National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) study, by contrast, was not discussed in any of the news articles in the sample. Established following a speech by Nick Clegg during a Liberal Democrat conference, the goal of the project was to understand the motivations and the role of young people.⁶⁰ While the Cabinet Office was officially the body that commissioned the study, it was largely the Liberal Democrats who pushed it through. Given such a tie to the government, how widely the project's findings were disseminated was more directly contingent on whether politicians wanted to make them public.

The *Guardian*-LSE project was a collaboration led by Paul Lewis, a journalist at *The Guardian*, and Tim Newburn, Head of the Social Policy Department at the London School of Economics. This collaboration was well positioned from the start to be highly visible. With institutional ties to a major news publication, the project had a readymade dissemination platform. Ties to a major, well-respected research institution further enhanced the project's credibility. The project received considerable publicity from the start. *The Guardian* published more articles on the riots than any other publication, situating itself as a central institution through which debate about the riots would filter.

The first phase of the *Guardian*-LSE project consisted of interviews with rioters, a decision consciously made against the grain of the dominant understanding of who should be allowed to speak on the riots. An important member of the project team argued that gathering the perspectives of rioters is essential for understanding the riots. From its inception, *The Guardian*-LSE sought an alternative to the dominant frames and positioned itself to generate new frames for understanding the rioters—ones that would place the rioters themselves at the center.

WHAT FRAMES DID THE REPORTS ADVANCE?

The Guardian-LSE Project

The Guardian-LSE project frames poor relations between the community and the police in high poverty areas as a principal cause of the riots. While other factors like opportunism and materialism played a role, the riots were, at the core, an expression of pent-up tensions in neglected communities. This frame stands in direct opposition to the dominant account that suggests that “what began as a protest against the police shooting of Mark Duggan was stripped of political meaning before it spread across the country, fuelled by ‘mindless’ and ‘copycat’ opportunists.”⁶¹

Policing issues are presented as an overarching theme in the interviews. Rioters expressed their displeasure with the police, particularly on the subject of stop-and-search, a power that police have to stop individuals they deem suspicious and search them for illegal goods. They partially attributed their actions to their attitudes toward the police. In the section on gangs, for example, the report states that “a sense of a common enemy, a common cause”⁶² caused rival gangs to cooperate against the police.

The section in the report on inequality emphasizes the existence of political grievance most strongly, opening with the quote: “I still to this day don’t class it as a riot...I think it was a protest.”⁶³ The report discusses how rioters felt alienated from the rest of society, faced limited job opportunities, and felt invisible. Even in the section on opportunism and looting, the report connects the rioters’ actions to larger political motivations; rioters were “reacting to a society fuelled by greed” and “resenting being excluded from a consumerist world.”⁶⁴ Rioting was a logical, if condemned, form of political action.

The report largely considers the speech of rioters to be reliable and authoritative. Consider the closing of the section on policing:

The mayhem saw rioters take control back, in their own minds, from the clutches of the police—who were seen as a corrupting influence in the community. This is not to justify the riots but in part explains why, for many rioters, they are not troubled by the moral implications of what occurred.⁶⁵

This quotation signals the acceptance of discursive norms, as it anticipates potential dismissals of this finding on the grounds that it provides justification for the rioters’ actions.

The report synthesizes and evaluates the viewpoints gleaned from the interviews. An extra layer

of interpretation in the report becomes noticeable in moments of speculative language, for example: “Memories of black people in Tottenham whose deaths have been linked to police hands don’t fade easily—perhaps making Duggan’s death even more potent.”⁶⁶ The report’s authors are positioned as an authoritative, centralizing voice in relation to the rioters. The authors draw high-level connections that the respondents did not make themselves. While the project draws the rioters’ views into the public discourse, it still ultimately controls how they are released to the public.

The NatCen Report

The NatCen report suggests many complex interacting factors led youth to riot. NatCen offers a typology of involvement, sorting participants into one of four categories: watchers, rioters, looters, and the non-involved. Of particular interest are the sub-categories included under rioters: protesters, retaliators, and thrill seekers. Protesters are described as those who got involved in the riots because of “specific issues or events, in particular the police handling of the Mark Duggan case in Tottenham.”⁶⁷ Retaliators were those who wanted to get back at the police for longer-term grievances, seeing the riots as an opportunity to “get one over [on]” the police. The report suggests grievances against the police are broadly shared, stating:

The view that some young people were more likely to get involved in the riots because of previous negative experiences with the police was clearly expressed across the sample. There were few positive comments about the police in general, even from young people who were not involved in the riots.⁶⁸

The report points to the existence of political motivations, but establishes these motivations as one among many sets of possible motivations.

The NatCen report anticipates potential challenges to its findings rooted in the delegitimization of the rioters. In one section, it acknowledges that “[it] may well be suggested that ‘blaming the power of the group’ is a convenient post-hoc rationalization, tailored to put a socially desirable spin on what were antisocial events.”⁶⁹ But the report offers three points to counter such a reading: the prison interviewees were quick to acknowledge they had committed a crime, they were comfortable disclosing previous convictions, and they offered complex explanations that also included motivations based on individual material gain. In this example, the report engages with the pre-

vailing discourse and proactively defends the honesty of interviewees' responses against unfair criticism.

Riots, Communities and Victims Panel

The Riots, Communities and Victims Panel report is devoted to synthesizing the views of the community members, which are presented as facts that should inform policy. *Five Days in August* clearly states the rioters' motivations: "Individuals—including those who rioted—highlighted a range of motivations, from immediate gratification of a free pair of trainers, to a desire to attack society."⁷⁰ It notes that "some [community members] felt a number of people might have been influenced by the wish to protest" the police handling of Mark Duggan's death or stop-and-search practices.⁷¹ But the report devotes merely a page to stop-and-search procedures and does not connect stop-and-search to the riots. It opens only a limited door to political grievance, setting it aside and dismissing it as analytically distinct from the rest of the rioting.

Rioters are depoliticized in the participant typology presented in the report. They are categorized as organized criminals, violent aggressors, late night shoppers, opportunists, and spectators. Violent aggressors are described as those "responsible for serious offences against the police and for cases of arson, setting light both to cars and residential premises."⁷² In this typology, actions targeting the police are grouped together with arson. Unlike the NatCen typology, there is no space for political motivation.

According to the report, underlying factors that explain why so many people "abused society's moral and legal codes when the opportunity arose"⁷³ include a lack of hopes and dreams, low personal resilience, poor parenting, consumerism, repeat offending, and perceptions of community policing. Of particular note is personal resilience, which is defined as being ambitious, optimistic, and self-sufficient in the face of hardship. The report cites examples of young people who remain positive despite limited opportunities while their peers do not. This idea offers an important conceptual tool to emphasize that social context is not deterministic, shifting the weight of responsibility back to individuals.

Five Days in August explores several subjects not covered in other reports. These subjects reinforce the construction of the community as victim and defender. The report includes sections on community

cleanup efforts and the impact of the riots on communities. Documenting the victimization of the community, case studies of community members offer the same narratives as those featured in newspapers. The construction of the community as a defender emerges clearly in discussions of community cleanup efforts. It is stated that "[following] the riots, communities mobilized to undo what the rioters had done. Horror at what had happened motivated people to demonstrate shared values and show that the rioters' actions were not in their names."⁷⁴ The community's cleanup activity is framed as a purposive, symbolic act to draw a boundary between the community and the rioters. The community's actions testify to the "true" community's moral superiority.

RECEPTION TO RESEARCH

The three reports were published within weeks of each other. The NatCen report was released on November 2, 2011, followed by *Five Days in August* on November 28, 2011, and *Reading the Riots* on December 5, 2011. The NatCen report did not gain traction in the media; not a single newspaper piece in the sample referenced it and interviews confirmed that it did not attract substantial public attention.

The press, by contrast, picked up *Five Days in August* and *Reading the Riots*. Newspapers adopted two approaches for reporting the research findings. One approach was to accept the research by harmonizing it with prevailing accounts of the riots. The panel's research was subjected to this first approach. The *Daily Telegraph* and *The Daily Mail* supported the panel and presented its findings as definitive and trustworthy.⁷⁵ Its findings were reduced to the narrative that the riots were caused by greed and spread when people saw that the police were ineffective at containing the disorder. A *Daily Telegraph* piece, "New religion' of greed blamed for rioting," for example, opened with the statement: "A culture of greed exacerbated by police inaction was to blame for the summer's riots, an official report has found."⁷⁶ The Guardian-LSE research was also subjected to this approach by *The Daily Mirror*, which claimed that the findings revealed that "greed and a desire to exploit a 'once in a lifetime' chance to steal were key motives behind the summer riots."⁷⁷ This simplified frame largely omits each report's discussion of community-police relations.

A second approach newspapers adopted was to reject the research by attacking its credibility. This

tactic was used repeatedly against Reading the Riots. The Daily Mail attacked the project's methodology and argued that the project only sought to shift blame away from the rioters. Its critiques demonstrated the ways in which the project violated discursive norms. Particularly significant among the newspaper's output was a scathing piece entitled "Apologists for the Mob"⁷⁸ that attacked the credibility of both the research subjects and the researchers. It sarcastically notes that the report declares the rioters victims whose "grievances deserve to be heard." It also turned to the Riots, Community and Victims Panel's research, suggesting that its finding that the riots were driven by greed was "surely what anyone—without a political agenda—already knew." The piece further undercut the impartiality of the researchers, stating that the project was "little more than Left-wing claptrap dressed up as serious academic research." The article did concede that the police were not blameless in the riots but limited this blame to their inability to contain riots.

The Guardian-LSE project was unique, however, in that it had considerable control over how its findings were disseminated. The Guardian was able to publish a series of articles capturing different dimensions of the project's findings, an advantage that allowed the project to make a major media splash. The Guardian clearly established the project's overarching message on its own terms, printing a front-page article that opens with "Widespread anger and frustration at the way police engage with communities was a significant cause of the summer riots in every major city where disorder took place, the biggest study into their cause has found."⁷⁹ The Guardian and LSE also organized a conference to discuss the report's findings. The event was well attended by policymakers and researchers. Speakers included Ed Miliband, the leader of the Labour Party; Theresa May; Lynne Owens, deputy commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service; and Louise Casey, the person appointed to lead the government's response to the riots. This list of attendees was a testament to the report's influence and visibility. Although some attendees, notably Theresa May, criticized the report at the conference, the conference nonetheless offered a venue to disseminate the project's findings to influential actors.

DIRECTING POLITICAL ACTION

The government's initial public response to the riots came in two parts: actions to address the public

order crisis and actions to address the social breakdown crisis. During the emergency session of Parliament, David Cameron announced that he had asked his Cabinet to devise an inter-ministry plan to tackle gang culture. Complementing this effort, he announced that he had invited William Bratton, a former chief of police of the Los Angeles Police Department, to serve as an adviser on gangs. Theresa May further announced that the Home Affairs Committee would pursue a report on what could be learned from the policing of the riots. These reviews limited the conversation early on about appropriate solutions to prevent future rioting to two specific policy domains: policing and gangs.

Nearly two years after the riots, in July 2013, the Department of Communities and Local Government issued an official government response to the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel's final report, *After the Riots*, which built off *Five Days* in August and offered policy recommendations. In this document, the government presents a sweeping survey of policy challenges and policy actions that it suggests captures the breadth of issues pertinent to the riots. The government's authoritative case for how it appropriately and effectively responded to the riots two years out is broad, but its underlying logic is deeply rooted in the terms of debate established in the first months after the riots.

The following sections trace important political actions to address the public order and social breakdown crises taken in the first five months following the riots and connect these actions to the parameters of the government's final official response to the riots.

Political Action on the Social Breakdown Crisis

Gangs were positioned at the center of the government's initial efforts to address the social breakdown crisis. In the House of Commons, gangs appeared repeatedly on the agenda in the fall of 2011. The attention directed toward gangs was initially clearly framed as the government's strategy to prevent future rioting. However, the government had to change course and readjust its framing of the issue when the Home Office released statistical evidence that suggested that gangs did not play a major role in the riots.⁸⁰ By mid-September, there was already public recognition of this discrepancy, with Theresa May conceding that the role of gangs was "not as high as people first thought."⁸¹ The review on gangs was nonetheless completed, pub-

lished, and presented before Parliament on November 1, 2011.

The review's final report, "Ending Gang and Youth Violence," reflects a significant shift in the way the government framed the connection between the riots and political action tackling gangs. It takes two approaches to resolving the awkwardness of directing energy toward gang-related issues when statistics suggest that few rioters were involved in gangs. First, it only states that the riots brought the issue of gangs to light. It does not claim that tackling gangs would prevent future riots. The executive summary, for example, states, "[The] disorder in August was not caused solely by gangs but the violence we saw on our streets revealed all too vividly the problems that sometimes lie below the surface and out of sight."⁸² Second, the report emphasizes the high costs that gangs impose to legitimate its focus on them. The foreword, for example, states, "The proportion of rioters known to be gang involved may be low...but we must not let that distract us from the disproportionate and devastating impact they have on some of our most deprived communities."⁸³

Echoing the Broken Britain thesis, the report suggests that gangs are a symptom of the emergence of troubled youth and "troubled families." The social breakdown crisis, graphed onto a minority group of troubled youth disengaged from broader society, can only be addressed by coordinating policy efforts to target these populations in the same way one would target a public health outbreak. Accordingly, policy prescriptions are designed to zap the source of society's sickness—members of gangs and "120,000 troubled families" with youth.⁸⁴

Gangs and troubled families with youth were the targets of some of the most significant government action in the early months following the riots. The Troubled Families Team, headed by Louise Casey, was created to turn around the "120,000 most troubled families" discussed in the report.⁸⁵ As part of this work, David Cameron announced on December 15, 2011 that the government would establish a network of "troubleshooters." These troubleshooters would be assigned to support specific families and would serve as a centralizing mechanism for state services. The Troubled Families Team was given a budget of £448m over four years to implement the program.⁸⁶

Two years later, in the government's statement in response to the riots, the government presented

a wide-ranging suite of social policy measures it associates with preventing and treating the criminality in young people that they claim caused the riots. The statement presents many of these measures as part of broader initiatives that may contribute to preventing riots in the future, rather than as specific actions triggered in response to the riots. These measures feature policy solutions to improve parenting, including pilots to give parents vouchers for parenting classes and efforts to expand home visiting programs for young mothers.⁸⁷ Additional measures discussed include efforts to strengthen early childhood education, improve instruction in schools, expand teacher authority to discipline students, and direct additional resources to disadvantaged students. Arguing that unemployment can draw young people toward criminality, the document also points to efforts to better support young people through existing job centers and to boost urban economic development. These measures spanning policy domains and government agencies are all centrally concerned with addressing the early diagnosis that the riots were caused by a small subsection of society—troubled youth and the families that produce them—at the heart of the social breakdown crisis.

Political Action on the Public Order Crisis

Early political responses to the public order crisis focused on using the criminal justice system to deter future rioters and on improving the police's capacity to contain disorder. Concerns about strengthening the strategic operations of the police in cases of disorder continued to outweigh concerns about community-police relations. Concerns about appropriately punishing perpetrators prompted immediate punitive action: large rounds of arrests; prison sentences quadruple the normally expected lengths for similar offences; raids of suspected rioters' homes; relaxed restrictions on publicly disclosing the names and addresses of young offenders; and support for local authorities to evict households suspected of participating in the riots from subsidized housing.⁸⁸

Two reviews explicitly propelled forward the debate on addressing the public order crisis: one by the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee and the other by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). Reports from both reviews rearticulate preexisting frames in line with the dual crises the government defined. They focus on police tactics to contain disorder:

what the police can do to control or disperse rioting crowds. Long-term policing concerns, like those articulated in *Reading the Riots*, go largely unaddressed. Both reports minimize the importance of Duggan's death; the Home Affairs Committee stipulates that Duggan's death is only relevant to events in Tottenham and the MPS discusses the fallout surrounding Duggan's death as an exceptional event of bureaucratic mishandling, not as a tipping point in negative relations with the community. Following the discursive norm against considering the riots a protest, the Home Affairs Committee report separates Duggan from the causal narrative of the riots. It reaffirms the notion that the riots were apolitical, stressing that "there does not seem to be any clear narrative, nor a clear element of protest or clear political objectives."⁸⁹ While both reports acknowledge concerns about police-community relations, neither explores this subject in depth. The MPS report conceives of community engagement narrowly as engaging the community to prevent potentially controversial events from escalating and partnering with communities to contain rioting once it is underway.

While these reviews reinforced the view that a public order crisis lay at the heart of the riots, they did not completely exclude the possibility of other underlying causes. In an important development, Theresa May made a low-key announcement at the *Reading the Riots* conference. Despite criticizing *The Guardian-LSE* research, she announced the Home Office would launch a review of stop-and-search procedures. This announcement represented the first major instance in which the political impact of the riots extended outside the two crises defined previously. Before the NatCen study and *The Guardian-LSE* report, community-police relations had largely been dropped from the discourse. While *The Guardian-LSE* collaboration was panned by conservative newspapers and criticized by politicians, it still appeared to cut through the dominant discourse, generating enough attention that it became impossible to ignore. Theresa May was compelled to act even though doing so contradicted her claim that the riots had nothing to do with political grievance.

This action points optimistically to the possibility that significant actors can stretch the terms of debate and forge additional pathways of political action, even if they are not able to wholly replace the dominant frames. Indeed, the *Riots, Victims and Communities*

Panel devotes an entire chapter of its final report, published three months after *Reading the Riots*, to issues affecting public confidence in the police, even though it largely dismissed the issue in its interim report.⁹⁰ The panel does not go so far as to say that rioters were politically motivated to riot because of friction with the police, but rather suggests that distrust of police facilitated the criminality behind the riots. More cooperative communities would help prevent crime and make individuals socially accountable. This alternative framing helps to preserve the riots as apolitical while putting community-police relations back on the table.

Accordingly, the government acknowledged the panel's concerns about community-police relations. Its response statement offers a brief section that highlights existing efforts to make policing more transparent, improve institutional oversight, introduce clearer guidance on officer conduct, and promote more judicious use of stop-and-search powers.⁹¹ This inclusion reflects a reluctant acceptance of community policing concerns as a potential cause of the riots.

Despite this optimistic indicator of broadened debate and action, it is important to note that considerably more political energy was invested in resolving the public order crisis by enhancing police readiness to combat public disorder and by expanding punitive powers to deter criminality. Most notably, on the latter front, the government institutionalized many of the exceptional punitive sanctions installed against rioters in 2011. The government added provisions to a criminal justice reform bill, for example, to enable landlords to evict an entire household should one member of the household be criminally convicted,⁹² effectively collectivizing punishment.⁹³ In addition, the government formally provided courts with greater powers to punish offenders financially, lifting a cap on compensation payment size and expanding access to tax, income, and social benefits information.⁹⁴

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Frame analysis

In the interpretive process following the riots, early framing activities by media and political elites constrained the subsequent trajectory of debate on the meaning and causes of the riots. A crucial question that actors addressed in the early stages of the debate was whether the events constituted a form of political protest. The riots began with a peaceful march but end-

ed in widespread violence, looting, and destruction of property. To what extent the subsequent growth of the riots was political in nature was initially unclear.

The answer to this question lay in the interaction of various frames. The rise in salience of frames that distinguished the rioters and the community and the corresponding decline in salience of the Duggan frame conspired to negate the possibility of interpreting the riots as political protest. Through public criticism of those who suggested the riots were inspired by political grievance, conservative newspapers and politicians established norms for speaking about the riots. These norms set the terms of the debate, and actors in media and politics broadcast the price of deviating from the script by publicly denouncing infractions.

These frames further helped construct two types of crises: a public order crisis and a social breakdown crisis. Politicians were enabled to attribute responsibility for the riots by mapping the former crisis onto issues with policing and lax criminal justice and the latter crisis on gangs and troubled families. In doing so, politicians performed three core framing tasks specified by Snow and Benford⁹⁵: they diagnosed the problem of the riots in terms of two crises, they offered the solution of tackling policing, criminal justice, and family issues, and they motivated by highlighting the costs of the riots.

Impact of frames on research

How the riots were constructed early on shaped subsequent dynamics of knowledge production. These dynamics introduced implicit, commonly accepted views on who could be considered a legitimate voice in the discourse. These views affected the credibility of the frames generated in research. Thus, we observed a form of discursive path dependency, in which early discursive actions limited the range of possible options moving forward. The elevation of the community and the delegitimization of the rioters in political discourse influenced research in multiple ways, from research design to the substance and framing of findings to how the research was amplified in the media.

When frames generated in research clashed with the dominant narrative of the riots, the news media and politicians pursued two strategies of neutralization: they harmonized the findings to the prevailing account or they attacked the credibility of the research. Overall, the game was tipped in favor of those who adhered to the dominant discourse on the riots

because established frames provided ammunition to challenge the credibility of heterodox interpretations. Discursive rules and established terms of debate offered resources that actors could exploit to delegitimize others. In this way, the dominant discourse, once settled, diminished the possibility of subsequent challenges.

However, while early framings significantly influenced subsequent steps in the interpretive process, they did not completely close the door to all other forms of action. The Guardian-LSE collaboration was able to expand the terms of debate through advantageous institutional ties. These ties allowed the authors to vigorously defend the project's methodology and findings against attacks grounded in the dominant discourse.

Impact of frames on political action

The acceptance of the social breakdown and public order crises as the problems at the heart of the riots dictated subsequent political action. Keeler has argued that politicians may engineer a sense of crisis to advance particular policy goals.⁹⁶ This paper demonstrates how, given a disruptive shock, politicians can capitalize on the ambiguous nature of the event to define what kinds of crises the event represents. Their ability to do so is enabled and constrained by the news media, which may manipulate the depiction of events to heighten alarm about particular types of crises. Ultimately, in the aftermath of the 2011 English riots, the types of crises constructed shaped what problems were thought to underlie the disorder. Political influence over the construction of the crises and the blessing of the conservative news media helped the government establish the events as testimony to a broader problem of gangs and a youth mired in criminality. This allowed the government to advance a policy issue that resonated with the Broken Britain thesis.

Triggering both the fear and urgency mechanisms, the crises channeled political action initially into two areas: improving policing of public disorder and tackling gangs. In the latter case, when it emerged that gangs did not play a large role in the riots, political action concerning gangs was enabled to persist with a slight frame adjustment that broadened the target population to troubled youth and their families. This case testifies to the enduring influence of early framing activities that allowed political action to maintain momentum once channeled into politically desired policy domains.

Prompting a parliamentary review of gang and youth problems directed additional resources toward deprived communities, as Cloward and Piven predict.⁹⁷ But this paper demonstrates this was not a natural, immediate political response, but one that occurred as an outcome of the interpretive process. Unpacking this process suggests that the state's action should not be categorized as conciliatory. While providing more support for the most vulnerable members of society may be understood as a generally desirable outcome, there is little reason to believe that these actions were necessarily the direct desired outcomes of the rioters or community members. Parenting classes, for example, may represent a helpful new community resource, but it is dubious that rioters were motivated to riot because they wanted the government to intervene in their "troubled families." We cannot ascertain the content or even the existence of actual desired political outcomes given the systematic exclusion of the perspectives of the rioters. As such, contrary to what Cloward and Piven posit, the government's response should not necessarily be understood as the successful achievement of political objectives through an alternative means of expressing political grievance. Rather, the government's action might be understood as an imposition of political change without any effort to directly consult those affected in the process.

Given the government's recognition that gangs played a small role in the riots and evidence suggesting that the government's "120,000 troubled families" do not overlap with the families of rioters,⁹⁸ it is important to note that the government's pursuit of gangs and "troubled families" cannot be interpreted as a realistic effort to quell the possibility of future disorder. This stands in contrast to the work of Cloward and Piven, which argues that the state's desire to prevent future unrest motivates its political responses.⁹⁹ This paper highlights the possibility that state action following disruptive events might have a broader range of goals than increasing coercive or social control. As the government's official response to the Riots, Communities and Victims panel exemplified, governments may utilize disruptive events to serve as springboards to a variety of policy domains. As such, my paper suggests that future empirical studies on the political impact of disruptive events should look for political consequences in a broader range of policy domains than public benefits and criminal justice.

This paper suggests that power to effect po-

litical change through rioting does not always come through the act of rioting itself, but rather through access to conversations on how rioting is to be interpreted. In the latter account, marginalized groups may remain at a disadvantage. Inclusion in media reports and research projects may not necessarily be understood as a direct transfer of power. Ultimate control over the expressive content of the rioters' actions may remain with external players. Rioters may only be allowed a voice insofar as powerful actors and institutions enable them to have a say. In the case of the 2011 English riots, it was only through the exercise of power by the already powerful that the perspectives of rioters were allowed to enter into evidence.

FUTURE RESEARCH

This paper begins to elucidate how the process of generating political meaning shapes the impact of large-scale disruptive events. However, additional questions remain to be addressed in future research. While the process of political meaning making allows actors to offer varying interpretations of major events, reality is not infinitely malleable. Future research should consider how political discourse is constrained by other factors like influential actors, institutional arrangements, public opinion, and economic, social, and political conditions. Future research should also include analyses of television, radio, Internet, and social media content, which may have offered more diverse constructions of the riots than did print media.

Lastly, future research should explore how large and what kind of an impact the riots will have in the long term. Studies should test competing hypotheses on the longevity of reforms introduced in response to riots. Prevailing theories posit that reforms will be short-lived. Cloward and Piven suggest that expansions of relief occur in short-term spurts that fluctuate with waves of unrest.¹⁰⁰ Keeler argues that political action operating through the urgency and fear mechanisms may not produce enduring change because dormant political opposition may begin to reassert itself once a crisis starts to be neutralized, making reforms difficult to sustain.¹⁰¹ Similarly, Tarrow has argued that initiating reform efforts is not enough to produce change; continuous innovation and access to actors influencing reform efforts are necessary to usher initiatives through the political process.¹⁰² This paper suggests an alternative hypothesis. It suggests that when politicians are able to strategically define riots,

the reforms observed may consist not of good-faith efforts to prevent future unrest but rather of pet projects that politicians are motivated to uphold. The focus on gangs in political responses to the 2011 English riots persisted, for example, even when politicians acknowledged that gangs played little role in the riots. This suggests that reform efforts may not be motivated by a desire to quell the possibility of future unrest but rather by an interest in advancing favored policy issues that can be rhetorically connected to the events at hand. Further work examining the long-term impact of disruptive events will be valuable for testing these hypotheses.

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DESIGN POLITICS: CONSUMERIZATION OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOUTH KOREA

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, design has become a main theme in administration of Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Under this theme of design, many projects have taken place, including a number of public constructions. While the purpose behind supporting “design” as the symbol of Korea is to promote a new national image of post-developed nation, some of the Seoul government’s design projects yielded unintended side effects. This paper analyzes the discrepancy between the professed rationale of these projects and the actual consequences through the case of Gwanghwamun and Dongdaemun, and suggests a possible direction for the future of design in Korean politics.

DESIGN AND THE CITY OF SEOUL

In 2005, the International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (ICSID) announced an initiative called World Design Capital (WDC) at a convention held in Copenhagen. According to the initiative’s architects, WDC was to be an opportunity for cities to present their innovative design accomplishments and celebrate their successes in urban revitalization, with a focus on the broader impact of design on urban spaces, economies, and citizens. While recognizing design’s role in making a space more habitable and efficient for its local residents, WDC also emphasized design as “an economic development tool” in a global sense. Furthermore, WDC suggested design as something that should foster a partnership between “developed countries and emerging economies”¹. This statement revealed the ICSID’s understanding of the status of design in the global time line of development. Design represented the importance of soft power, moving away from the twentieth-century developmental paradigm.

As a nation that had for some time sought global recognition of its status as a developed country rather than an emerging economy,² South Korea pounced on the opportunity offered by the WDC initiative. After the announcement in 2005, the metropolitan government of Seoul hurriedly put together a bid to be selected as a World Design Capital, a bid that was ultimately successful when the ICSID selected Seoul

as the WDC of 2010. As part of the WDC launch, the city sponsored international events and created institutions that could help implement various design-related projects in the capital. The city’s active sponsorship of design-related events and institutions would eventually pay further dividends, and Seoul was designated the 2010 “City of Design” under the UNESCO Creative Cities Network, supplementing its earlier selection as WDC 2010.³

Taking advantage of growing publicity both at home and abroad, Seoul’s government actively promoted the image of Seoul as a sophisticated, cosmopolitan center with ambitions to become “the hub of global design.”⁴ When the promotion of this image gathered more attention, Oh Se-Hoon, the mayor of Seoul from 2006 to 2011, adopted “Design Seoul” as the new slogan for his administration. A savvy politician, Oh saw that design could be the point of distinction for his administration, similar to the “Green Growth” (*nokssaek seongjang*) heralded by predecessor, Lee Myung-Bak. The metropolitan government then launched two large-scale public construction projects that would become the hallmarks of the new Seoul: Gwanghwamun Plaza and Dongdaemun Design Plaza.

One of the most historically rich sites in all of Korea—enduring from the Joseon Dynasty through the years of Japanese colonial rule and American military occupation to authoritarian and post-authoritar-

ian eras –, the Gwanghwamun area of Seoul has long been considered a spatial symbol of political power. In turning this politically contested site into a symbol of “Design Seoul,” the Seoul Metropolitan Government sought to create a space explicitly dedicated to cultural events and leisure activities. At the same time, the government revised an existing ordinance to prohibit political gatherings in the space, prompting civic organizations to criticize the government’s vision of the new Gwanghwamun Plaza as an attempt to disempower politically minded citizens. The process leading up to the building of the Gwanghwamun Plaza raised an important question about the nature of citizens’ participation in a public space at the heart of Seoul. While the metropolitan government defined accessibility as the openness and availability of more leisure and cultural spaces to citizens, the citizens foregrounded political participation as an integral part of what it means to have access to public space. The tension between these two visions shaped the debate surrounding the success of the metropolitan government’s urban renewal campaign.

If the question of citizens’ access became a point of contestation in the building of Gwanghwamun Plaza, the question of history emerged as the lightning rod for concerns about the relationship between local specificity and “globality” in the building of the Dongdaemun Design Plaza (DDP). The Seoul metropolitan government launched DDP as an ambitious global landmark, intended to symbolize Korea’s status as an advanced, post-industrial nation. National achievement was to be reflected in the sophisticated and cosmopolitan design of the plaza. The landmark would also serve as a tourist attraction, signaling a shift away from manufacturing industries and toward service industries. A couple of years into the planning, however, historical remains from Joseon Dynasty were found at the site. The discovery resulted in the addition of a “historical park” to the original design. The city declared that the purpose of the DDP was also to serve as a memorial to the richness of Korean history and culture, but to achieve the seemingly conflicting goals of DDP as both a global landmark as well as a memorial to Korean history, the blueprint of the DDP had to be modified considerably. The resulting layout placed small history museums in the shadows of the main structure designed by a world-renowned architect Zaha Hadid, an Iraqi-British architect known for her abstract, futuristic designs. The resulting debate

surrounding DDP thus interrogated the relationship between local history and global design.

This thesis explores the efforts of Seoul to become a city represented by the theme of design by examining these two projects. What were the stated objectives and rationales for each project? What contestations and negotiations took place in the process of their construction, articulated by the state and various civil society groups? What were the consequences of their construction? In answering these questions, this thesis pays particular attention to the political implications of the active governmental promotion of “design” as a tool for creating a new national, post-industrial image of South Korea. I have coined the term “design politics” to encapsulate these dynamics. In addition to consulting political scientific and architectural literature, I incorporate interviews and contemporary media coverage of the construction projects in order to capture the voices of people, both from producer and consumer perspectives.

The thesis will then conclude with a brief, preliminary discussion about a possible alternative to the coupling of design and an image of post-industrial Korea. This alternative termed “social design,” places the emphasis on the agency of people within urban design. If design politics focuses on the role of design in representing national advancement for both domestic and global consumption—paradoxically by making design the banner for depoliticizing the public and reconfiguring them as passive consumers as we will see in the section on Gwanghwamun Plaza—the concept of social design requires design to serve the needs of local people, increasing the habitability of the space and the quality of life.

DESIGN POLITICS: POST-INDUSTRIALISM AND THE NATIONAL IMAGE

Mayor Oh Se-hoon, mayor of Seoul between 2006 and 2011, proclaimed the twenty-first century as the century of design.⁵ Oh argued that because Korea was no longer an impoverished country, and because most Koreans are now able to meet their basic needs, it was time for Korea to join the global trend of expanding the paradigm of design from individual products and businesses to one that also included government policy.⁶ In his acceptance speech for Seoul’s appointment as the World Design Capital, Oh declared, “Design is a growth driver of the Seoul economy. We have surprised the world with the Miracle of the Han River

and advancements in the IT sector. Now we would like to bring global attention to Seoul with strong design.”⁷

Oh’s speech reveals several conflicting associations with respect to the concept of design. On the one hand, focusing on design is a challenge to break out from the developmental paradigm. Design is taken as an indicator of how far Korea has advanced since the days of the “Miracle of the Han.” During this era of developmental dictatorship under Presidents Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo-Hwan, GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars rose from \$155.21 in 1960 to \$4,465.67 in 1988, the year Chun stepped down.⁸ Now coming out of this era, Oh here is attempting to move on with the new theme of design and take the first step in a shift toward modernity. At the same time, design is also understood as the next step in the developmental continuum that proceeds from manufacturing to information technology. Furthermore, design is also presented as a new way of “surprising the world” and bringing “global attention to Seoul.” Far from being antithetical to the developmental paradigm, design thus inherits the Miracle of the Han River, especially in the way it can generate a positive economic outcome reinforced by a new national image.

To understand why design came to be seen as the twenty-first century heir to the twentieth century economic development in Korea, we would need to place it in the context of Korea’s modern economic history. During the colonial era, Korea underwent extractive industrialization as the Japanese colonial government drained its natural resources. As Korea entered the 1960s, aggressive economic development policies pushed the nation into consumer goods and light manufacturing, for example, textiles and sneakers, which required both relatively low technological investment and skilled labor. The focus of Korean industrialization then moved towards heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s.⁹ Although the economy suffered in the latter half of the 1990s due to an economic crisis, commonly referred to as the “IMF Crisis” in Korea, progress was still made in pursuing systematic information and communications technology policies. The result was a growing IT industry during the 2000s.¹⁰ Now Korea is rubbing shoulders with the most developed economies in the world. The pace of this change has been one of the most rapid witnessed in world history. The per capita GDP of Korea was \$2,432 in 1970 and dramatically rose to \$10,910 in 1990, rising to \$18,730 in 2000 and again to \$27,540

in 2011.¹¹ While manufacturing continues to be an important sector of the Korean economy, Korea is rapidly moving toward service industries. The move has increased investment in high value-added industries as protections for cultural and intellectual property. Design has similar potential to be such an industry. Just as food consumption evolved from sustenance to culinary art in wealthier societies, spending on entertainment and leisure activities has increased in developed economies. Design belongs to the realm of intellectual property with maximum value added. These factors explain why design has become a buzzword for post-industrial societies of the twenty-first century.

With this embedded message, Oh and the city’s government sought to achieve a new image of Korea. The new image of Korea is of a nation with a globally renowned capital, a city of design that exemplifies Korea’s high level of development. However, the level of development is not the only part of the image that design promotes. While some people applauded Park’s leadership for laying the foundation for economic growth during the developmental era, many others criticized Park and Chun’s authoritarian rule “characterized by the brutal repression of political dissidents and labor activists, as well as the exclusion of the populace from politics.”¹² Hence, breaking out from the old developmental era is also associated with an end to the exclusionary political atmosphere that characterized it. The “brutal repression” and “exclusion of the populace” of authoritarian regimes heightened dissidence, often in the form of militant street protests. This link between protests and the legacy of developmental authoritarianism led the metropolitan government to distinguish the new image of a developed Korea from the protests and militant public that had helped define its past. Indeed, the vision of citizenry and civil society portrayed in the metropolitan government’s model of developed country does not foresee the necessity of dissidence. Determined to not allow protests, the government even filed a lawsuit against several protesters in 2010. The government claimed that protestors interrupted one of the WDC-related events Seoul was hosting, causing dissipation of more than \$0.6 million in wasted tax revenue.¹³ In holding a select few of the protesters responsible for the collective action of a large mass of people, the Seoul government strategically used fear to discourage protests and various political assemblies. If Park and Chun used military force to suppress their dissidents

continued economic development, then Oh adopted measures to preclude protests to prevent the disintegration of the model society. Both stand as methods of muting popular voice.

Given this context, I argue that the deployment of design as the defining characteristic of Oh's metropolitan administration was political in two major ways. The immediate reason given for committing city resources to large-scale construction projects was that these projects would improve Seoul's citizens' quality of living, but many opponents worried these projects would turn out to be more monumental than practical, pointing to the city's great reluctance to expand welfare spending.¹⁴ It was clear that design was tied to the desire to create an idealized image of Seoul to project onto the global arena, and an attempt to create new revenue streams by stimulating consumption and promoting tourism. Thus, the image, though seeming to move beyond the developmental paradigm of earlier administrations, actually continued that paradigm in a different guise. Secondly, design became political during Oh's term as mayor in that it led to depoliticization of public action. Because industrialization occurred in South Korea within the political context of authoritarianism, post-industrialization meant that the political practices associated with the earlier era, including the culture of mass protests against the government, would be seen as backward. In turning a place traditionally known as the center of mass politics into a plaza that permitted no political assembly, Design Seoul reconfigured citizens primarily as consumers rather than active participants in the political process.

Still, what did the implementation of design politics mean for the ordinary citizens of Seoul? Did they embrace the new image of their city and the reconfiguration of their relationship to public space? The answers to these questions can be found in the case of Gwanghwamun Plaza construction.

GWANGHWAMUN: THE MEANING OF MASS POLITICS

Gwanghwamun is the central gate of Gyeongbokgung, the main palace of the Joseon Dynasty. Because of its significance as the entrance to the seat of royal authority, Gwanghwamun became a symbol of political power. Every regime that has come to power in Korea since the end of the Joseon Dynasty has worked to appropriate this symbol, whether through

destruction, relocation, or augmentation. In order to undermine "Koreanness," for example, the Japanese colonial government physically tore down the gate to the house of the king, the symbol of Korean sovereignty, and repositioned it to make it the entrance to the Government-General Building. The gate burned down during the Korean War, but in 1968, Park commissioned its reconstruction as a metaphor of the rise of Korea he planned to achieve through economic development. Later, during Roh Moo-Hyun's presidency, the sign of Gwanghwamun, written by Park in vernacular Korean script, was removed and restored to a version of the Chinese original. The act was deeply symbolic. Not only did it remove the mark of an earlier dictator from a public monument, it also suggested that the authoritarian era when one person could wield the power to imprint history was over.¹⁵ The newly constructed Gwanghwamun Plaza also established a political message for Oh and former president Lee Myung-Bak, who shared the same conservative political base. For these neoliberal conservatives, the Gwanghwamun Plaza would become a symbol of the post-developed nation, where design represents the level of economic advancement, and citizenry do not engage in militant protests.¹⁶

Furthermore, the metropolitan government attempted to redefine the political nature of the space. In addition to its political symbolism, the Gwanghwamun area was an important political center for civic participation. A major assembly point during the days of pro-democracy demonstrations in the 1980s, the area regained significance in terms of mass politics in the early days of Lee's presidency. When the Oh administration initiated its reconstruction plan in 2008, for example, Seoul was in chaos, with protesters pouring out onto the streets in an attempt to appeal to a government that had ignored public opinion. Sparked by widespread dissatisfaction over the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, primarily as it concerned the importation of beef from cows older than thirty months, the so-called "candlelight protests" lasted over one hundred days and involved an estimated one million frustrated citizens.¹⁷ The Gwanghwamun area was a focal point of these protests. Even though most citizens respected the rule of peaceful assembly, the sight of a large number of discontented citizens alarmed the conservatives, including President Lee and Mayor Oh. Meanwhile, Gwanghwamun Plaza had been included as one of the two centerpieces for

Oh Se-Hoon's Design Seoul. Before the renewal project was undertaken, as the story of candlelight protesters reveals, the Gwanghwamun area was one of the most popular areas for mass rallies in Seoul. The gatherings were not always political in nature. For example, during the 2002, 2006, and 2010 FIFA World Cups, citizens came out and cheered on the Korean team, enjoying the festivities in the company of their fellow Koreans. In other words, Gwanghwamun functioned as a site of both civil activism and popular cultural expression. The city government explained that the construction was intended to enhance citizens' leisure and recreational life by increasing their access to public space. During a 2009 interview, Oh commented, "One of the goals we are pursuing through public construction projects as part of our 'design policies' is to respond to the public opinion that there are not enough public spaces where people can go to relax or to which they can bring visitors from foreign countries."¹⁸ But how exactly did the metropolitan government go about expanding citizens' access to public space, and how did this seemingly rational effort dovetail with the conservatives' political agenda of curtailing the candlelight protests?

To find an answer, it is fundamental to understand the changes made to Gwanghwamun. The renewal plan divided Gwanghwamun into a "plaza" (Gwanghwamun Gwangjang) and the "Citizens' Open Ground" (Shimin Yölin Madang). Gwanghwamun Plaza was a new creation. The site where the plaza stands now used to be a sixteen-lane thoroughfare leading to Gwanghwamun, the main gate of Gyeongbokgung. The only additional monument in the area was the statue of General Yi Sun-shin rising above the busy traffic. The new plaza took over six of the original sixteen lanes. Open to pedestrians, the plaza is divided into four different zones, each with a different theme: Urban, Culture, Representation of History, and Restoration of History.¹⁹ With five lanes to the left and five lanes to the right on this busy road at the city center, this space created has the appearance of a stranded island.

While the plaza was being created from scratch, the other site, the Citizens' Open Ground, was changed in focus. It had once been the hub of mass protests, together with Seoul Square and Cheonggye Square. The renewal, however, placed emphasis on culture. When asked about the purpose behind the creation of Gwanghwamun Plaza, Shin Hyun-Don, the landscape architect in charge of the project, answered, "Until

now Seoul lacked open spaces in the center of the city. Gwanghwamun Plaza will bring about the renaissance of Seoul's downtown. In addition to the 'hardware' part of the plaza, 'software' is very important. Gwanghwamun Plaza will be where this 'software,' that is to say, culture, is created."²⁰ For Shin, however, the creation of a space where "culture" can blossom meant restricting the political use of the space. Accordingly, the Gwanghwamun renewal project was accompanied by a change in the city government's ordinance regarding the use of public squares or open spaces to limiting mass gatherings for purposes other than culture.

The revised ordinance curtailed citizens' access to Citizens' Open Ground. Prior to the change in the ordinance, public usage of Citizens' Open Ground followed a reporting system that did not require the government permission. However, the new ordinance implicated that any application running counter to the stated purpose of the Gwanghwamun Plaza—leisure and culture—would be denied. The vagueness of language used in the revision further added to the problem and amplified the executive and discretionary power of the mayor, who could now decide single-handedly what threatened public security. The new ordinance began with language that specifically excluded political rallies from the type of activities considered appropriate for the space: "This ordinance intends to define the rules regarding usage and management of Gwanghwamun Plaza for recreational activities and cultural events of citizens." It then instituted a review process subject to the mayor's approval: "Application for the permission to use the Plaza will be reviewed by mayor of Seoul in consideration of the following: 1) Whether the event violates the purpose of the plaza; 2) whether the proposed use is restricted by other laws. If necessary, mayor can enforce additional regulations in order to secure public order." Even a peaceful assembly within the boundaries of the law, as was the case during the candlelight protests when citizens of all ages—secondary school students, moms with their infants, senior citizens, white collar workers—gathered in the Gwanghwamun area with candles in hand, would no longer be permitted if deemed "political" in any way. Moreover, the revised ordinance entitled the government to cancel the granted approval with a simple notification if the already-approved event was considered to pose a threat to the safety of citizens or the public order, or deemed to be in violation of "other regulations," broadly defined. In addition, the eighth

clause of the ordinance states, "The mayor can change the status of permission even after the permission is granted if the metropolitan government of Seoul needs the space in the interest of the public, or if the change of status is required to ensure public security and social order."²¹ Again, the ordinance remains unclear about what kinds of situations would qualify as serving "public interest."

In response to dissatisfaction expressed concerning the restricted usage of Gwanghwamun Plaza, the government cited many reasons supporting their decision to revise the ordinance. The main reason was that the Blue House, the U.S. Embassy, and other national landmarks surround Gwanghwamun, making security an absolute imperative. Another reason presented was the protection of citizens' security and unrestricted flow of traffic from possible danger and chaos arising from protests and political assemblies. However, the argument regarding traffic appears invalid, because the government had reduced the number of traffic lanes from sixteen to ten in order to create the Gwanghwamun Plaza in the first place, leading to a perennial bottleneck in the area. In 2009, moreover, the city council gave permission for a soap opera to be filmed in the area for twelve hours from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., the busiest hours of the day, even though this led to serious congestion in the area. These examples suggest that the city council's justification of its decision to ban political rallies in the area on account of traffic is specious at best.

The revision in the ordinance can thus be seen as an indirect commentary on the legacy of mass politics in South Korea. At critical junctures during the era of developmental dictatorship, protesters poured out onto the streets, often risking their lives to voice their demands. The people's struggle to gain the power to express their voices and participate in the political process has been an integral part of modern Korean history. By proclaiming the new definition of a citizen as a consumer, the Design Administration is also suggesting that Korean society has moved beyond the stage of development when mass politics were needed to check state power. According to political scientist Stuart White, "The concept of economic citizenship has aspired to the universalism, embodying the rights to work and have the means to consume, to invest and be entrepreneurial, and the obligation to be taxed... The concept of economic citizenship has developed and solidified into an agenda for entrepreneurship,

wealth creation, and adaptability to economic and technological change."²³ According to this definition, the concept of economic citizenship developed with the economic changes of a society. Applying this concept to Korea, we can argue that along with the change of society from developmental dictatorship to post-industrial neoliberalism, there is also a shift in the definition of citizenship, from political citizenship by dissidence to economic citizenship by consumption. Oh focuses on this notion of citizens as consumers when he defines accessibility to public space as the ability to have more choices in consuming leisure activities. Now, the role of the citizens lies in their economic activity, primarily as consumers. In this government-citizen relationship, having more rights as citizens means having more opportunities to consume, and more access means more consumption choices.

Nevertheless, some civic groups have articulated definitions of citizenship that oppose Oh's perspective. Korean geographer Hee-Sun Chung interprets Harvey's theory of heritageisation(with respect to the case of Gwanghwamun, ²⁵ calling it "a case where the state gets rid of remains of the negative past, sorts out glorious elements, and uses them to reinforce its group identity."²⁶ Government deliberately erased the remnants of the authoritarian regime by prohibiting protests, and at the same time pointed out the glory of development Korea had achieved. This political manipulation generated the new group identity of a citizenry whose role is to consume leisure services and leave the space of politics in the hands of trusted political leaders.

However, some civic groups, consisting mostly of left-leaning progressive organizations, but also including many Seoul citizens who share their beliefs, disagree with such normative model suggested by the design politics. One of these groups is the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, who are so concerned about the issue of Gwanghwamun Plaza that they are leading a campaign to reverse the revision of the protest ordinance. A part of their argument is that the revision of the ordinance constitutes an infringement on people's right to public assembly, which is guaranteed by the constitution.²⁷ For the civic group, being citizens mean being active participants of a political process, not merely spectators watching the political scenes unfold and consuming what is ready-made for them to use. Participating in

the political process entails playing a role in forming the choices themselves, not simply choosing between already determined options. This is where the definition of accessibility, as articulated by some of the civic groups such as People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, diverges from that given by the Seoul government.

When citizens are merely consumers of leisure space, the government fulfills its duty of serving public interest when it increases the accessibility and availability of such leisure spaces. However, if citizens are seen not simply as consumers but as co-producers, accessibility becomes something more than individual enjoyment of a given space. In his examination of the discourse and practice of citizenship, political sociologist James Manor argues that what makes a citizen is whether he or she possesses "sufficient 'political capacity'—a term that implies political awareness, confidence, skills, and connections—to be able to operate effectively enough in the public sphere to qualify as a citizen rather than a mere resident or subject."²⁸ With respect to this idea of operating in the public sphere, citizens assume their rights to make modifications to the political outcome. Therefore, their definition of accessibility is closer to the accessibility to the process of producing these spaces in the first place, not simply consuming them once they have come into being. Citizens, who feel that they cannot operate in the public sphere because their voice is not heard or accepted by policy-makers, can turn to collective action to make their voices heard. It is precisely this dimension of collective civic action that the ordinance targets by removing the outlet of call for changes. The ambitious and forceful implementation of the post-industrial image has replaced the civil activism. The contradiction, however, is that Oh's ideal post-developmental society reflected in Design Seoul assumes no contention between the citizenry and the government. Rather, it assumes a place where the public does not feel the need to have its voice heard through protests.

If citizens indeed felt no need to continue their political struggle through visible, physical, public contestation, why did the Seoul Metropolitan Government revise the ordinance to prevent protests? If Korean society is truly post-industrial and post-developmental, as claimed in the government's rationale for design politics, why would people feel the need to protest in the first place? The renewal of the Gwanghwamun area and the ordinance regarding its public

use may be seen as an example of failed mediation between the government's goal of fostering a post-industrial national image and the civic groups' demand, which does not align with the pace of progress that the government suggests. Schot and de la Bruheze characterize mediation as "a process of mutual articulation and alignment of product characteristics and user requirements. In the process of mutual articulation and alignment (or mediation), product characteristics, the use, the user, and the user's demands become defined, constructed, and linked."²⁹ Producers and users have different sets of needs, and mediation is an important process to find a middle ground between two dissimilar, possibly conflicting interests. While it may be problematic to draw an analogy between the producer-consumer relationship in the market and the government-civilian relationship in politics, the narrow focus on the use of public space allows us to see the producer-consumer dynamic emerge in the debate over Gwanghwamun. According to Schot and de la Bruheze, a successful mediation is reached when there is a balance between differing opinions. If one side's interests are given more weight, a bias is created, and such a bias ends up furthering the divide rather than closing it. While the initial goal of creating a better public leisure space for citizens has been achieved, the government failed to take into consideration the voice of opposition. The opinion that welcomed the Gwanghwamun area's transformation into a leisure place was obviously well reflected, as it was constructed into a leisure place. On the other hand, the significant public voice that asked for a public space where freedom of speech and freedom of assembly could be exercised was neglected. Because citizens' interests were not considered to have the same weight as the ruling party's interests, mediation failed. In the process of designing the plaza, only the opinions of those experts and politicians aligned with the government came to matter.

DONGDAEMUN:

HISTORY AND CULTURE IN A GLOBAL WORLD

Dongdaemun has a long and rich history that goes back to the dynastic period. Dongdaemun literally means "east gate" in Korean and was one of the four gates surrounding Hanyang, the capital of Joseon Dynasty and modern-day Seoul. Near this gate, there were many historically important sites, including one of the capital's main sluices and the training ground of

Hadogam, the fortress guards of Hanyang. The area also served as the base for the Qing army brought into the country to suppress the Imo Mutiny of 1882. The mutiny was one of the many violent episodes that occurred as traditional Korea encountered the modern world. One of the rebellion's root causes was the grievances of the traditional military, which suffered discrimination relative to the new modern army at the end of the Joseon Dynasty.³⁰

During the Japanese colonial period, the Dongdaemun area emerged as a site of national humiliation when it became the ground for a stadium built to celebrate the Japanese prince's wedding.³¹ During the Park era, the Dongdaemun area witnessed the self-immolation of an uneducated and impoverished garment cutter named Jeon Tae-Il, who set himself on fire to protest the unjust treatment of workers. Dongdaemun Stadium also evokes the nostalgic memory of the high school baseball league that played there throughout the 1980s to the delight of Seoul's many students and baseball fans.³² In the hands of dictators from the 1970s to the 80s, namely Park and Chun, baseball became an instrument for deflecting people's attention away from pro-democracy protests. Today, the name Dongdaemun indicates the shopping district near the actual Dongdaemun, or one of Seoul's twenty-five administrative precincts.

In 2007, Oh unveiled his grand plan of demolishing the old stadium and constructing a design plaza on the site. His justification for the demolition was that the dilapidated facilities, combined with street vendors crowding the area, were hindering the Dongdaemun area from growing bigger as a global shopping mecca.³³ Many civic groups opposed the proposed demolition. Heo Jeong-Hun, Secretary-General of Citizens United for Sports (Chaeyuk Shimin Yeon-dae) said, "As the first modern sports facility in Korea and a structure built by imperial Japan in 1925, Dongdaemun Stadium is a symbolic cultural asset." Hwang Pyeong-U, the chair of Cultural Action, echoed the sentiment: "Dongdaemun Stadium is worth registering as an official cultural asset. It should be managed at the national level."³⁴ Despite its dilapidated exterior, many people recognized the value of Dongdaemun Stadium as a site rich in historical memory, not only for the residents of Seoul, but for Korean citizens at large. In spite of these voices of resistance that recognized the value of Dongdaemun Stadium as a historical artifact, if not as the site of livelihood for the flea

market vendors, Oh was excited to redevelop the site as a different kind of landmark. He made his ambition explicit when he said that he planned to "make a number of landmarks during his term, with the Dongdaemun Design Plaza as the representative landmark out of all the landmarks to be built in Seoul."³⁵ This statement conforms precisely to the idea of design politics—promoting a national image of a highly developed society with sophisticated landmarks that would become known worldwide and attract tourists from all over the world.

With the beginning of the building of Dongdaemun Design Park in 2010, the development faced some unavoidable changes when a substantial number of Joseon Dynasty historical artifacts were found during the initial stage of construction. In an interview with *The Korea Herald*, Oh explained the change of plan in the following terms: "Shifting from the original plan of design facilities and green areas, the design park is now going to be a place where the history and culture of Korea co-exist."³⁶ The statement highlights a new emphasis on commemoration of Korean history and culture, while keeping the initial goal of creating a global landmark.

The final blueprint settled upon by the Oh Administration thus added "History and Culture Park" to the design plaza that was the original focus of the project. In this blueprint, half of the Dongdaemun Design Park is dedicated to a large main structure, and the other half of the site is dedicated to be the "History and Culture Park." The History and Culture Park itself has three main features: Dongdaemun Stadium Memorial, devoted to the demolished stadium and heyday of high school baseball, the History Museum that presents the long history of Dongdaemun and its surrounding vicinities during the Joseon Dynasty, and a couple of exhibition galleries that display the historical artifacts unearthed on the site. According to Seoul Design Foundation, History and Culture Park is intended to serve as a "living place of history education."³⁷

These facilities of History and Culture Park, however, are dwarfed by the giant structure that is to be the home of Dongdaemun Design Plaza. Designed by Zaha Hadid, the large metallic structure takes on the shape of waves with green patches of grass covering them on top.³⁸ The structure's lack of straight lines, its curved shape and metal silver appearance, combined with its unusual size, are reminiscent of a

large UFO. Calling it “Metonymic Landscape,” Hadid tried to symbolize historical, cultural, urban, societal, and economic elements of Korea all united metonymically in a landscape.³⁹ However, the aspect of scale and visibility makes readily obvious the uneven relationship between the design plaza and the History and Culture Park. The “Metonymic Landscape” is not only too large to grasp its look from the ground, but it also blocks the view of other components of the park. The museums are much smaller in scale and arranged to one side of “Metonymic Landscape,” and would be completely invisible from the side where most tall buildings from which people can look down on the park are located. Despite the Seoul government’s repeated insistence that the entire project is supposed to celebrate the past, the present, and the future, the blueprint of the design plaza area celebrates only the future as it pushes the History Museum and Dongdaemun Stadium Memorial to one side and into the shadow of “Metonymic Landscape.”

Marginalization of historical memory can also be seen in partial restoration of the remains of the fortress and training ground of Hadogam, the special fortress guards during the Joseon Dynasty, and Igan Sluice Gate, a crucial part of the capital city’s infrastructure remaining from its days as Hanyang. But even when 31,000 square meters out of 61,585 square meters of the site designated for the construction was further excavated for precious remains underneath, the recovered sluice gate was sandwiched right in the middle of the whole park. When the whole park was viewed from the side where shopping mall buildings are concentrated, the recovered remains are mostly hidden behind “Metonymic Landscape.”⁴⁰ Looking at the effort that was put in to help this park somehow serve the function of “living place of history education,” it seems apparent that the objective of commemoration would be achieved only minimally at best. One might even conclude that the History and Culture Park side of the construction was built for the sake of being able to claim that the new design park is also serving the role of a memorial, when in actuality, that role has been subjugated to the goal of erecting a globally recognizable landmark. English cultural geographer David Harvey also supports the idea that history is more than merely a consumable entity, saying, “Heritage must be allowed a wider scope than simply being portrayed as something that people do to fill their free time, or as a hostage to the whims of

leisure fashion.”⁴¹ Strictly structured into the most consumable shape, only the Joseon Dynasty part of the history is chosen and displayed at the site of Dongdaemun, despite the value of Dongdaemun Stadium as a cultural asset that survived the history of colonization by Japan. Dodging the controversial elements instead of leaving the history to be shown naturally, at the site of demolished stadium, the city government dug up even older history, Seoul Fortress and Hadogam from Joseon Dynasty, both of which date well before the construction of the stadium. Too concerned with the park’s ability to be consumed, Oh and the city government sacrificed the centuries of history and culture.

The decision reveals the government’s reluctance to confront any history that has the potential to be politicized, as there still are many ongoing political issues regarding the legacies of the colonial era. Joseon Dynasty, on the other hand, is safe from contestations of this kind. Why was there this shift in focus away from the still present colonial history? I argue that depoliticization of history was a step toward molding the past into a consumable product.

In response to the selection of Hadid’s “Metonymic Landscape,” several South Korean architects denounced the government’s insistence on a global landmark. Well-known for prioritizing her own distinctive design style over local specificity or architectural context, Hadid is unapologetically abstractivist.⁴⁴ This is despite the attempt by the Seoul Design Foundation to argue for a degree of local context in her commissioned work: “What Ms. Hadid intended was to create a landscape by metonymically integrating the various historical, cultural, urban, societal, and economic features as exhibited by the Dongdaemun Design Plaza.”⁴⁵ Architect Yang Sang-Hyun called Hadid’s work “an extreme of morphological experiment” and claimed that “the annelid-looking structure has no relation to the memories we have about this site [Dongdaemun].”⁴⁶ In Hadid’s structure, “various historical, cultural, urban, societal, and economic features” that are local to Korean history and to the site itself appear only “metonymically”. The nebulous word “metonymy” in this case is synonymous with the absence of local specificity. “Metonymic Landscape” can probably be built anywhere on earth and still remain the same, since the specificity of Korean culture and of the site of Dongdaemun itself is very lightly, perhaps even negligibly represented.

In another set of commentaries about DDP, Seoul Design Foundation actually seems to negate its earlier claim about the embeddedness of Korean history and culture in Hadid's futuristic design. According to these comments, the DDP buildings and their arrangement in the park is meant to resemble the wave of water, representing flexibility of the space. Embodied in "Metonymic Landscape" is the philosophy of using architecture to enable people to think about something that was not imaginable in the past.⁴⁷ In such a characterization of DDP, the emphasis is on the future rather than on history as a lived reality in the present, despite the governmental rationale of creating a "living place of history education." While it may be possible to "metonymically" see the wavelike appearance of the buildings as a reference to Igan Sluice Gate, it is clear that the structure makes no recognition of the lived and living history of the Dongdaemun area.

This is precisely the problem singled out by Korean architects. Yu Gul and Seung Hyo-Sang, who participated in the International Invitational Design Competition, have expressed their disappointment in the lack of cultural consideration evident in Dongdaemun Design Park.⁴⁸ Seung Hyo-Sang points out that Hadid claims that her style of architecture is independent from the site of construction. Seung laments that an architect who has no intention of reflecting the significance specific to a locality is designing a structure of a historically charged site. In fact, Seung's entry for DDP followed a direction opposite from that of Hadid's. Seeking to fully engage the historicity of Dongdaemun, Seung's design recovered the submerged fortress walls completely (rather than only partially), left the stands of Dongdaemun Stadium intact, and symbolically recreated the mountain that once existed at the site.⁴⁹ Because the government valued the attractiveness of a showy design, which is something more suitable for a landmark, Seung's design did not win. However, considering the long-lasting effects of the environment on the residents, unrepresented history may eventually lead to history in oblivion. Global recognition may be achieved through the splendidness of the current design of DDP, but only at the expense of remembrance of history. Moreover, from the perspective of the national interest as well, it would be more meaningful to spread the fame of Korean history attached to the DDP than to spread the fame of the DDP building itself as a brainchild of the designer Hadid.

For architect Moon Hoon, "Metonymic Land-

scape" is simply "Zaha's Crap." With this name, he mocks the structure's lack of local specificity and sarcastically describes the actual look of the building from a bird's eye view. In fact, many architects have expressed growing worries over the trend in creative façade design, free from the composition of interior space: "Façade designs that represent the purpose of the architecture and composition of the interior are losing popularity despite the praise given to the 'honesty' of the design."⁵⁰ This trend, they fear, challenges and reverses the principle of "form follows function," famously articulated by the American architect Louis Sullivian.⁵¹ Public space has increasingly become exhibitionist, but upon the shiny silver exterior of Dongdaemun Design Plaza and inside its glittering surface, living history and local culture are nowhere to be found. The aspiration toward a global landmark may remain an empty dream when it fails to capture what makes the site locally specific and meaningful in the first place.

CONCLUSION:

THE FUTURE OF DESIGN POLITICS

So far we have looked into the cases of public construction projects carried out in Seoul by the Design Administration of Oh. Built to promote the new national image of Korea as a post-industrial country, the projects highlighted design as a symbol of Korea's advancement but also revealed major contradictions. In the case of Gwanghwamun Plaza, the metropolitan administration and civic groups collided on the question of what it means to increase citizens' accessibility to public space. While the government viewed citizens as consumers of leisure spaces, civic groups demanded that they be recognized as active participants in the political process. In the case of Dongdaemun Design Park, a site rich in living history and local culture, the site is decontextualized and depoliticized in the process of creating a global landmark.

Under the grand ambition of fostering a new national image, these design projects together furthered the consumerization of Korea, its people, and its culture. At the heart of the debates surrounding their construction may be the question of agency and the status of human lives that unfold within these spaces. Taking pride in what Korea has achieved differs from the phenomenon of consumerization in the way it positions people and what they mean in the society. If the national pride is the focus, people are the subject

of achievement and the driving force that made things happen. But when the nation becomes a consumable product, people are the objects of consumption. Is there any possibility that the theme of design could change such dynamics of subjectivity?

Ironically enough, a partial answer may be found in a close examination of the vision statement of “Design Seoul.” This vision is divided into design strategy and design principle. Design strategy is citizen-first design, and design principle is “emptying, merging, cooperating, sustainable design.” Along with these mottos, the Design Seoul Administration also suggests its ambition of bringing about “Designomics,” by linking public design and design industry together to promote Seoul’s competitiveness as a global city.⁵² If citizens’ satisfaction is one of the foci in this vision and economic advancement is the other, in the middle lies the principle of “emptying, merging, cooperating and sustainable design,” even though that seems far from what was actually done. There appears to have been some confusion within the ranks of the city government about the exact direction the Design Administration should pursue.

As ideas, the vision statement contains many things that appear promising. Had they been developed creatively with deep and equal consideration for every element that makes up the whole, the Design Administration may not have garnered a far less attractive nickname, Exhibitionist Administration. But without the process of careful refinement of goals, and with the chaos resulting from conflicting visions, the slogan of design became a way of creating a façade around the hollow core.

Bringing the idea of design into the political scene was a brilliant start of a creative and flexible political culture. However, the politicians who initiated this process still seem to sport tunnel vision. In order for design politics to be a genuine innovation, it cannot simply borrow something already established and force it into a new framework. The application of design into politics needs to be different than the application of design into the commercial architectural industries. Creating a prettier public space is not the role of design in politics. A public construction is a public possession that serves the citizens’ needs, considered in a multi-faceted and holistic way, before it is an architectural project run by the government.

In order for this custom-made adaptation of design to politics to succeed, the very possibility of what

design can mean must undergo expansion as well. Design, rather than representing a static, preestablished concept, should be explored for all its creative potential in all kinds of new directions in order to find the right shape for its use in politics. In Oh’s Design Seoul, design simply meant aesthetics. The projects undertaken with the slogan of design were limited only to the visual medium, such as public construction, or a design fair. The term design, however, means much more. Though the Korean loanword “design” refers mainly to the action of sketching or planning a product’s look or form, the general meaning of design includes the action of crafting a purpose, which refers to the planning or intention behind an action or a fact.⁵³ Within this broader definition, appearance is only a part of what constitutes design, not the whole. Illuminated in this light, the idea of social design can be an alternative framework of design politics capable of achieving the government’s initial vision of putting citizens first.

In exploring the concept of Social Design, we can take inspiration from the work of New Urbanists. According to architect Ellen Dunham-Jones, New Urbanists see the current post-industrial landscape to be regressive, promoting diverse, mixed-use, mixed-income communities instead.⁵⁴ Succeeding Oh, Seoul’s current mayor Park Won-Soon has embraced Social Design in the New Urbanist sense as the design that changes life, society and people, a smart design that can reflect the thoughts, habits, and culture of humans in a comprehensive way and upgrade their quality of life as a whole.⁵⁵ At the core of this design philosophy lie people. The philosophy is simple and modest; things around people should be transformed to meet the needs of people, rather than transforming people to fit the government-dictated changes.

One step toward achieving this goal of people-centered politics is simply to open ears to listen. The new administration of Seoul under Mayor Park has hosted regular workshops called “Cheongchaek Workshops” to gather public opinion. “Cheong” is a Chinese character that means “to hear or listen” and “chaek” signifies “policy.” A neologism, “Cheongchaek” is just one letter different from “Jeongchaek,” the Korean word for policy.⁵⁶ The name of the workshop suggests the new administration’s determination to bring public opinion into the policymaking process.

An important facet of social design and people-centered politics is the question of welfare. The under-

lying philosophy behind social design is the collective well-being of the society. The notion is to create a city or a nation where citizens of all different backgrounds are happy together by providing more welfare benefits to support citizens of lower socioeconomic strata. To Mayor Park and the supporters of social design, closing the gap of socioeconomic status by strong welfare is the way to achieve “Sangsaeng,” or “co-prosperity.”^{57;58} And as a support to their belief, the Legatum Prosperity Index, used by Forbes to rank the happiness of countries, ranked four out of the five Scandinavian nations – Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland – within the top ten, and the remaining Scandinavian nation Iceland fell just short of the top ten, ranking as thirteenth.⁵⁹ Considering that Scandinavian nations have reputations for their emphasis on social welfare, their high ranking as the most prosperous and happiest countries in the world proves that social welfare is a way to achieve national well-being. Furthermore, it makes social designing through providing social welfare more promising for the future of Seoul. As opposed to Oh’s professed goal of creating a new revenue stream with designing the outlook of the city, stimulating the consumption of citizens by providing leisure opportunities and promoting tourism by constructing landmarks is the better alternative.

To be sure, there are concerns about the philosophy of social design. Because the value of social design lies in meeting people’s needs and wants, it may lead to populism and fiscally irresponsible promises made to the voting public in order to buy their political support. Even though people of higher socioeconomic status, whose lives are less affected by welfare, most often voice fear of populism, these people nevertheless comprise a segment of the citizenry, and their voices should not be neglected. Taking the fear of populism to an extreme, the right-wing media has called Park’s social design “dictatorship through populism.”⁶⁰

Another criticism of social design is that paying such attention to meeting the current needs and wants of the people of Seoul mortgages the city’s future competitiveness. Kim Myung-Soo, the head of the Seoul City Council, has charged that building landmarks and promoting tourism are important investments in growing the economic pie for the city of Seoul, and that this is a part of the equation that social design neglects.⁶¹ Even though civil engineering and construction are not the only ways to increase the city’s competitiveness, they do indeed contribute to the growth

of the competitiveness of a city in a nation, if pursued in a balanced way.

Despite these concerns, social design does seem to offer an important corrective to the design politics of the former administration by refusing to sacrifice the content for form, and paying greater attention to the lived reality inside rather than seeking to manufacture a national image for the consumption of the outside world. Currently, the manifestation of social design in Seoul’s administration under the new mayor has its own problems. But the essence of social design remains people. A balanced approach to put this fundamental insight into practice will bring the definition of design one step closer to becoming aligned with the ideal development of a healthy society. Politics is the governance of people. When people who make up the nation are adequately cared for, the desired national image will come in time.

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THE CONSEQUENCES OF RISING SUBURBAN POVERTY ON THE HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM: A STUDY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the consequences of suburban poverty on meeting two primary goals of the HUD-administered housing choice voucher (HCV) program: to de-concentrate inner-city poverty and to extend greater access to opportunities that enable socioeconomic mobility. Recent studies have shown that housing choice vouchers have been spreading away from central cities into the suburbs. While promising, the quality of many of these suburban neighborhoods no longer aligns with the idealistic notions of suburban opportunity. This paper measures the quality of the neighborhoods in which voucher-occupied households are located. It then compares the quality of suburban and urban neighborhoods by using composite neighborhood quality and opportunity structure indices. The data confirm a decentralization of vouchers but highlight re-clustering in low-quality and opportunity-poor suburbs. Secondly, although suburban neighborhoods collectively are of higher quality, their opportunity structures are relatively weak. Furthermore, there is an inverse relationship between neighborhood quality and the proportion of voucher-occupied households regardless of racial makeup and metropolitan location. Atlanta's public housing authorities need to engage in more intentional strategies to help families move to opportunity-rich neighborhoods and to work past existing barriers to geographic mobility. Future policy objectives need to encourage inter-municipality collaboration and to target federal and state aid for neighborhood development.

The story of American cities is not one of ubiquitous opportunity or of unrestrained liberty. Rather, metropolitan areas across the nation remain characterized by stark inequity and pervasive segregation. Take the case of Atlanta, Georgia. This Olympic City has seen decades of constant growth and expansion and has become a regional hub for business, education, transportation, and politics. Juxtaposed against its promising trajectory, estimates by the American Community Survey indicate that 13.5 percent of people living in the Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta metropolitan statistical area (MSA) are currently living below the federal poverty line.¹ Moreover, 84.1 percent of Atlanta's poorest residents live in neighborhoods of extreme poverty. From the middle of the twentieth century onwards, Atlanta's share of urban poor grew and geographically concentrated into neighborhoods within the "inner-city." Additionally, as emphasized in Sjoquist's "The Atlanta Paradox," poverty and segregation in Atlanta cannot be mentioned without their racial implications. Ex-

tensive redlining, the development of public housing, white flight, and racially-charged zoning and land-use policies were among the historical forces that isolated black residents into poor inner-city regions and continue to perpetuate high levels of residential segregation.²

Urban scholars are in agreement that such concentrated poverty, which traditionally refers to census tracts with at least 40 percent of residents living under the poverty line, exacerbates the challenges of living in poverty itself.³ The quality of schools and public services, infrastructure, exposure to and perception of crime, access to jobs, and bridging social networks are among the neighborhood characteristics that are influenced by concentrated poverty. Thus, neighborhood quality has been theorized as being amongst the strongest indicators of socioeconomic mobility.⁴

Since the 1980s, policy responses from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) signal recognition of these consequences. One of its largest assisted housing programs, the Housing Choice

Voucher Program (HCV), has been used to decentralize and de-concentrate urban poverty. The HCV program was designed to reduce racial and economic residential segregation in American metropolitan areas. In alignment with this overarching goal, participants in the housing voucher program are given the freedom to live wherever they choose, ideally outside of segregated and highly poor inner-city locations. The HCV program intends to provide low-income families with greater degrees of mobility and access to opportunities that can improve socioeconomic well-being. The quality of the destination neighborhoods to which HCV families move within the metropolitan areas is thereby essential to measuring the success of the program. In ideal conditions, participants in the voucher program would move to opportunity-rich neighborhoods; however, empirical studies question the program's success and achievements. Most recently, a Brookings Institution study found a "suburbanization" of these vouchers.⁶ While such geographic decentralization may seem desirable in terms of the goal of poverty deconcentration, a recent rise in suburban poverty has altered the nature of metropolitan opportunity altogether.

Suburban neighborhoods generally have fewer social service actors and non-profits,⁷ limited accessibility to public transportation, and increasingly segregated schools.⁸ Thus, rising suburban poverty may lead to a new range of challenges for suburban social service providers and policy-makers. Although extensive research has been completed on measuring the efficacy of the HCV program, little attention has been given to the impact of rising suburban poverty in relation to the goal of deconcentrating poverty.

In this thesis, I address this gap in knowledge by posing several questions: What types of suburban neighborhoods are voucher recipients moving to? How robust are the opportunity structures in these suburban neighborhoods? And how do these neighborhoods compare to their urban counterparts? Moreover, do the conditions in these destination neighborhoods align with the goals of the HCV program? I answer these questions by examining data from 2000 to 2009 in Atlanta, Georgia. The paper is comprised of two broad sections: a review of literature and an empirical analysis of destination voucher neighborhoods.

LITERATURE REVIEW

How is rising suburban poverty influencing HUD's goal of deconcentrating urban poverty via the Housing Choice Voucher Program? This review addresses this primary question by outlining the following topics: the historical formation of concentrated poverty in inner-cities, federal housing programs intended at deconcentrating this poverty, and concerns emerging from rising suburban poverty over the past decade.

Concentrated Inner-City Poverty

William Julius Wilson and Xavier de Souza Briggs are among the many urban scholars who argue that neighborhoods are instrumental in shaping one's life opportunities. A combination of individual and policy-driven forces has resulted in extreme variations in neighborhood quality within singular metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). A recent review of the literature illustrates that characteristics such as access to jobs, exposure to and perception of crime, the quality of public and social services and schools, poverty, and connections to positive social networks are determined at least partially by residential location.⁹

A mixture of historical, social, economic, and political forces throughout the twentieth century have resulted in a concentration of low-income and minority residents in America's central cities.¹⁰ Drawing upon Jargowsky's definition,¹ concentrated poverty refers to census tracts in which at least 40 percent of the population lives below the federal poverty line.¹² Neighborhoods with concentrated poverty tend to have high crime rates, few social service providers, high rates of obesity, few options for healthy lifestyles, and segregated and struggling schools. Additionally, these neighborhoods tend to lack "bridging" social capital and therefore contribute to social isolation.¹³ As indicated by these and other empirical studies, the geographic concentration of poverty exacerbates the hardships faced by those living in poverty. In cities like Atlanta, racial segregation transcends mere economic segregation. Wilson urges policy-makers to "consider how explicit racial structural forces directly contribute to inequality and concentrated poverty."¹⁴ While the creation of poor and black urban cores is complex and multifaceted, primary structural forces include redlining, white flight, suburban resistance to black populations, and public housing.

Redlining as a practice refers to racially charged mortgage-lending policies in which the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) excluded black neighborhoods entirely, regardless of financial standing, from receiving federal mortgage capital intended to encourage suburban homeownership. Policy makers, politicians, and real estate agencies rationalized this practice on the basis that investments in black neighborhoods would lead to inevitable economic losses.¹⁵ The Housing Act of 1968 outlawed these discriminatory selling practices, but later studies and journalistic endeavors such as the Atlanta Journal-Constitution's "The Color of Money" exposed continued implicit forms of the practice. Coupled with these practices were the parallel forces of white flight and suburban separatism. The former refers to the exodus of white populations from inner-cities to suburban communities that were characterized by having good schools, low crime, and being the epitomes of the "American Dream." Much of this migration was racially motivated. Lassiter argues that middle-class whites employed a color-blind racial ideology that considered the segregation and white homogeneity of suburbia as a product of individual meritocracy, not of structural racism.¹⁶ The Federal Interstate Act further rationalized suburbia, because highways seamlessly connected white suburbs to central business districts. Wealthy white suburbanites in Atlanta's Cobb and Gwinnett Counties vehemently opposed the extension of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Authority Transit Administration (MARTA) rail lines into the suburbs for fears of attracting urban problems. As low-income and black residents grew more isolated in central cities, loci of employment started to shift to the suburbs.

The first generation of federally funded affordable housing also contributed to and exacerbated urban decay.¹⁷ Soon after their introduction into inner-city neighborhoods, traditional high-rise public housing developments quickly became symbols of extreme poverty. These developments were and remain located mostly in densely populated urban ghettos. They continue to isolate many low-income and black populations from the economic growth and opportunities budding in the metropolitan periphery. As this brief review shows, urban decay was and continues to be a product of many intertwined factors.

In the 1960s, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) policy objectives be-

gan to reflect the crucial link between place and opportunity.¹⁸ In 1993, President Clinton's Secretary of HUD, Henry Cisneros, claimed that "highly concentrated minority poverty [is] urban America's toughest challenge."¹⁹ Poverty de-concentration has since become a primary goal of the HUD and has led to the creation of one of its largest housing programs today, the Housing Choice Voucher Program. Tenant-based programs, such as the HCV program, rely far less on increasing the physical supply of affordable housing through traditional public housing. HUD now invests more in the HCV program and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program than in traditional public housing.²⁰ This program provides low-income families the option of moving away from segregated and poor inner-city communities.

HCVs were first introduced to HUD's policy toolbox in 1981 as a modified version of Section 8 housing. The Reagan administration pushed for the HCV program because the administration's prevailing sentiment was that the cost of existing assisted housing programs, not their poor conditions, was the primary problem for poor residents.²¹ The administration's primary goals were to both cut the costs of assisted housing and decrease government involvement in the execution of assisted housing interventions. Vouchers appeared to fit both of these requirements since they enable low-income residents to rent private market homes.²² Voucher-recipients are responsible for paying 30 percent of the fair market rent, and a local public housing authority covers the remainder. Section 8 was formally merged and eventually replaced by the housing voucher program in 1998.²³ Unlike their predecessor, housing vouchers are not geographically restricted to a PHA's jurisdiction and can actually be used anywhere in the nation. A study by Hartung and Henig (1997) found that between the 1970s and 1990, the "ratio of tenant-based to project-based subsidies increased from 0.6 vouchers to 4.75 vouchers per every unit of project-based housing."²⁴ The HCV program was initially greeted with angst by Democrats and driven by the conservative bloc.

With President George H.W. Bush's administration came a more positive atmosphere and bipartisan consensus. The Housing Act of 1990 signaled a paradigm shift for assisted housing policy; Hays identifies its four key elements to be: a "reliance on tenant-based assistance programs, an increased reliance on CDCs, an emphasis on increased low-income home-owner-

ship, and the integration of other social features.”²⁵ This last element is perhaps of most importance to this study. The 1990 Act recognizes that place-based policies cannot operate successfully in a vacuum and must be conducted in concert with other social service initiatives. Hays argues that those on the right favored this latter element because they saw an integrated approach to social services as the path to self-sufficiency. While Democrats agreed about these long-term goals, they argued that this outlook was far too individualistic and minimized the structural barriers to socioeconomic mobility. Nevertheless, this dual emphasis on people and place-based intervention has become the prevailing ideology in affordable housing policy.

In its official documentation, HUD explicitly states a primary policy objective of the HCV program: “Providing opportunities for very low-income families to obtain rental housing outside areas of poverty or minority concentration is an important goal of the housing choice voucher program.”²⁶ Additionally, HUD states that it seeks to identify low-poverty neighborhoods, recruit landlords in these neighborhoods, encourage families to move away from high-poverty and segregated neighborhoods, and connect families to agencies that provide relocation counseling.²⁷ At a more local level, the Atlanta Housing Authority identifies poverty levels, crime, and access to jobs, transportation, and good schools as priorities in its provision of vouchers.

Geography of Housing Choice Vouchers

Because a key imperative of the HCV program is to improve neighborhood conditions for low-income residents, the location of vouchers is vital to assessing the program’s effectiveness. In theory, PHAs encourage voucher recipients to move to higher income neighborhoods, but voucher recipients face serious barriers in reaching this ideal end.²⁸ Several qualitative studies have been completed to document the motivations, preferences, barriers, and processes that drive where voucher participants tend to relocate. Rent and size criteria set forth by local public housing agencies drive the search strategies for choosing homes, and suburban discrimination, social isolation, and excessive utility and transportation costs are among the most cited concerns for HCV participants.²⁹

Beyond the mere location of vouchers lies the question of the quality of neighborhoods in which voucher-holding families are living. Studies by Goetz,

Kingsley et al., and Devine et al. each indicate that a significant proportion of voucher recipients, both traditional and those relocating from public housing under HOPE VI, are moving to neighborhoods with above-average poverty rates. Devine et al. find that 22 percent of voucher recipients lived in census tracts in which at least 30 percent of residents live under the poverty line in 2000, and 10 percent of the voucher recipients live in census tracts with 40 or more percent poverty.³⁰ Galvez finds a small decrease in the share of voucher recipients living in high poverty neighborhoods; however, she notes that the typical voucher recipient lives in a neighborhood with above 20 percent poverty.³¹ In their study, Kingsley et al focus on vouchers given to residents moving from public housing.³² They find that this group of voucher recipients moves to neighborhoods poorer than the national average. Goetz reports that this group of participants moved to neighborhoods that have increasing poverty rates, and those who relocate multiple times tend to move to neighborhoods with even greater poverty after subsequent moves.³³ Thus, my review uncovers modest improvements in poverty rates in destination neighborhoods and finds that voucher recipients are moving to neighborhoods that have rising poverty rates. These empirical observations are troubling as they may indicate a deviation from HUD’s goal to increase socioeconomic mobility.

Of special relevance to this study, recent HUD data show that a significant percentage of vouchers are being used in the suburbs, indicating at least some success at deconcentrating the poverty found in public housing developments. Covington, Freeman, and Stoll use HUD’s “Picture of Subsidized Households” (PSH) dataset to measure the percentage of voucher recipients who live in urban versus suburban census tracts; their national study is longitudinal and find that 50 percent of vouchers are being used in suburban neighborhoods in 2008.³⁴

Suburbia Redefined

Merely the issue of suburban relocation of HCVs is not a troublesome phenomenon in itself. Recent data challenge the utopic veneration of American suburbia. An article by Garr and Kneebone, entitled “The Suburbanization of Poverty,”³⁵ uses data from the 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey and finds that American suburbs collectively had a higher share of the nation’s poor relative to central cities by

2008. Additionally, the study argues that suburbs are home to the fastest growing poverty rates, finding a 25 percent growth in suburban poverty nationwide. Atlanta in fact has the highest share of its metropolitan low-income residents living in the suburbs at 84.5 percent.³⁶

This rise in absolute and relative suburban poverty within the metropolitan context has prompted scholars to uncover a wide range of new and uniquely suburban challenges. Press, Murphy, and Allard and Roth write about a general dearth of social service providers in suburban municipalities.³⁷ Troublingly, Garr finds that by 2010, the number of unemployed in the nation's suburbs grew by 3.1 million people, which inevitably increased the demand for many of these services. Murphy and Hanlon warn against treating all suburbs as one and the same. While some inner-ring suburbs are similar to urban neighborhoods, others have pockets of deep poverty that go unnoticed by funders. These suburbs especially lack the necessary social and political infrastructure for handling rising poverty. Murphy refers to these suburbs as existing in "policy blind spots."³⁸

The Concern

The suburbanization of HCVs unravels the notion of suburban prosperity. Although studies indicate that the HCV program in general has made strides in decentralizing poverty, it is unclear whether voucher participants are indeed moving to higher quality and opportunity-rich neighborhoods. Pendall and Devine et al. find that voucher recipients in the HCV program tend to live in distressed neighborhoods.³⁹ Popkin et al. say that PHAs need to be wary of the clustering of voucher recipients in poor neighborhoods.⁴⁰

The existing literature does not directly study the influence of suburban poverty on the experiences of HCV families. Additionally, scholars often only consider the consequences of poverty levels that lie above the 40 percent threshold. However, it may be important to document the effects of lower poverty rates given the challenges that some suburban neighborhoods may face. Depending on the findings, this project may reveal key vulnerabilities in the implementation of this program, thereby deviating from a primary goal of the HCV program to provide low-income families with opportunities to leave segregated and poor neighborhoods and access more opportunities for socioeconomic mobility. The dual forces of rising sub-

urban poverty and the suburban decentralization of housing vouchers are quite possibly creating a new range of challenges for public housing authorities and related actors in Atlanta.

Research Questions

My primary research question is as follows: is the suburban spread of Housing Choice Vouchers to low-income suburban neighborhoods aligning with HUD's primary policy goal of helping families move into neighborhoods that provide better opportunities for socioeconomic mobility in the case of Atlanta, Georgia? Supporting questions include:

- Over the past decade, how has the urban-suburban distribution of Housing Choice Vouchers changed in the Atlanta metropolitan area?
- Has there been a deconcentration of vouchers in the Atlanta metropolitan area?
- What types of neighborhoods are voucher recipients mostly relocating to?
- Has the quality of destination voucher neighborhoods changed between 2000 and 2009?
- Does the quality of destination neighborhoods vary by location (i.e. suburban or urban location), and if so, has this pattern changed between 2000 and 2009?

Hypotheses

Based on existing literature and recent demographic and geographic trends, two concerns emerge: (1) the intra-metropolitan locations of HCVs and (2) the quality of destination neighborhoods. In attempts to answer the primary research concern and supporting question, I build upon existing literature to posit the following hypotheses. Each of these hypotheses requires a distinct methodological approach that is described in the subsequent section.

Ho (1): Suburban HCV neighborhoods are not of higher quality than urban HCV neighborhoods regardless of the number and percentage of voucher-occupied households.

Ha (1): Suburban HCV neighborhoods are of higher quality than urban neighborhoods regardless of the number and percentage of voucher-occupied households.

Ho (2): As the quality of a neighborhood increases, the proportion of HCV-occupied households increases.

Ha (2): As the quality of a neighborhood increases, the proportion of HCV-occupied households decreases.

Ho (3): Urban neighborhoods provide weaker opportunity structures than suburban neighborhoods within the Atlanta metropolitan area.

Ha (3): Urban neighborhoods provide stronger opportunity structures than suburban neighborhoods within the Atlanta metropolitan area.

THE DATA

Independent Variable

The independent variable in this study is the number or proportion of housing choice vouchers in a census tract. To collect this data, I use HUDs “Picture of Subsidized Households”⁴¹ (PSH) dataset, which contains national data on all of HUD’s subsidized housing programs. The PSH dataset is available from 1996-2009 and contains data at various geographic scales ranging, from the census tract to the national level. This study follows common practice and uses data from the census tract level to best capture intra-metropolitan variation.⁴² From the PSH dataset, I use the “number of vouchers reported” variable as the count variable for number of vouchers in each census tract. This data may underrepresent the true number of vouchers due to underreporting or misreporting by local PHAs. Particularly, I chose four years of data for analysis: 2000, 2004, 2007 and 2009. These years adequately reflect the change in metropolitan poverty over the past decade and fit the data limitations of the PSH datasets.⁴³

I will rely on Atlanta Regional Commission’s ten-county definition for describing the Atlanta Metropolitan Area. I specifically address Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb, Douglass, Fayette, Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, and Rockdale Counties. Following OMB standards, neighborhoods located within the “City of Atlanta” will be considered urban and the remaining will be considered suburban. As stated previously, this rather crude distinction between urban and suburban neighborhoods does not intend to overlook or simplify the great diversity that that lies within the broad concept of suburbia. Rather, this simplification merely aids in carrying out this empirical analysis.

Table 1 describes the data extracted from the PSH dataset in the 10-county ARC area over the four time points. In 2000, 16,236 vouchers were spread throughout the 565 census tracts in the metropolitan area. This number rises to 28,250 by 2009. The growth in the population of residents in the HCV program

reflects this rise in actual vouchers reported. 97-98 percent of families fall into the “very low-income” economic bracket in each year. Additionally, approximately 80 percent of the participating families are considered to earn extremely low incomes. The majority of the participants are of minority racial groups, primarily African-American. However, the percentage of black families receiving housing vouchers drops from 92.3 percent black in 2004 to 79 percent black in 2007. This change is most likely due to underreporting of data on the part of Atlanta-based housing authorities. As a participant in the Moving to Work Demonstration, the Atlanta Housing Authority was not required to report data to HUD in 2007.

Data Sources

The dependent variables are two indices that measure neighborhood quality and access to opportunities that promote socioeconomic mobility. This study builds upon existing methodologies to construct measures of neighborhood quality that align with HUDs goals for the HCV program. Table 2 provides the names, geographies, and availabilities of the constituent indicators found in the first index, which this study will refer to as the “Composite Neighborhood Quality Index” (CNQI) from here onwards. Table 3 provides a complete list of the indicators included in the second index, which this study will refer to as the “Opportunity Index” from here onwards. This second index essentially is a subset of the first index. The methodology for the construction of these indices is adapted from work by Dr. Michael Rich and Dr. Moshe Haspel at Emory University.⁴⁴

This section provides greater detail regarding the data sources, coding, and rationales for including each of these above-listed indicators.

Poverty Rate. In 2012, the federal poverty threshold was \$23,283 for a family of four with two children, and varies on an annual basis.⁴⁵

Educational Quality. I operationalize educational quality through the percentage of students meeting standards on the Fourth Grade CRCT, the Georgia state exam, at the school level.

Healthcare Access. I measure healthcare access via two proxy measures: (1) designation as a medically underserved community (MUA) and (2) proximity to a Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) supported “Health Center.” The HRSA designates areas that have “too

CONSEQUENCES OF RISING SUBURBAN POVERTY ON THE HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM

	All Vouchers			
	2000	2004	2007	2009
Number of Vouchers	16,236	19,168	16,630	28,250
Population	48,000	58,109	48,326	77,113
Average Household Income	11,441.63	11,761.41	13,259.3	12,090.00
% Very Low Income	98.57	98.60129	97.65	97.05
% Extremely Low Income	80.65	83.95177	80.09	80.89
Majority Income Welfare	8.4	9.765273	5.76	6.20
% Minority	92.07	93.78778	81.169	94.09
% Black	90.48	92.35	79.049	91.93
% Native American/ Pac. Islander	.081	0.086	0.10	0.14
% Hispanic	3.38	3.9	4.36	4.28
% Surrounding Neighborhood in Poverty	18.30	12.62	12.32	15.24
% Surrounding Neighborhood Minority	74.85	52.05	52.71	64.08

Source: Picture of Subsidized Housing, HUD

Table 2: Indicators in the Composite Quality Index

Indicator	Geography	2000	2004	2007	2009	Source
Poverty Rate	Census Tract	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	2010 Census, 2005-2009 ACS
Educational Quality	Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	National Longitudinal School-Level State Assessment Database; Dept. of Education
Foreclosure Filings	Census Tract	No	No	Yes	Yes	Equity Depot
Access to Transportation	Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ARC GIS Basefiles; MARTA
Number of Non-profits	Zip Code	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	County Business Patterns
Healthcare Access	Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)
Medically Underserved Areas	Census Tract	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)
% Of Households on Public Assistance	Census Tract	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	2005-2009 ACS; 2010 Census
Vacancy Rate	Census Tract	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	2005-2009 ACS; 2010 Census
% Of Renter Occupied Households	Census Tract	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	2005-2009 ACS; 2010 Census

Table 3: Indicators in the Opportunity Index

Indicator	Geography	2000	2004	2007	2009	Source
Educational Quality	Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	National Longitudinal School-Level State Assessment Database; Dept. of Education
Access to Transportation	Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ARC GIS Basefiles
Number of Non-profits	Zip Code	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	County Business Patterns
Healthcare Access	Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)
Medically Underserved Areas	Census Tract	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)
Number of Jobs	Zip Code	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	2005-2009 ACS; 2010 Census

Table 4: Numbers of Vouchers in City and Suburban Census Tracts

	City		Suburbs	
	Vouchers	City	Vouchers	Suburb
2000	6769	41.69%	9467	58.31%
2004	6856	42.37%	9325	57.63%
2007	1758	10.57%	14872	89.43%
2009	10594	37.50%	17656	62.49%

Data Source: Picture of Subsidized Housing 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009; Department of Subsidized Housing

few primary care providers, high infant mortality, high poverty, and/or high elderly populations⁶ as medically underserved areas or populations.⁴⁷ HRSA health centers are responsible for providing quality primary care for traditionally underserved populations, including those who are homeless or live in public housing.

Access to Public Transportation. For these indices, access to transportation is operationalized via proximity to a bus stop. I use GIS to geocode bus routes operated by three large public transportation providers in the ten-county ARC region: the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, Cobb County Transit, and Clayton County C-Tran.

Foreclosures. To account for the number of foreclosures in each neighborhood, I use data compiled by the “Neighborhood Nexus” database.⁴⁸ The data comes from the private firm “Equity Depot” and measure the number of foreclosure filings in each neighborhood. Foreclosure filings refer to properties that are eligible for public auction, and may skew the true number of foreclosures in a neighborhood.

Access to Social Service Providers and Jobs. To account for access to social service providers, I follow Murphy’s methodology. To isolate data on social service providers, I extracted data for NAICS Industry Code 624190, which refers to “Other Individual and Family Services.” This category “comprises establishments primarily engaged in providing nonresidential individual and family social service assistance services.”⁴⁹ The dataset’s primary drawback is that it only contains organizations that pay formal payroll and leaves out single-employee institutions.

Public Assistance, Vacancy Rates, Percent of Renters, and Unemployment Rate.⁵⁰ Public assistance refers to payments that families can receive in the form of aid from the government and includes payments to families with disabled children (AFDC, ADC), temporary assistance to needy families (TANF), and emergency assistance. Vacancy rate refers to the percentage of households that are unoccupied by tenants within given geographic boundaries. The proportion of renters equals the number of renter-occupied to total occupied households in a census tract.

METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

The empirical portion of the paper is divided into three parts: the location of housing choice voucher re-

ipients in the Atlanta metropolitan area, the quality of neighborhoods in which voucher recipients live, and the opportunity structures within each of these neighborhoods. Each section provides the methodology for hypothesis testing, when applicable, and then lists the results.

Location of Vouchers in the 10-County ARC Region Methods

For the sake of privacy, the PSH dataset does not provide geographic data for each individual voucher or family, though it still provides geographic information at the census tract level. I created maps that depict both the numbers and proportion of voucher-occupied households for each of the years. To look for clustering, I use a measure of residential evenness and calculate an index of dissimilarity for each of the years. Massey and Denton define the index:

[The index of dissimilarity] measures departure from evenness by taking the weighted mean absolute deviation of every unit’s minority proportion from the city’s minority proportion, and expressing this quantity as a proportion of its theoretical maximum.⁵¹

The equation for index of dissimilarity follows (Equation 1). This index represents the percentage of vouchers that would need to be relocated in the metropolitan area to reach an even distribution of vouchers across the entire 10-county metropolitan area.

$$D = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{t_i |p_i - P|}{2TP(1 - P)} \quad \text{Equation 1}$$

Results: Location of Vouchers

1) Suburban versus Urban Location

Since 2000, suburban census tracts have contained more HCVs than those within the City of Atlanta, proper (Refer to Table 4). The City of Atlanta contained 6,769 voucher recipients in 2000 and 10,594 in 2009. The drastic decline in the City of Atlanta’s HCV’s in 2007 is most probably due to underreporting by the Atlanta Housing Authority and other city PHAs. By contrast, suburban census tracts were home to 9,467 voucher recipients in 2000 and 17,656 HCVs in 2009. Suburban census tracts have had a greater share of the metropolitan area’s HCVs since 2000, and their share has increased since then. In 2000, suburban census tracts contained 58.31 percent of the metropolitan area’s vouchers, and by 2009, they contained 62.49 percent. More recent data would most likely in-

dicating further growth in this share.

The maps in Figure 1 illustrate the distribution of vouchers in the 10-county metropolitan area by census tract. To highlight change, the counts of HCVs per census tract were ranked and sorted into terciles of low, medium, and high numbers of vouchers. In 2000, the loci of high voucher census tracts were the southern half of the City of Atlanta, South DeKalb County, Clayton County, and tracts in Fulton County just south of the City of Atlanta. In 2004, tracts in West Cobb County, South DeKalb County, Douglas County and portions of Gwinnett County saw major increases in the number of vouchers. These same areas saw further increases by 2007. The decrease in vouchers in the City of Atlanta evident in the 2007 map is most likely due to underreporting and is not an empirically valid pattern. Minimal changes occurred between 2007 and 2009 in terms of the geographic distribution of HCVs. These maps indicate a degree of decentralization of HCVs from traditional core of Public Housing, namely the City of Atlanta. While the decentralization of vouchers is meaningful and does align with the overarching goals of housing mobility programs, decentralization itself does not imply an improvement in the quality of destination neighborhoods. The second aspect of the evaluation of the HCV program is to measure the extent to which HCVs are concentrated.

2) Concentration of Vouchers

In 2000, 64.6 percent of vouchers would have to be relocated to reach parity with the total number of occupied households. This value was 53.5 percent in 2004, 52.3 percent in 2007, and 56.3 percent in 2009. Thus, it appears that there was a degree of deconcentration of the number of vouchers between 2000 and 2007; however, since 2009, HCVs have been re-concentrated in select census tracts.

The following maps (refer to Figure 2) depict the proportion of vouchers to occupied households in each census tract. As in the previous maps, census tracts were divided into terciles. In 2000, the census tracts with the highest proportions of vouchers to total occupied housing units were mostly located within the City of Atlanta, in northern Clayton, and in southwest DeKalb County. In 2004, Clayton County, South DeKalb, and South Fulton Counties experienced a rise in tracts with high proportions of vouchers to occupied housing units. This pattern continues in 2007 and 2009, with Cobb County also experiencing an

increase in high voucher proportion tracts. The 2007 map is skewed by underreported Atlanta data. Loci of high voucher proportion tracts are highlighted with black circles.

Neighborhood Quality

This section explores the quality of neighborhoods in which voucher participants live. For this portion of the empirical study, the unit of analysis is that of the census tract. The independent variable is the classification of each census tract as either urban or suburban. The dependent variable for hypotheses one and two is “neighborhood quality,” which is measured by the CNQI index.

To construct the CNQI index, I needed to operate on a standard geography. I use GIS mapping techniques to reconcile the geographic discrepancies found in the raw data and tagged addresses to the centroid of the closest census tract. After the geographies were in sync, I constructed a composite score for each of the tracts. I calculated z-scores to standardize the values for each of the indicators- except for the dummy variables- around the population mean. Then, I summed the various z-scores and calculated a score for each census tract.

1) Hypothesis 1:

Ho (1): Suburban HCV neighborhoods are not of higher quality than urban HCV neighborhoods regardless of the number and percentage of voucher-occupied households.

This analysis consists of three parts: first, I looked for differences in neighborhood quality between urban and suburban tracts without any control variables. Secondly, I looked for differences in neighborhood quality between urban and suburban tracts when controlling for the number of vouchers. I ranked the number of vouchers in each census tract and sorted the census tracts into low, medium, or high numbers of vouchers. I used one-directional t-tests to statistically compare the mean neighborhood quality scores for each neighborhood. Thirdly, I looked for differences in neighborhood quality between urban and suburban tracts when controlling for the proportion of housing voucher-occupied households in each census tract. I also ranked these proportions of vouchers for each year and separated the census tracts into low, medium, or high proportions numbers of vouchers. I then used one-directional t-tests to statistically compare the mean neighborhood quality scores be-

Figure 1: Terciles of Housing Choice Vouchers; 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009





Figure 2: Terciles of the Proportion of HCV-Occupied Housing Units; 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009



Data Source: Picture of Subsidized Housing 2000, 2004, 2009

Table 5: Summary Statistics of CNQI Scores

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max	Number of Observations
2000	-0.869	4.168	-17.039	8.912	417
2004	1.333	5.982	-18.107	19.536	495
2007	-0.607	5.202	-24.879	12.186	476
2009	-0.481	4.871	-22.969	10.993	500

tween suburban and urban census tracts. To falsify the null hypothesis, tests must show that suburban tracts have lower CNQI scores than urban neighborhoods.

2) Hypothesis 2:

Ho (2): As the quality of a neighborhood increases, the proportion of HCV-occupied households increases.

Hypothesis Two seeks to establish a relationship between neighborhood quality and its proportion of voucher-occupied households. To test for this relationship, I once again used a bivariate regression between the proportion of voucher-occupied households and neighborhood quality, operationalized by the CNQI index. To falsify the null hypothesis, the proportion of voucher-occupied households must not decrease as the CNQI score increases.

Results

Table 5 lists the summary statistics for the CNQI for census tracts that contain at least one voucher in 2000, 2004, 2007, and 2009, respectively.

In 2000, the mean CNQI score is -0.08687, followed by 1.333, -0.6074, and -0.4805 in the subsequent years. The standard deviations around the means stay relatively constant between 4.168 in 2000 and 5.982 in 2004. To better illustrate the metropolitan distribution of CNQI scores, I ranked and divided scores for all census tracts, including those containing zero HCVs, into quintiles. A score of 1 refers to the lowest quintile of scores, and a score of five refers to the highest quintile of scores. The following maps depict the CNQI scores in the ten-county ARC region (Figure 3).

In 2000, the majority of the highest quality neighborhoods were located in East Cobb County, North DeKalb, North Fulton, and in Gwinnett Counties. On the other hand, the lowest quality neighborhoods were located in the southern half of the City of Atlanta and Clayton County. Similarly, neighborhoods with scores in the second quintile of scores are found in Rockdale, Henry, and Douglass Counties. In 2004, the majority of the highest quality neighborhoods were located in


East Cobb County, North DeKalb, North Fulton, and in Gwinnett Counties. By contrast, the lowest quality neighborhoods are located in the southern half of the City of Atlanta and Clayton County. Similarly, neighborhoods with scores in the second quintile of scores are found in Rockdale, Henry, and Douglass Counties. Minimal changes appear to have taken place between 2000 and 2004.

In 2007, the majority of the highest quality neighborhoods were located in East Cobb County, North DeKalb, North Fulton, and in Gwinnett Counties. The lowest quality neighborhoods were located in the southern half of the City of Atlanta and Clayton County. Similarly, neighborhoods with scores in the second quintile of scores were found in Rockdale, Henry, and Douglass Counties. Additionally, neighborhoods in South DeKalb County appeared to have seen decreases in CNQI scores compared to 2000 and 2004 whereas Cherokee County had more census tracts in the highest quintile of scores. In 2009, the majority of the highest quality neighborhoods were located in East Cobb County, North DeKalb, North Fulton, and in Gwinnett Counties. Contrastingly, the lowest quality neighborhoods were located in the southern half of the City of Atlanta and in Clayton and South Fulton Counties. Similarly, neighborhoods with scores in the second quintile of scores were found in Rockdale, Henry, South DeKalb, and Douglass Counties. Compared to earlier years, a more salient north-south divide appeared. Tracts south of the 1-20 corridor generally seemed to be in the bottom two quintiles whereas those north appeared to be in the highest two quintiles.

1) Suburban versus Urban

This next section addresses the key questions of this study: Does a neighborhood's urban or suburban characteristic influence neighborhood quality? Moreover, do the numbers of vouchers and the proportion of voucher occupied households within each neighborhood influence this relationship? To test this hypothesis, I classified the census tracts that contained

Figure 3: Quintiles of Composite Neighborhood Quality Index Scores, 2000, 2004, 2007 & 2009



at least one voucher as either urban or suburban, based on their location inside or outside of the formal boundaries of the City of Atlanta. A one-directional unpaired t-test for difference of means finds that a neighborhood's urban or suburban location has a statistically significant impact on its quality. Specifically, the scores of suburban tracts were significantly higher than urban tracts, as the $p=0.00$ for $H_a=\text{suburb-city}>0$ for all years. The results of these tests are presented in Table 6 below.

While these findings are interesting themselves, I then evaluated the relationship between the number and proportion of voucher-occupied households and a neighborhood's quality. To do so, I ranked all the census tracts that contain vouchers into three groups: low, medium, and high numbers of vouchers for each of the four years. Then, I performed a series of unpaired difference of means t-tests for each of the terciles. The results are displayed in Table 7. Suburban census tracts have statistically significant higher scores than urban census tracts in 2000, 2004, and 2009, at all three levels of voucher quantities. In 2007, only suburban tracts with the lowest terciles of vouchers had higher scores.

These unpaired t-tests were also performed with an independent variable of the proportion of vouchers per total occupied households in each census tract. As with the previous set of t-tests, the proportion of voucher values were ranked and divided into terciles: low, medium, and high proportions of vouchers. The results are displayed in Table 8. Suburban census tracts had higher scores than urban census tracts in 2000 and 2009 at all three levels of voucher quantities at the $\alpha=0.05$ significance level. At low proportions of vouchers, there was no significant difference in suburban and urban census tract scores in 2004. In 2007, urban tracts with the highest terciles of vouchers had higher scores than their urban counterparts at the $\alpha=0.05$ level of significance, which followed the pattern set by the previous tests.

2) Suburban versus Urban Neighborhoods, Longitudinal Analysis.

To account for missing data, I removed the indicators that were not available for all four years, namely school quality and the number of foreclosure filings and recalculated the index. Then, I compared the two indices using Pearson Correlation Coefficients. The high coefficients, ranging from $r=0.922$ to $r=0.9799$, depicted in Table 9, illustrate that removing the two

measures does not make a large impact on the overall composite score. This recalculated index lends itself for longitudinal analysis. Although suburban tracts consistently have higher scores, the disparity between urban and suburban tracts stays relatively constant over the decade. From 2007 to 2009, the quality of suburban and urban tracts grows a little more similar. The small sample size of four years precludes long-term conclusions.

3) Relationship between Proportion of Voucher-Occupied Households and Neighborhood Quality

This study now attempts to forge connections between the two established patterns: the location of vouchers and the quality of neighborhoods with voucher-occupied households. To do so, I use multivariate linear regressions to predict the effect of a neighborhood's CNQI score on its proportion of voucher-occupied households. Then, I observe the relationship while controlling for a neighborhood's total population, racial minority population, and its suburban or urban location. The outputs of the regressions are provided in Table 10. Model 1 denotes the regression with no controls, model two includes controls for a tract's minority population and total population, and model three includes an interaction term for a tract's urban or suburban location.

When excluding all controls, CNQI score has a significant and negative effect on the proportion of voucher-occupied households in a neighborhood in all four years (See Model 1). In 2000, as the CNQI score increases by one point, the proportion of voucher-occupied households decreases by 0.0036 percent. The proportion of voucher-occupied households decreases by 0.002 percent in 2004, by 0.00054 percent in 2007, and by 0.0034 percent in 2009. When I added the controls for race and population in model two, the effect of the CNQI index retained its significant influence on the proportion of voucher-occupied households. The small coefficients suggest a small effect, but these findings are still interesting. Additionally, this model finds that as a tract's minority population increases, the proportion of voucher-occupied households increases. The influence of a tract's population is only significant in 2000 and 2004.

Model three adds an interaction term between the CNQI score and a tract's urban or suburban classification. A tract's urban classification has a significant effect only in 2004, 2007, and 2009 on its proportion of voucher-occupied households. In 2004 and 2009,

Table 6: Difference of Means between Urban and Suburban Tracts

	Observations	City Means	Observations	Suburb Means	Abs. Value of Diff	p-values
2000	92	-4.954	325	0.288	3.62	0.00*
2004	117	-1.273	446	2.53	1.257	0.00*
2007	83	-1.347	393	-0.451	0.896	0.077**
2009	106	-3.279	394	0.272	0.272	0.00*

*Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at α<0.10

Table 7: Difference of Means between Suburban and Urban Tracts by Number of Vouchers

		Observations	City	Observations	Suburbs	p-values
2000	Low Vouchers (1-6)	22	-3.55	121	1.57	0.00*
	Medium Vouchers (7-30)	18	-7.16	121	.180	0.00*
	High Vouchers (37-569)	52	-4.79	84	-1.43	0.00*
2004	Low Vouchers (1-6)	22	1.789	121	3.74	0.0832**
	Medium Vouchers (7-30)	18	-4.90	121	1.38	0.00*
	High Vouchers (37-569)	53	-4.17	82	-.43	0.00*
2007	Low Vouchers (1-8)	34	-1.88	130	1.85	0.0001*
	Medium Vouchers (9-35)	34	-1.65	125	-0.54	0.1389
	High Vouchers (36-298)	15	0.55	138	-2.55	0.9935
2009	Low Vouchers (1-11)	26	1.05	145	3.30	0.0042*
	Medium Vouchers (12-52)	28	-2.29	137	-0.63	0.0273*
	High Vouchers (53-679)	52	-5.98	112	-2.55	0.00*

*Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at p<0.10

Table 8: Difference of Means between Suburban and Urban Tracts by Proportion of Vouchers

		N	City Means	N	Suburb Means	Suburb>city
2000	Low	14	-1.75	126	1.57	0.0005*
	Medium	17	-5.04	122	0.35	0.000*
	High	61	-5.66	77	-1.91	0.00*
2004	Low	14	3.79	126	3.86	0.4838
	Medium	17	-0.98	122	1.39	0.0428*
	High	62	-4.94	77	-1.00	0.00*
2007	Low	35	0.86	124	0.49	0.7548
	Medium	37	-0.17	121	-0.31	0.603
	High	11	0.68	147	-0.90	0.9816
2009	Low	29	1.38	167	2.77	0.058**
	Medium	33	-3.47	166	-0.84	0.002*
	High	44	-6.21	166	-3.73	0.0001*

*Significant at p=0.05; **Significant at p=0.10

Table 9: Pearson Correlation Coefficients

2000	0.9662
2004	0.92222
2007	0.9472
2009	0.9799

Table 10: Multivariate Regressions between CNQI and Proportion of Voucher-Occupied Households

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Model 1 (no controls)</i>	<i>Model 2 (Without interaction)</i>	<i>Model 3 (with interaction)</i>
<i>2000</i>			
CNQI	-0.0036* (0.00036)	-0.0016* (0.0004)	-0.0015* (.000527)
Minority		0.00045* (0.00005)	4.49e-04* (4.7e-05)
Total Population		-0.000106* (0.000407)	-1.005e-06* (4.23e-07)
CNQI * City			-0.0001 (0.0007)
Constant	0.020* (0.0015)	0.0038 (0.004)	0.0038* (0.0042)
R²	0.19	0.36	0.36
<i>2004</i>			
CNQI	-0.002* (0.00019)	-0.00075* (0.000201)	-0.0005* (0.0002)
Minority		0.00096* (0.000039)	0.00052* (0.0004)
Total Population		0.00049* (0.00000036)	-5.82e-07* (3.00e-07)
CNQI * City			-0.00026* (0.00035)
Constant	0.024* (0.0012)	0.002 (0.0035)	0.00055* (0.003)
R²	0.17	0.392	0.47
<i>2007</i>			
CNQI	-0.0005* (0.0149)	-0.00075* (0.0002)	-0.00063* (0.00028)
Minority		9.60E-07* (3.51E-07)	0.0002* (3.32e-05)
Total Population		0.00049 (0.000039)	-1.50e-07 (1.90e-07)
CNQI * City			-0.0016* (0.00043)
Constant	0.015* (0.0008)	0.002* (0.0035)	0.0079* (0.0025)
R²	0.02	0.064	0.076
<i>2009</i>			
CNQI	-0.0034* (0.00046)	-0.0010514* (0.0002)	-0.001* (0.0008)
Minority		1.43E-07* (1.91E-07)	0.000745* (9.79e-05)
Total Population		0.0001557 (0.00003)	1.25e-06* (4.69e-07)
CNQI * City			0.002* (0.0009)
Constant	0.027* (0.002)	0.007* (0.0025)	-0.02* (0.007)
R²	0.098	0.198	0.204

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Table 11: Summary Statistics: Opportunity Index

	Mean	Std Dev.	Min	Max	Number of Observations
2000	0.00548	2.593	-8.047	8.738	564
2004	1.543	4.539	-8.938	16.97	564
2007	1.94x10 ⁻⁸	2.986	-9.11	7.565	564
2009	1.89x 10 ⁻⁸	2.695	-8.876	8.571	564

this effect is negative, whereas in 2007, the effect is positive. These findings do not lend to any clear patterns. A tract’s suburban classification has a negative relationship with the proportion of voucher-occupied households. For suburban tracts, as the CNQI score increases by one point, the proportion of voucher-occupied households decreases by 0.15, 0.05, 0.063, and 0.1 percentage points in 2000, 2004, 2007, and 2009 respectively. Similarly, the proportion of vouchers very minimally decreases as a neighborhood’s population increases by one person in 2000 and 2004. In 2009, the proportion of voucher-occupied households marginally increases with total population. Interestingly, the proportion of voucher-occupied households marginally increases as the percentage of a neighborhood’s minority population increases; the coefficients for the minority and total population variables are extremely small.

Opportunity Structure

While suburban neighborhoods are theoretically categorized as being collectively of higher quality than urban neighborhoods, research by Murphy⁵² and Hanlon⁵³ challenge the popular image of American suburbia. They argue that many suburbs lack the social structure that helps encourage socioeconomic mobility for low-income families. This study contributes to this emerging body of literature by creating an index for opportunity structures at the census tract level. This second index contains a subset of the indicators

in the CNQI which more directly relate to providing opportunities for socioeconomic mobility. These indicators are found in Table 11. I constructed this index using an identical method to the CNQI construction.

Ho (3): Urban neighborhoods provide weaker opportunity structures than suburban neighborhoods within the Atlanta metropolitan area.

First, I looked for differences in mean opportunity index scores between all urban and suburban tracts using one-directional t-tests. Then, I performed one-directional t-tests when controlling for the number of vouchers. To do so, I ranked the number of vouchers in each census tract and sorted the census tracts into low, medium, or high numbers of vouchers. Then, I control for the proportion of voucher-occupied households in each tract. The proportion of vouchers equals the number of vouchers reported divided by the total number of occupied housing units in the census tract. I ranked census tracts into low, medium, or high proportions of vouchers. I then used one-directional t-tests to statistically compare the mean neighborhood quality scores between suburban and urban census tracts. In order to falsify the null hypothesis, urban neighborhoods must have higher opportunity scores than suburban neighborhoods.

Results

Table 11 provides the descriptive statistics for the Opportunity Index.

In 2000, the mean score is 0.00548, followed by 1.543, 1.94 x 10⁻⁸, and 1.89 x 10⁻⁸ and -0.4805 in the

Table 12: Difference of Means between Urban and Suburban Opportunity Scores

	Observations	City Means	Observations	Suburb Means	p-values
2000	92	0.815	325	-0.575	0.00*
2004	117	3.6837	446	1.263	0.00*
2007	83	0.376	393	-0.282	0.023*
2009	106	0.71	394	-0.184	0.0007*

*p<0.05

**Table 13: Difference of Means Between Urban and Suburban Tracts Opportunity Index:
Sorted by Number of Vouchers**

		N (City)	City	Observations	N (Suburb)	p-values
2000	Low	22	1.784	121	-0.449	0.0005*
	Medium	18	-0.302	121	-0.649	0.269
	High	52	0.791	84	-0.650	0.00*
2004	Low	22	7.12	121	2.01	0.00*
	Medium	18	1.94	121	1.257	0.1087
	High	53	1.416	82	-0.6496	0.063**
2007	Low	33	0.587	130	1.35	0.9304
	Medium	35	-0.36	125	-0.754	0.275
	High	15	-0.281	138	-1.518	0.0216*
2009	Low	26	1.8915	145	0.693	0.0278*
	Medium	28	0.87	137	-0.843	0.0018*
	High	52	-0.089	112	-0.593	0.0626**

*Significant at $p < 0.05$; **Significant at $p < 0.10$ **Table 14: Difference of Means Between Urban and Suburban Tracts Opportunity Index
Sorted by Proportion of Voucher-Occupied Households**

		N (city)	City	N (Suburbs)	Suburbs	p-values
2000	Low	14	2.169	126	-0.417	0.001*
	Medium	17	0.909	122	-0.679	0.0035*
	High	61	0.477	77	-0.699	0.00*
2004	Low	14	7.710	126	1.867	0.0001*
	Medium	17	4.974	122	0.356	0.0001*
	High	62	1.199	77	0.1514	0.0464*
2007	Low	35	0.627	124	1.054	0.214
	Medium	11	0.0699	147	-1.544	0.0159*
	High	15	-0.281	138	-1.518	0.0216*
2009	Low	18	1.724	149	0.589	0.0621
	Medium	25	1.633	142	-0.907	0.00*
	High	63	-0.050	103	-0.391	0.133

significant at $p < 0.05$

subsequent years. The standard deviations around the means range between 2.593 in 2000 and 4.539 in 2004. The following maps depict the distribution of opportunity index scores in the 10-county ARC region. For these maps, I ranked the scores into terciles, as indicated by the legends. In Figure 4, areas within the City of Atlanta, as well as in North Fulton, DeKalb, and East Cobb counties rank the highest on this scale. Outer ring suburbs as well as all of the southern counties uniformly rank in the lowest tercile of scores. In 2004, tracts in Henry, Rockdale, and Gwinnett Counties all witnessed increases in their opportunity scores, while Clayton County tracts remained in the lowest terciles (Figure 4). The 2007 and 2009 data depict minimal changes 2000, except for improvements in western segments of Gwinnett counties. Clayton County still remained entirely in the lower tercile while northern counties remained in the highest. Thus, these data suggest that places like Clayton County have the weakest opportunity structures.

Urban versus Suburban Opportunity Scores. I perform a series of unpaired one-directional *t*-tests for each of the years. The results are displayed in Table 12. Urban census tracts have statistically significant higher scores than their suburban counterparts in all four years at the 0.05 significance level. These results suggest that urban census tracts within the City of Atlanta have stronger opportunity structures than those in the suburbs when taken as aggregate wholes.

I ranked all of the scores into three groups of low, medium, and high numbers of vouchers for each of the four years. I performed a series of unpaired one-directional *t*-tests for each of the years. The results are displayed in Table 13. Urban census tracts had statistically significant higher scores than their suburban counterparts in 2000, 2007, and 2009, at the lowest terciles of voucher frequency. Additionally, urban tract scores were consistently and significantly higher than suburban tract scores in every year for the top tercile of vouchers. Urban tracts in the second tercile only had higher scores than suburban tracts in 2009. However in 2004, suburban tracts with the fewest vouchers had higher scores than their urban counterparts. I then sort the census tracts into terciles on the basis of the proportion of voucher-occupied households. These results are displayed in Table 14. When using a one-directional test, urban tracts had significantly higher opportunity scores than suburban tracts at the $\alpha=0.05$ significance level for every tercile in 2000 and

2004. Urban tracts did score better in 2007 and 2009, but only for higher proportions of voucher-occupied households. Moreover, the *p*-values are larger, indicating a convergence in the later years.

DISCUSSION

The Location of Vouchers


The Housing Choice Voucher program has two primary geographic goals: to decentralize poverty and to deconcentrate urban poverty. This study's findings show that, aligning with Garr and Kneebone's⁴ results,⁵⁵ vouchers are slowly decentralizing poverty in Atlanta. Therefore, these vouchers meet the first goal of housing mobility programs. Suburban tracts in Atlanta consistently contained a higher share of vouchers between 2000 and 2009, and their share grew through the nine-year period. More current data would most likely show further decentralization. However, vouchers appear to be re-concentrating into specific portions of the metropolitan area. While Massey and Douglass's index of dissimilarity provides a rough measure of geographic unevenness, it fails to provide insight into the actual locations of concentration. The maps of the proportion of voucher-occupied households show new concentrations of vouchers in Clayton, South Fulton, and Henry counties (refer to Figure 2).

Juxtaposed against the promise of decentralization is this issue of re-concentration of vouchers in Atlanta's suburbs. Based on the findings, the neighborhoods where vouchers are re-concentrating are most likely to have weaker opportunity structures and offer less accessibility to necessary public and social services. Such a rise in voucher concentration in opportunity-poor suburbs presents new challenges for metropolitan-level planners and policy makers. These findings beg the question of why voucher-recipient families are segregating into these locations. Further research on the locations of voucher-eligible rental units may provide clarity on these patterns.

Neighborhood Quality

Beyond simply location of voucher recipient families, there lies the question of what quality of neighborhoods in vouchers tend to be located. This study's findings suggest an inverse relationship between a neighborhood's quality and its proportion of housing choice vouchers. That is, as the quality of the neighborhood improves, the proportion of vouch-

Figure 4: Opportunity Scores for 10-County ARC Region in 2000, 2004, 2007 & 2009



er-occupied households decreases. The majority of vouchers are found in the lowest quality of neighborhoods. Additionally, these findings suggest that, in 2004 and 2007, a neighborhood's urban location and CNQI score interact and lead to lower proportions of voucher-occupied households. In addition, a direct relationship exists between a neighborhood's minority population and vouchers, as depicted by Models 2 and 3 in Table 10. Further research may be needed to fully hash out this relationship. Residential location is mostly driven by the availability of rental homes. Thus, a coordinated effort between PHAs, state policies, real estate developers, and participants in the voucher program should be undertaken to map out existing properties and introduce incentives for the development of eligible renter properties in high quality neighborhoods. Additionally, even if rental properties are available in high quality neighborhoods both in the city and the suburbs, participants in the HCV program may not know about them or be willing to move to them. Neighborhood preferences are complex and are at least partially driven by a neighborhood's racial composition. Thus, as I will mention later, interviews with current residents can better inform the barriers participants face and give them more agency.

The minimal improvements in neighborhood quality between 2000 and 2009 are promising, but the limited scope of this study cannot determine whether this improvement is statistically significant. Much of this change derives from improvements in school quality, job growth, and the introduction of social service providers and medical centers. However, these improvements are not ubiquitously experienced throughout the metropolitan area. Significant variation still exists between the quality of neighborhoods in the southern portions within the city of Atlanta and in the peripheral counties. As depicted by Figures 3, all suburbs are not created equal. These maps provide strong evidence against the antiquated illustrations of utopic suburbia. Suburban tracts, particularly south of the I-20 corridor in South Fulton, Clayton, and Henry Counties have comparable CNQI scores to the poorest neighborhoods in the City of Atlanta. Regardless, when comparing suburban and urban neighborhoods as collective groups, suburban tracts came out on top in all four years. The same results appear when controlling for the proportion of vouchers in each neighborhood. Why, then are many suburbs still superior in overall neighborhood quality?

A further look into the data show that the characteristics that researchers traditionally use to measure neighborhood quality, such as the number of rental properties, foreclosures, and poverty rates, are driving the urban-suburban disparity in CNQI scores. Urban tracts score significantly lower for these indicators. The growing convergence in suburban and urban CNQI scores over time may be substantively marginal. Perhaps the ten-year time frame of this study and the error associated with the ACS data mask some degree of the longitudinal variations. A wider period of analysis would most likely illuminate more change in suburban and urban quality. From the perspective of low-income housing policy-makers, the suburbanization of vouchers in Atlanta enables some voucher recipients to reside in high quality neighborhoods.

Opportunity Structure

Despite these relative successes, these findings expose new sets of concerns for Atlanta-area PHAs and related policy-makers and social service delivery agencies. When looking specifically at indicators that measure the opportunity structures within neighborhoods, suburban neighborhoods do worse than neighborhoods within the City of Atlanta on the whole. Non-profits and social service providers are almost entirely absent from certain portions of the metropolitan area including in Clayton, Henry, and Rockdale counties. Public transportation is scarce in all suburban counties except for Cobb, Gwinnett, and Clayton counties. The data also reveal that southern suburban districts had relatively low percentages of students meeting the standards on the 4th grade Criteria-Referenced Competency Tests. For these and other reasons, opportunity structures are weak in many of the new nodes of voucher-occupied households. Still, some communities like in East Cobb and North Fulton counties appear to be exceptions to this statement. The relative superiority of these types of areas may be explained more by old-wealth and exclusionary land use policies.⁵⁶ Moreover, these areas are still predominantly white.

The geographic distribution of the opportunity scores appear to find a positive relationship between a suburban tract's proximity to the City of Atlanta and its opportunity structure.⁵⁷ Still, further research is necessary to make more solid conclusions. High-performing schools, relatively plentiful non-profit providers, new HRSA medical centers, and suburban

transit lines provide aid to the northern and eastern suburbs closest to the City of Atlanta. However, as distance increases, a gaping divide in public and social service provisions emerges. These patterns are logical due to historical patterns of urbanization and metropolitan change. As indicated in the brief review of Atlanta written above, for much of their modern history, Clayton, Fayette, Cobb, and Gwinnett counties were historically white, wealthy, and enjoyed low poverty rates. While some of these areas met the demands placed on them by rising poverty and racial change, others did not. Clayton county serves as the prime example of the latter, as its experiences with white flight were the most extreme. In 2009, the data indicated the difference between urban and suburban opportunity scores was not significant. While more recent data is necessary to observe trends, the 2009 data provide a semblance of good news.

Conclusions: Finding Solutions

When discussing how to move forward, a discussion of urban-suburban politics is relevant and necessary. While this study has special focus on Atlanta, one can safely assume similar conditions in other metropolitan areas; for this reason, this section is more broadly intended. Like in all political environments, sub-metropolitan level municipalities operate in environments of scarce resources. Logan and Schneider write that in many metropolitan areas, “[an] antagonistic relationship [exists] between cities and suburbs” as each competes for resources.⁵⁸ Such antagonism can be further applied to different types of suburbs. As these findings suggest, not all suburbs afford high opportunities and cannot be equated with the highest quality of life. Each municipality has unique and often conflicting interests. Logan and Schneider expand the suburban stratification theory:

[C]ertain characteristics of the political economy of most metropolitan regions- such as zoning codes restricting high density housing in some suburbs, variations across communities in tax rates or services, and institutionalized racial discrimination- are believed to reinforce the status of affluent suburbs while at the other extreme subjecting poor suburbs to further deterioration.⁵⁹

Affluent suburbs in the outer peripheries of metropolitan areas try to keep their higher status; however, by doing so, low-income suburbs typically lose out due to decreasing tax bases and relatively less influential political clout. In her review of suburban municipi-

ties across the nation, Hanlon finds that inner-ring suburbs also typically “lose the battle for investment resources.”⁶⁰ Such inequality precludes effective regional policy interventions. Hanlon goes further to say that “poor suburbs have it even worse [than] central cities. They are more invisible and have less political clout” partly because many policy makers still prescribe to the myth of suburban opportunity and partly because federal policies primarily label cities as being high-need.⁶¹ For example, two of the largest federal aid programs, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program and HOPE VI, do not provide funds to most suburban municipalities. The former only gives to primary cities within metropolitan areas with at least 50,000 people and urban cities with greater than 200,000 people. The latter program only provides funds if the municipality has public housing. Even the use of indices for measuring neighborhood quality is still mostly restricted to urban scholarship. Thus, policy solutions need to account for the political and social realities facing metropolitan areas.

I cannot close this paper without emphasizing the issue of race. My models suggest that voucher-occupied households tend to be located in neighborhoods with higher populations of minorities. This finding suggests that the HCV program may be contributing, even if at a small scale, to new forms of racial segregation in the suburbs. Thus, I believe that actions need to be taken to intentionally reverse this trend. To do so, PHAs and related program administrators need to be aware of this trend and also work with community residents and voucher participants to make rental housing units more available outside of minority-majority neighborhoods.

Proposed Policy Recommendations

Suburbia can no longer exist in a “policy blind spot”; as the distinction between the opportunities and quality of life afforded by urban and suburban locations is becoming fuzzy.⁶² Large segments of Atlanta’s suburban counties appear quantitatively like the historically distressed segments of the City of Atlanta. Considering that suburban neighborhoods with the highest numbers and proportions of housing choice vouchers are those that rank amongst the lowest quality neighborhoods, the metropolitan area’s PHAs need to be cognizant of these new patterns. My findings suggest three tasks for PHAs: to work towards opening up renter-eligible housing in high-opportunity neigh-

borhoods, to take further steps to assist voucher recipients move to higher opportunity suburban neighborhoods and to increase opportunities in distressed neighborhoods, both suburban and urban. PHAs can spend more resources in assisting families move to these higher opportunity communities by expanding rental search assistance programs and by more clearly conveying information about the quality of neighborhoods within metropolitan areas (Hamilton and Atkins 2008). To accomplish these tasks, PHAs should work with other agencies, governmental actors, and non-profits to establish a more encompassing social infrastructure. Popkin et al (2012) suggest that PHAs should provide more comprehensive supportive services for voucher recipients, to provide mobility counseling so residents make more informed choices of neighborhood selection, and to use financial incentives to make more affordable housing available in higher income neighborhoods.

I suggest three avenues for improving opportunities for families in the housing choice voucher program: (1) state incentives for affordable housing and (2) tax-base sharing and (3) federal funding. As mentioned above, individual municipalities each have individual interests. Power lies primarily in affluent suburban municipalities, therefore it is unlikely that any state-mandated directives can be imposed successfully in terms of inclusionary zoning or equitable development. Rather, Hamilton and Atkins⁶³ suggest that state governments can financially incentivize high-opportunity suburban municipalities and real estate developers to maintain high-quality stocks of rental housing set aside for the HCV program. Currently, opportunity-rich suburban neighborhoods have little to no intrinsic motivation to invite affordable housing development or rental properties. Secondly, in terms of expanding the social infrastructure in urban and opportunity-poor neighborhoods, Orfield⁶⁴ advocates for tax-base sharing amongst municipalities. Currently, as supported by the suburban stratification theory discussed above, low-income suburbs like those in Clayton County, South Cobb County, and DeKalb County have small tax-bases due to population decline and high proportions of low-income populations. They also have the highest need for public and social services such as infrastructure, non-profits, and better schools as supported by the findings of this study. Tax-base sharing between municipalities would enable suburbs to pool money and take a regional ap-

proach to transportation, education, and social service allocation. However, tax-base sharing and regional coalitions of municipalities can be counteractive to the interests of many municipalities. Additionally, such an approach may not be able to overcome the prevalent ideology of “NIMBY-ism” that suburban populations have historically been known to embody in Atlanta. Norris states, “it is simply not in the interests of local jurisdictions to give away tax advantage. Similarly, local governments are not inclined to support proposals for such things as regional tax base sharing because nearly everyone sees them as a zero sum game.”⁶⁵

The third policy option builds upon Hillary Clinton’s Suburban Core Opportunity Restoration Act (SCORE) which sought to fuel federal aid into distressed suburbs. Hanlon⁶⁶ argues that while this act was not passed, it symbolizes progress and a realization of the troubles of many distressed suburbs. Although the decline of inner-ring suburbs is a metropolitan-level problem, cities all around the nation are facing the same challenges as Atlanta- making suburban decline a national problem. Reliance on federal aid may mitigate the key problem that lies inherent in regional approaches to urban and suburban redevelopment.

FURTHER RESEARCH AND LIMITATIONS

Limitations

The story of the Housing Choice Voucher program in Atlanta is far from complete. The following limitations exist for this study:

Limited Timeframe: Because the data only represent four years, I cannot make statistical inferences about trends. A long-term analysis would expose more variation over time.

Missing or Imprecise Data: This study would have benefitted from a greater amount of publicly available geographic data regarding Housing Choice Vouchers. Particularly, underreporting by Atlanta-area PHAs in 2007 preclude my ability to make decisive judgments about time. Moreover, I used several less-than-ideal measures for the CNQI and opportunity indices for foreclosures, educational quality, and access to transportation. These measures cannot fully explain these attributes of neighborhood quality. My indicators were chosen both based on precedent and for their relative ease of collection. Future studies can include more precise and rigorous indicators.

Simplification of Suburban Diversity: This study oversimplifies many attributes of suburban neighborhoods for the sake of time and ease. Characteristics such as proximity to Atlanta, population growth, age of municipal incorporation, and political infrastructures are all-important factors that need to be explored.

Further Study

Missing from this study's analysis are the experiences of public housing agencies and families. Employees at PHAs may be able to better explain the impact of the housing crash and difficulties in implementation. Additionally, interviews with families would further inform measures on neighborhood quality, opportunity structures, and on daily experiences. Such qualitative data would add richness, accuracy, and sensitivity to this study's methodology.

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THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND RULE OF LAW REFORM IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES

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ABSTRACT

The United Nations frequently engages in peacekeeping activities in post-conflict societies in order to build and sustain peace. A crucial component of the durability of peace is the rule of law. While there is extensive empirical literature on the effect of UN peacekeeping on the durability of peace in a post-conflict setting, there is little literature that empirically examines whether UN peacekeeping can improve the rule of law in a post-conflict state. This study uses data to determine whether UN peacekeeping has a positive effect on the quality of rule of law in post-conflict settings. Using regression and matching analysis, this study does not find evidence that peacekeeping influences the rule of law in a post-conflict setting in either a positive or negative direction. Even so, the "non-findings" of this study have implications for policy makers who wish to have post-conflict peace building efforts in order to improve the rule of law.

[In Bosnia] we thought that democracy was the highest priority, and we measured it by the number of elections we could organize...In hindsight, we should have put the establishment of the rule of law first, for everything else depends on it: a functioning economy, a free and fair political system, the development of civil society, [and] public confidence in police and the courts.

Lord Paddy Ashdown, UN High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, October 2002

Since its inception, the United Nations has worked to support international peace and security through various means, particularly through the use of UN peacekeeping forces. However, many have questioned whether UN interventions have empirically helped end conflict and maintain peace in the aftermath of a conflict. This paper will examine the impact that UN actions, specifically peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, have on the security and the socio-political conditions in post-conflict states.

There is extensive quantitative academic literature on the relationship between peacekeeping and the durability of peace in post-conflict settings, finding overall that UN involvement is significantly correlated with an increased durability of peace in post-conflict settings. One way in which a peacekeeping operation can affect the durability of peace is by altering the in-

centives that determine whether parties choose to go to war. Another way the operation could affect the durability of peace is by reducing uncertainty and fear between factions.¹ Peacekeeping missions can also take on peacebuilding roles beyond military tasks such as improving governance and the rule of law, monitoring elections, reforming police forces and the judiciary, human rights monitoring and training, and rebuilding state institutions. Peacekeeping missions (particularly multidimensional operations) can then sustain post-conflict peace by preventing the political abuses that originally instigated the conflict.² Overall, the academic literature posits that peacekeeping can help the durability of peace by both alleviating mistrust between formerly warring parties and by strengthening domestic political institutions to prevent misuses of power that provoke war. By strengthening them and improving their legitimacy, UN peacekeeping bolsters both the rule of law and the capacity of political institutions to respond to problems that could provoke conflict.

There is very little academic literature, however, on the specific question this paper wishes to address: how does peacekeeping influence the rule of law in post-conflict settings? Some policy-oriented work exists on the topic, which mostly takes an overwhelmingly negative outlook on the ability of the UN to im-

prove the rule of law. The UN approaches post-conflict policing and reforming the rule of law on an ad-hoc basis due to resource constraints and lack of a clear vision on how the mission should approach policing in a post-conflict setting.³ Additionally, while certain rule of law tasks by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations may be necessary, the implementation of these tasks is very dependent on the characteristics of a mission's operating environment, which the mission cannot control. Missions often have resources, but only enough to provide short-term security and stability. Because of these constraints, UN peacekeeping cannot consistently improve key rule of law institutions in post-conflict settings.⁴ Finally, this literature finds that rule of law efforts have fallen short because they tend to focus heavily on building legal institutions that are part of the formal sector. This approach can be futile, as the institutions are useless if the people do not believe in their value, efficacy, and ability to resolve disputes.⁵

There is a clear divide in the academic and policy literature. While academic literature finds that peacekeeping has a positive effect on the durability of peace (which includes the rule of law), policy and qualitatively oriented literature overall finds that peacekeeping has an unclear effect on the quality of rule of law in post-conflict settings. This paper hopes to fill the gap in the academic literature by providing a quantitative large-N analysis of the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the long-term rule of law in post-conflict societies. This paper will explore the following question: in a conflict and post-conflict setting, does UN peacekeeping effectively improve the rule of law years after a conflict has ended? To limit the very large scope of this question, I focus on the quality of rule of law in the long-term. I want to compare the UN's effectiveness in improving the quality of a host country's main rule of law institutions. Does the presence of UN peacekeeping troops, UN police, and/or UN formed police units improve both the effectiveness of the police, justice, and corrections sectors and the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict society?

DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS

Rule of Law

What exactly is the rule of law? Academics and policy-makers have historically struggled to accurately define this term, as it encompasses several issues and can be applied to different situations. In his 2004 re-

port, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan defines the rule of law as, "a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency."

In addition, Thomas Carothers (1998) defines the rule of law as "a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone." Specifically, the rule of law involves the following "anyone accused of a crime has the right to a fair, prompt hearing and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal system, including courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair, competent, and efficient. Judges are impartial and independent, not subject to political influence or manipulation. Perhaps most important, the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, its officials accept that the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the government seeks to be law-abiding."⁶

These two definitions encompass the manner in which the term "rule of law" will be used in this paper. The rule of law is a system in which people are held accountable to the law equitably and independently, and requires the effective functioning of legal institutions including the judicial, police, and corrections sectors of a society.

Peacekeeping

Not all UN peacekeeping missions are the same. Borrowing from the conceptual definitions of Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Fortna (2004), we can divide UN peacekeeping missions into different categories.

A monitoring or observer mission is an "interim arrangement used in violent conflicts with the consent of the host government. In these conflicts, there is no formal determination of aggression. The purpose is to monitor a truce and help negotiate a peace through the presence of military and civilian observers."⁷

These missions are not armed; their main task is to simply watch and report what they observe.

A traditional peacekeeping mission involves deploying military units and civilian expert officials to facilitate the negotiated settlement of a conflict. It is usually authorized with a Chapter VI mandate under the UN Charter, meaning it is deployed with the consent of the parties involved. This type of peacekeeping mission is meant to monitor compliance with an agreement, but they can also “establish and police a buffer zone and assist the demobilization and disarmament of military forces.”⁸

A multidimensional peacekeeping mission is also based on consent, but is designed to implement a more comprehensive peace agreement. It includes “a mix of strategies to build a self-sustaining peace, ranging from those of traditional peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to more multidimensional strategies for capacity expansion (e.g., economic reconstruction) and institutional transformation (e.g., reform of the police, army, and judicial system; elections; civil society rebuilding).”⁹ Rule of law reform activities are therefore a part of multidimensional peacekeeping missions.

Peace enforcement missions involve military intervention and operate under a Chapter VII mandate. Peacekeeping missions that operate under a Chapter VII mandate are sent into volatile conflict settings where the state is either unable or unwilling to maintain security and order. Chapter VII mandated missions involve traditional peacekeeping tasks but also include more complex tasks that may require the use of active, coercive force.¹⁰

Post-Conflict Justice

One important factor that influences the durability of peace is the form of justice that emerges in a post-conflict society. Post-conflict justice, as discussed in this paper, is separate from peacekeeping activities. Although it may be a complement to peacekeeping activities, it is distinct from peacekeeping itself. As it influences the ability of the UN to reform the rule of law, post-conflict justice must be discussed in the context of the rule of law and UN peacekeeping activities.

Non-retributive post-conflict justice focuses on the victims and the human rights violations they faced during a conflict. Usually, this takes the form of reparations to victims and truth commissions. A non-retributive justice mechanism leaves many perpetrators of conflict free on the streets. This presence

of perpetrators, and their potential to commit further violence, could influence the ability of the UN and national security forces to effectively re-establish the rule of law, because it is an additional security risk UN forces must address. The literature is divided on the impact of retributive versus non-retributive post-conflict justice on the durability of peace. Retributive post-conflict justice focuses on holding perpetrators accountable for the crimes they committed during the conflict. Institutional mechanisms that pursue retributive justice include prosecution and sentencing in domestic courts and/or special tribunals, international tribunals, and joint international and domestic tribunals created to address crimes committed during the conflict.¹¹ In democratic settings, these measures are usually a part of a greater reconciliation process designed to support human rights in a post-conflict setting. In an autocratic setting, however, retributive justice is arbitrary and aims to hurt the losing side of the conflict. In this case, trials are often “show trials” where the outcome is predetermined.¹²

Post-conflict justice could also protect against a cycle of revenge attacks. If victims of war feel that crimes and wrongdoings are inadequately addressed, they may be tempted to conduct “private justice” as a substitute for insufficient legal justice. Private justice could take on the form of extra-legal killings, fragmenting a peace between forces in a post-conflict state and increasing the risk of civil war recurrence. The immunity of insurgents increases the risk of “wild justice,” which is the unpredictable revenge of one side to obtain justice that could inadvertently provoke conflict again. Consequently, by holding criminals accountable, retributive post-conflict justice may help a post-conflict government make sure that individuals do not seek revenge through private (and often violent) means.¹³ On the other hand, some argue that retributive post-conflict justice can have a negative effect on peace. Post-conflict justice, particularly retributive post-conflict justice, could provoke resentment among the losing side by opening old wounds and creating new ones in already fractious societies.¹⁴

Retributive justice is easier to carry out when the military outcome of the conflict is clear. Prosecuting war criminals is more feasible when insurgents or the former regime is clearly and severely defeated and no longer poses a threat to the present leadership. In situations where there is no clear victory or where the perpetrators are hard to identify, non-retributive post-

conflict justice may be a better option.

Amnesty measures are mechanisms that make perpetrators immune from post-conflict prosecution. Amnesty is meant to convince parties to put down arms in exchange for a guarantee of not being prosecuted.¹⁵ However, amnesty measures could limit the actual realization of justice and reduce the period of post-conflict peace, as they may help perpetrators avoid prosecution and create instability again. Additionally, amnesty measures increase the risk of private revenge and distort the process of peaceful reconciliation. Combined with the fact that post-conflict societies often lack the resources to carry out fair and impartial trials without harming other aspects of peacebuilding, this makes the value of amnesty uncertain.¹⁶ Thus, it is important to look at various forms of post-conflict justice because it could impact the way in which UN peacekeeping should affect the rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

Theory & Hypotheses

The UN may be able to improve the rule of law by improving the efficacy of institutions that carry out rule of law functions, and bolstering public confidence in the police and judicial institutions. The UN facilitates the reformation of rule of law in post-conflict countries by specifically working to improve each aspect of rule of law in a country: the police sector, justice institutions, and corrections facilities. By training local police and improving the quality of judicial institutions through training and programming, the UN not only improves institutional capacity to settle disputes, but also works to build trust in legal institutions. UN peacekeeping can alleviate fear and mistrust towards rule of law institutions, which is a legacy of many conflicts, by strengthening the capacity of those rule of law institutions to address wrongdoings. By alleviating this mistrust of rule of law institutions, the UN hopes people will use rule of law institutions, further increasing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the institutions. The UN then perpetuates a cycle of trust, legitimacy, and effectiveness in rule of law institutions in post-conflict societies. Therefore:

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions.

Not all UN missions are the same, however. Given the various types of peacekeeping missions, some will be

better at strengthening the rule of law in a post-conflict setting, given the type of mandate and capacity they have. For instance, a simple monitoring mission, whose purview solely involves observing a truce and/or cease-fire, will not be as effective in reforming and/or developing rule of law institutions as a multidimensional peacekeeping mission, which has the capacity and strength of mandate to carry out rule of law reform tasks. Therefore:

Hypothesis 2: An increase in the strength of UN mission mandate will increase its ability to strengthen the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

Monica Toft, in her book *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*, finds that a negotiated settlement tends to reduce the likelihood of the durability of peace unless there is comprehensive security sector reform that is aimed at restructuring rule of law institutions.¹⁷ Thus, if a peace agreement does not include provisions for security sector reform a UN peacekeeping mission will most likely not have the mandate to carry out rule of law reform (a component of security sector reform). Therefore:

Hypothesis 3: A negotiated settlement that does not include provisions for security sector reform will lower the probability that a UN peacekeeping mission can successfully strengthen the rule of law.

Post-conflict justice, depending on the type, can also influence the UN's ability to successfully reform the rule of law. Particularly, amnesty measures may help perpetrators avoid prosecution and consequently remain politically intact to instigate conflict. Additionally, amnesty measures both increase the risk of private revenge and distort the process of peaceful reconciliation. Thus:

Hypothesis 4: The presence of amnesty measures will weaken UN peacekeeping's ability to improve rule of law institutions in a post-conflict setting.

Control Factors

There are several factors that influence the UN's ability to implement rule of law reform in a post-conflict setting. Notably, the severity and degree of hostility of the conflict could determine the success of the UN in improving the rule of law. In a post-conflict environment where deep hostility, ethnic fractionalization, and high levels of casualties exist, it may be more difficult for UN peacekeeping to improve the rule of law. These hostile conditions can be reinforced by the

duration of conflict as well. Longer fighting implies higher fatalities in conflict and ultimately deeper hostility. The more hostile the conflict (as indicated by the number of fatalities, level of ethnic fractionalization, and duration of conflict), the more difficult it will be for UN peacekeeping to improve the rule of law in the post-conflict environment. Additionally, the level of economic development can influence the level of political stability and security in a post-conflict setting. The more stable and developed a post-conflict setting is, the more feasible it is for the UN to implement rule of law reforms, as they do not have to deal with external security risks relating to economic concerns. Thus, the regression between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law controls for the number of deaths in conflict, war duration, ethnic fractionalization, and economic development (through proxies of electricity consumption per capita and real GDP per capita).

RESEARCH DESIGN

Unit of Analysis

For the empirical analysis, I use the International Peacebuilding Data Set from Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. The original data set is cross-sectional and includes 124 events of civil wars. It includes “wars that started since 1944 and terminated before 1997 and wars which were ongoing as of December 1999, but which had at least one significant settlement or truce or third-party peace operation, signaling the parties’ desire to terminate the war and start a peacebuilding process.”¹⁸ This allows for the examination of peacebuilding outcomes at least two years after the end of the war or after the start of a peace operation. Doyle and Sambanis also classify the data into four categories of peacekeeping missions: monitoring or observing missions, traditional peacekeeping, multi-dimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. This classification is used to examine the relationship between the scope of a mission and its ability to improve rule of law institutions in a post-conflict state.

To measure the dependent variable, rule of law, I use the Rule of Law estimate from the World Bank Governance Indicators. “Rule of Law,” as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators, encompasses several indicators that “measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society.” These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. These indi-

cators measure the protection of property rights and the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions.

The World Bank’s estimates of the quality of rule of law are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one each year of measurement. This implies that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5. Higher scores correspond to better outcomes/higher qualities of rule of law. This data spans from 1996 to 2012. Given this data limitation, for my first set of regressions, I only used those civil wars that ended 1986 or later in the Doyle and Sambanis data set, providing me with sixty-six events of civil war. I then coded the Rule of Law score ten years after a civil war ended. I also coded the Rule of Law scores eleven years after the conflict ended. I then coded and calculated a new dependent variable, the change in Rule of Law score by subtracting the Rule of Law score for ten years after the conflict from the score for ten years after the conflict.

The reason for my decision to evaluate the Rule of Law score between the tenth and eleventh years is three-fold. First, this study is designed to measure the effect of UN peacekeeping measures on the long-term rule of law, rather than the short term. As a result, a sizeable gap of ten years between the end of a conflict and the measurement of the Rule of Law ensures that the long-term, rather than the short-term, rule of law is the subject of this analysis. Second, a ten-year gap enables this study to use a greater set of post-conflict states in its analysis, given the limitations of both the World Bank and the Doyle and Sambanis data set, as described above. Lastly, ten years is not so long a period of time that one would expect for the impact of a peacekeeping operation to have faded regardless of the results on the long-term rule of law. This technique of measuring years out after the conflict has ended is not unique. Fortna, in a quantitative study on peacekeeping and democratization, follows a similar technique in which she measures her dependent variable of democratization one, two, and five years after the end of a conflict in order to measure movement from autocracy to democracy.¹⁹

I ultimately decided to use this difference in scores as the measure of improvement of each country’s rule of law, as it would give me a sense if each country’s rule of law improves. If I were to just look at only the level of rule of law ten years after a conflict

Table 1: Variables in Analysis

Independent Variables	Controls	Dependent Variable
un2int: Was there a UN peace operation? 0 = no; 1 = yes (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	Log of deaths during conflict (logcost): The log of the total number of dead, including civilians and battle deaths (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	World Bank Rule of Law score 10 years after a conflict ended (wbgi.rle 10 years after): World Bank Governance Indicator Rule of Law score 10 years after a civil war has ended (World Bank Governance Indicators).
untype 2: UN peace operation involving deployment of neutral military and/or civilian observers (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	Real GDP per capita (rgdpcaps): Real GDP per capita in US\$ (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	Difference between World Bank Rule of Law scores 10 and 11 years after a conflict has ended (difference.wbgi.rle): Change in Rule of Law score; the difference between the ROL score 11 years after the conflict and 10 years after the conflict (calculated from World Bank Governance Indicators).
untype 3: UN peace operation involving traditional peacekeeping operation (military and civilian personnel) (Doyle & Sambanis 2000)	Development levels (develop): measured by a proxy of electricity consumption per capita (Doyle & Sambanis 2000)	Difference in CIM values 10 and 11 years after a conflict has ended (difference.cim): the change in Contract-Intensive Money 10 years and 11 years after a conflict has ended. CIM is the ratio of non-currency money to total money supply (IMF International Financial Statistics)
untype 4: UN multidimensional peacekeeping/peacebuilding operation (Doyle & Sambanis 2000)	Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (elf): Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index; The index ranges from 0-100 and higher values correspond to higher degrees of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in the country (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	
untype 5: Peace enforcement, either multilateral through the United Nations or by a third party or coalition of parties, acting under a multilateral, UN-sanctioned mandate. Also includes executive authority and supervising authority (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	War duration (wardur): Duration of the war measured in months (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	
	Presence of a treaty signed to end a conflict (treaty): coded 1 = treaty signed by the parties with intent to end the war; 0 = no major treaty was signed (although cease-fires were possibly agreed upon at various times) (Doyle & Sambanis 2000).	
	Presence of amnesty measures (pcj.amnesty): Records whether or not an amnesty was given in the post-conflict peace period. Coded 0 - No Amnesty: There were no amnesties after the conflict; Coded 1 - Amnesty: At least one amnesty was initiated after the conflict (Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster 2012).	
	Presence of Security Sector Reform (SSRI): Security sector reform; a dummy variable that is a combination of 2 factors: 1) whether or not the combatants will form a new army after the war based on quotas from each side and 2) indicates the extent to which a settlement is implemented. The combination SSRI variable only includes those cases in which a successfully implemented settlement was present. If the settlement was well-executed, the variable was coded "1." Unsuccessful implementations were "0" (Toft 2010).	

has ended, there would be no way to control for baseline (pre-existing levels of rule of law). It would not be possible to know if the treatment (peacekeeping or no peacekeeping) actually improves the rule of law. By looking at the change in rule of law, I can directly observe if there is any improvement from peacekeeping. Looking ten years after a conflict has ended, and calculating this difference helps reduce endogeneity concerns and reverse causality concerns that arise from the fact that peacekeepers go to the places where the rule of law is weakest initially.

Another variable I use to measure the rule of law (as a proxy) is Contract Intensive Money. Contract Intensive Money (CIM) is the ratio of non-currency money to total money supply, or $(M2-C)/M2$, where M2 is a broad definition of the money supply and C is currency held outside banks. I calculate CIM in this analysis using the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics data on currency outside of banks, money supply, and quasi-money supply.²⁰ CIM is supposed to act as a proxy for the rule of law because if contract enforcement and property rights are strong, actors will be more willing to hold money in a form other than currency. This is because the value of non-currency money depends on the ability of depositors to enforce claims against banks and the ability of banks to enforce claims against borrowers. Therefore, a higher CIM (the higher amount of non-currency money that people hold) suggests a better quality of legal institutions. Essentially, a higher CIM value correlates with stronger rule of law.²¹

Similarly to my calculations for the World Bank rule of law variable, I calculate the difference between the CIM value a country has ten years after the conflict and eleven years after the conflict. This is done to isolate the measure of the improvement in rule of law, rather than the level of rule of law itself. As the data on CIM spans a longer time frame, I am able to use 119 cases from the original Doyle and Sambanis data set for a second round of regressions with this dependent variable.

The data for the controls come from a variety of sources. The controls of deaths from conflict, real GDP per capita, development, ethnic fractionalization, and the presence of a treaty signed all come from the data set constructed by Doyle and Sambanis. The data for the amnesty measures come from Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates and Elster and the data for security sector reform comes from Toft. These data sets

do not match up with Doyle and Sambanis. Thus I had to merge these data sets by matching each conflict in Doyle and Sambanis data set to their corresponding data in the post-conflict justice and the SSR data sets.

Table 1 lists the independent variables, controls, and dependent variables that are used in the analysis.

Regression Models

To first test my hypotheses, I conducted several ordinary least squares regressions to estimate the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the quality of rule of law, while controlling for factors that detail the hostility of conflict, presence of security sector reform, and the presence of amnesty measures as post-conflict justice mechanisms. I run two major sets of regressions, each using a different dependent variable. The first set uses the rule of law measure from the World Bank, and the second uses the Contract Intensive Money variable as a proxy for the quality of rule of law.

I first test the hypotheses by carrying out a variety of regressions with the dependent variable as the difference in rule of law/CIM scores ten years and eleven years after a conflict has ended. In order to test all facets of hypotheses 1 and 2 on the independent variable of peacekeeping, I create five models with different variations of the general independent variable "UN peacekeeping" to test on the dependent variable. By testing each mandate type by itself, I can examine if different mandate types have varying influences on the quality of rule of law (what Hypothesis 2 is questioning). Below is a table that describes the independent variable(s) that each model contains.

Table 2: Independent Variable Models²²

Model	Independent Variables/Mission type
Model A	All mandate types (untype 2, 3, 4, 5)
Model B	Presence of UN peacekeeping (un2int)
Model C	Monitoring/observer mission (untype 2)
Model D	Traditional peacekeeping mission (untype 3)
Model E	Multidimensional peacekeeping mission (untype 4)
Model F	Peace enforcement mission (untype 5)

Additionally, I also interact the amnesty measures and security sector reform variables with the UN peacekeeping presence variable (*un2int*) to further test Hypotheses 3 and 4. I wish to test if the effectiveness of peacekeeping will vary depending on what values the amnesty and security sector reform variables take. The interactive terms are the products of the basic peacekeeping variable (*un2int*) and the SSRI and amnesty variables.

I. Regressions with the World Bank measure as dependent variable

This set of tests has $N = 66$. Due to data missing in the post-conflict justice amnesty variable and the security sector reform variable, I ran three different sets of tests. The first set of tests includes all the independent variables and controls listed in Table 1 excluding the Security Sector Reform variable (Table 3: PCJ Amnesty, included in Appendix B). The second set of tests includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, excluding the amnesty dummy variable (Table 4: SSRI, included in Appendix B). The third set of tests includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, but excludes both the amnesty and security sector reform variables (Table 5: Neither, included in Appendix B). The results in Tables 3, 4, and 5 are the coefficient estimates of the controls/independent variables on the dependent variable.

II. Regressions with CIM measure as dependent variable

This set of tests has an $N = 119$. Due to data missing in the post-conflict justice amnesty variable and the security sector reform variable, I ran four different sets of tests with the CIM measure as the dependent variable. The first set of tests includes all the independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, including both the Security Sector Reform and PCJ amnesty variable (Table 6: All controls (Amnesty and SSR at the same time), included in Appendix C). The second set of tests includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, including the amnesty variable and excluding the SSRI dummy variable (Table 7: Controls + Amnesty control (No SSRI), included in Appendix C). The third set of tests includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, in addition to the SSRI variable, and excludes the amnesty variables (Table 8: Controls + SSRI control (No Amnesty), included in Appendix C). The fourth set of tests

includes all independent variables and controls listed in Table 1, but excludes both the amnesty and SSRI variables (Table 9: Controls sans Amnesty and SSRI, included in Appendix C). The results in the tables are the coefficient estimates of the controls/independent variables on the dependent variable. Additionally, I tried to interact the SSRI and amnesty variables with the presence of peacekeeping variable (*un2int*) and did not find any significant relationships. The results of these tests are indicated in the tables under the IV/Controls column (“Interactive term on UN Presence and [amnesty or SSRI]”).

Matching analysis

UN peacekeeping missions are not randomly assigned. UN peacekeeping and peace building missions intentionally go to the most difficult locations, the places where the intensity of conflict was high, and in the case of this study, where rule of law is poor or practically non-existent. Cases in which the UN intervenes for improving the rule of law are very different from cases in which the UN does not intervene. Thus, linear regressions may not effectively estimate the effect that UN peacekeeping has on the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict state, because a linear regression model can lead to effects that are more of a result of the model rather than the data itself.

I hope to resolve this selection issue by carrying out a matching analysis. This would involve choosing two countries that are very similar on multiple dimensions. Then one mission would be “treated” with a UN mission, whereas the other one does not get the treatment. This sort of analysis is used by Gilligan and Sergenti (2007), in which they determine whether or not UN interventions cause peace. Gilligan and Sergenti, noticing that previous literature did not randomly assign UN missions in studying the relationship between UN interventions and sustainable peace, correct for this flaw with matching techniques, using a sample of UN interventions in post-Cold War conflicts. They ultimately find, similar to the previous studies, that UN interventions are effective in sustaining peace in post-conflict environments, but have no causal effect on peace while civil wars are still ongoing. By using non-random assignment of UN missions using matching techniques, they find that previous studies have underestimated the positive impact that UN interventions have on sustainable peace in a post-conflict setting. The results suggest both that the UN

does have a strong ability to extend periods of peace and that the effect is larger than previously estimated by previous studies because of the correction for the nonrandom assignment of UN missions.²³

Matching finds an overlap in cases of conflict that vary solely on whether or not UN peacekeeping was present. These cases are all matched based on a variety of controls. By finding the overlap between non-UN intervention and UN intervention cases based on the similarity of controls, matching allows for the comparison of similar cases. The controls used in this matching analysis are the log of deaths during conflict, ethnic fractionalization, and the duration of war. Matching thus assesses whether or not UN intervention makes a difference in cases that had the same level of conflict. Matching helps give an average assessment of the effect of peacekeeping on the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict state.

To start the matching analysis, I temporarily coarsen exact match (CEM) the data by creating “bins.” The CEM command sorts the data into the various bins. The CEM command creates one “stratum” per observation of X, and then places each observation in a stratum. Then, the CEM command assigns each stratum to the original data and drops observations that do not contain at least one treated and one control unit. Then CEM creates a weight measure that I use in a regression with the uncoarsened data. The results of the “weighted” regression are the results of the matching analysis.²⁴

REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS

A. Results, Empirical Findings, and Interpretation for World Bank measure

The empirical evidence does not support my theoretical hypotheses. There is not significant evidence to show that UN peacekeeping (in any variation of mandate type) positively improves the rule of law quality in a post-conflict state.

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country’s rule of law institutions

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country’s rule of law institutions.

Hypothesis 2: An increase in the strength of UN mission mandate will increase its ability to strengthen the quality of a country’s rule of law institutions

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship between the UN peacekeeping mission mandate and the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

The regression tests conducted with the World Bank rule of law measure do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping, or any increase in the mandate of UN peacekeeping, is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. As seen each set of tests, the coefficients of the peacekeeping variables (un2int, untype2, untype3, untype4, and untype5) are not statistically significant. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis. These results show that there is no clear relationship or association between UN peacekeeping and the quality of rule of law.

Hypothesis 3: A negotiated settlement that does not include provisions for security sector reform will lower the probability that a UN peacekeeping mission can successfully strengthen the rule of law.

H0 (null): There is no significant relationship between the provision of security sector reform and the UN’s ability to strengthen the rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

The presence of security sector reform is not significantly correlated with UN peacekeeping’s ability to improve the rule of law, thus I cannot reject the null hypothesis. Conversely, the lack of presence of security sector reform in a negotiated settlement (as indicated by 0 in the dummy variable) is not significantly correlated with a lower quality of rule of law. The coefficient for this variable, while positive (indicating that the direction the hypothesis put forward is correct), is not statistically significant. The results show that there is no clear relationship or association between the presence of security sector reform, UN peacekeeping, and the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment.

Hypothesis 4: The presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism will weaken UN peacekeeping’s ability to improve rule of law institutions in a post-conflict setting.

H0 (null): There is no significant relationship between the presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism and UN peacekeeping's ability to strengthen the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

The presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism is not significantly correlated with UN peacekeeping's ability to improve the rule of law, and again I cannot reject the null hypothesis. Amnesty measures, (controlling for several variables, including UN peacekeeping) however, are negatively correlated with the quality of rule of law in post-conflict states. Let us turn, for example, to Model A in the first set of tests that include the amnesty dummy variable, in a post-conflict environment, controlling for all UN mandate types, the log of deaths during conflict, ethnic fractionalization, development, real GDP per capita, and the presence of a peace treaty.

The results show for Model A that the presence of amnesty measures will cause a -0.123 unit change in the difference between rule of law quality ten years and eleven years after a conflict has ended. Given that the correlation coefficient of this regression is a negative number, the regression model results in a negative relationship between amnesty measures and the quality of rule of law in post-conflict environments after 1986. With twenty-two degrees of freedom in a two-tailed test, the 90-percent confidence interval of the slope will be $-0.123 \pm 0.06846(1.72)$ from -0.241 to -0.005.

We can also examine Model C in the first set of tests that include the amnesty dummy variable, controlling for UN peacekeeping missions with a mandate to deploy of neutral military and/or civilian observers (untype 2), the log of deaths during conflict, ethnic fractionalization, development, real GDP per capita, and the presence of a peace treaty. The results for Model C show that the presence of amnesty measures will cause a -0.09863 unit change in the difference between rule of law quality ten years and eleven years after a conflict has ended. Just like the results from Model A detailed above, given the correlation coefficient of this regression is a negative number, this regression model results in a negative relationship between amnesty measures and the quality of rule of law in post-conflict environments after 1986. With twenty-five degrees of freedom in a two-tailed test, the 90-percent confidence interval of the slope will be $-0.09863 \pm 0.0561(1.71)$ from -0.195 to -0.003.

Given the correlation coefficients of the regression equations for Models A and C for the amnesty variable are negative numbers, the multiple regression models demonstrate a negative relationship between post-conflict amnesty measures and the rule of law. While it is not possible to conclude that post-conflict amnesty measures distort/influence the UN's ability to improve the rule of law (as Hypothesis 4 intended to test), the data is consistent with the theoretical explanation that the presence of amnesty measures can result in an overall poorer quality of rule of law.

B. Results, Empirical Findings, and Interpretation for CIM measure

The empirical evidence does not support the theoretical hypotheses. There is not ample enough evidence to show that UN peacekeeping (in any variation of mandate type) is significant in positively improving the rule of law quality in a post-conflict state.

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions.

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

Hypothesis 2: An increase in the strength of UN mission mandate will increase its ability to strengthen the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship between the UN peacekeeping mission mandate and the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

The regression tests conducted with the CIM measure as the dependent variable do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping, or any increase in the mandate of UN peacekeeping, is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. As seen in each set of tests, the coefficients of the peacekeeping variables (un2int, untype2, untype3, untype4, and untype5) are not statistically significant. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. These results show that there is no clear relationship or association between UN peacekeeping and the change in the quality of rule of law after a conflict has ended.

Hypothesis 3: A negotiated settlement that does not include provisions for security sector reform will lower the probability that a UN peacekeeping mission can successfully strengthen the rule of law.

H0 (null): There is no significant relationship between the provision of security sector reform and the UN's ability to strengthen the rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

With the CIM proxy for the rule of law dependent variable, the presence of security sector reform is not significantly correlated with the ability of UN peacekeeping to improve the rule of law. The coefficient for this variable is not statistically significant. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The results show that there is no clear relationship or association between the presence of security sector reform, UN peacekeeping, and the change in the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment.

Hypothesis 4: The presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism (pcj.amnesty) will weaken UN peacekeeping's ability to improve rule of law institutions in a post-conflict setting.

H0 (null): There is no significant relationship between the presence of amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism and UN peacekeeping's ability to strengthen the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict setting.

With the CIM proxy for the rule of law dependent variable, the presence of amnesty as a post-conflict justice mechanism is not significantly correlated with UN peacekeeping's ability to improve the rule of law; I cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Controls

While none of the hypotheses were accepted, this particular analysis shows that the log of deaths during a conflict has a negative correlation with the change in the quality of rule of law. In the first set of tests with Models A, B, and D, controlling for all UN mandate types, rGDP per capita, electricity consumption per capita, ethnic fractionalization, amnesty measures, security sector reform, and war duration, the log of deaths per conflict is negatively correlated with the difference in CIM values ten years and eleven years after a conflict has ended. Additionally, in the second set of tests with Models A, B, C, D, E, and F, controlling for all mandate types, rGDP per capita, electric-

ity consumption per capita, ethnic fractionalization, amnesty measures, and war duration, the log of deaths per conflict is also negatively correlated with the difference in CIM values ten years and eleven years after the conflict.

For example, the results in the first set of tests show that for Model A (in which all UN mission mandate types are present), a one unit increase in the log number of deaths during conflict (logcost) will cause a -0.02451 unit change in the difference between CIM value ten years and eleven years after a conflict has ended. Given that the correlation coefficient of this regression is negative, the regression model results in a negative relationship between log of deaths during conflict and the change in quality of rule of law in post-conflict environments after 1947. With thirty-three degrees of freedom in a two-tailed test, the 90-percent confidence interval of the slope will be $-0.02451 \pm 0.01246(1.6924)$ from -0.0456 to -0.00342.

This particular analysis also shows that ethnic fractionalization has a positive correlation with the change in the quality of rule of law. In the first set of tests, Models A, B, C, D, E and F, controlling for all mandate types, rGDP per capita, electricity consumption per capita, ethnic fractionalization, amnesty measures, and war duration, ethnic fractionalization is positively correlated with the difference in CIM values ten years and eleven years after the conflict. Additionally, in the second set of tests, Models A, B, C, D, E and F show a positive correlation between ethnic fractionalization and the difference in CIM values.

For example, the results in the first set of tests show that for Model A (in which all UN mission mandate types are present), a one unit increase in the level of ethnic fractionalization will cause a 0.002193 unit change in the difference between CIM values ten years and eleven years after a conflict has ended. Given that the correlation coefficient of this regression is a positive number, the regression model results in a positive relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the change in quality of rule of law in post-conflict environments after 1947. With thirty-three degrees of freedom in a two-tailed test, the 95-percent confidence interval of the slope will be $0.002193 \pm 0.001012(1.6924)$ from 0.0005 to 0.0039.

Table 3: Regression Results with CEM weight (using algorithm)

Dependent variable (difference.wbgrle)	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-value	Min.	Max.
un2int	-.1495865	.1261033	0.301	-.4997054	.2005324
Wardur	.0007444	.0007952	0.402	-.0014633	.0029521
Elf	-.000358	.0021241	0.874	-.0062555	.0055395
Logcost	-.0782816	.0527691	0.212	-.2247922	.068229
Constant	1.050172	.6103211	0.160	-.6443509	2.744695

RESULTS FOR MATCHING ANALYSIS

A. Results for Matching Analysis using World Bank measure as dependent variable

I. Using CEM algorithm

Command used in STATA:

cem wardur elf_destringed logcost, treatment(un2int)

Multivariate L1 distance: 0

Interpretation with algorithm CEM

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

The regression tests conducted with the World Bank difference measure as the dependent variable do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis.

II. Using coarsened matching by explicit user choice

Command used in STATA:

cem wardur (80) elf_destringed (25 65) logcost (10 12), treatment(un2int)

Multivariate L1 distance: .51111111

Interpretation with explicit user choice CEM

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

The regression tests conducted with the World Bank difference measure as the dependent variable do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Table 4: Regression Results with CEM weight (explicit user choice)

Dependent variable (difference.wbgrle)	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-value	Min.	Max.
un2int	-.0618187	.0535736	0.260	-.172644	.0490067
Wardur	-.0000715	.000202	0.727	-.0004893	.0003463
Elf	-.0003919	.0008771	0.659	-.0022063	.0014226
Logcost	-.0066913	.0140664	0.639	-.0357899	.0224072
Constant	.1495394	.1915143	0.443	-.2466381	.5457169

Table 5: Regression Results with algorithm CEM weight

Dependent variable (CIM difference)	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-value	Min.	Max.
un2int	.001116	.0089213	0.901	-.0169951	.0192271
wardur	-.0000529	.0000782	0.503	-.0002116	.0001058
elf	-.0000333	.000155	0.831	-.000348	.0002815
logcost	.0021292	.0020669	0.310	-.0020668	.0063251
constant	-.0156197	.0228245	0.498	-.0619559	.0307166

B. Results for Matching Analysis using CIM measure as dependent variable

I. Using CEM algorithm

Command used in STATA:

cem wardur elf_destringed logcost, treatment(un2int)

Multivariate L1 distance: .18965517

Interpretation with algorithm CEM

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

The regression tests conducted with the CIM difference measure as the dependent variable do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis.

II. Using coarsened matching by explicit user choice

Algorithm used in STATA:

cem wardur (80) elf_destringed (25 65) logcost (10 12), treatment(un2int)

Multivariate L1 distance: .50222575

Interpretation with explicit user choice CEM

Hypothesis 1: The presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country will strengthen the quality of the country's rule of law institutions

H0 (Null): There is no significant relationship/correlation between the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in a post-conflict country and the quality of a country's rule of law institutions.

The regression tests conducted with the CIM difference measure as the dependent variable do not provide ample evidence to support the original claim that UN peacekeeping is a causal mechanism for improving the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict environment. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis.

DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The results of the regression and matching tests were on the whole inconclusive in finding any specific directional relationship between peacekeeping and the rule of law in post-conflict state. The limitations of existing measures and data on the rule of law ultimately reduce the number of data points that can be analyzed in such a study. Given the limited data and quality of data on the rule of law there is a limited amount that can be said, using empirical large-N analysis as evidence, on whether or not UN peacekeeping improves the rule of law.

That being said, there is still much to be learned given the finding that peacekeeping had neither a significantly positive or negative effect on the rule of law in both the regression and matching analyses. For

Table 6: Regression Results with CEM weight (explicit user choice)

Dependent variable (CIM difference)	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-value	Min.	Max.
un2int	.0155614	.0192143	0.420	-.022669	.0537918
wardur	.0000436	.000082	0.597	-.0001195	.0002066
elf	.0003126	.0003133	0.321	-.0003108	.0009361
logcost	-.004761	.0047257	0.317	-.0141636	.0046416
constant	.0280284	.0560619	0.618	-.0835172	.1395741

both the World Bank Rule of Law measure and the Contract Intensive Money measure, there was no significant relationship between UN peacekeeping in all iterations of the independent variable and hypotheses 1 and 2, regardless of whether or not the rule of law improved after a conflict had ended.

This has important implications for UN peacekeeping rule of law activity. Even though UN peacekeeping makes a concerted effort in promoting the rule of law in post-conflict states, its impact is undetectable in the long-term. The fact that UN peacekeeping is not making an obvious improvement in the quality of rule of law in post-conflict states despite massive amounts of time and resources dedicated towards improving the rule of law means that there are most likely other factors/issues at hand (whether it be UN-based or host-country based) that impede the UN's ability to decisively and comprehensively improve the rule of law.

Another interesting conclusion that can be pulled from this analysis is the finding that amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism are negatively correlated with the difference in rule of law quality after a conflict has ended. While I was not able to find evidence that amnesty measures act as a conditional/interactive factor between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law, there is much to be said about this finding about the relationship between amnesty measures and the rule of law. As discussed in the literature review, post-conflict amnesty measures can protect perpetrators of conflict and leave them politically and physically intact to launch into conflict again, thus harming efforts to improve the rule of law. This particular finding supports findings in the literature that amnesty measures can harm the durability of peace in a post-conflict setting.

CONCLUSION & FUTURE RESEARCH

Does UN peacekeeping improve the rule of law in a post-conflict society? I proposed that UN peacekeeping helps improve the long-term rule of law by both physically improving the rule of law institutions themselves and building up public confidence in various rule of law institutions (such as the police and justice sectors). The empirical results, however, do not provide ample enough evidence to confirm that UN peacekeeping improves or harms the rule of law after the end of a conflict. It does not appear that UN peacekeeping has a substantive effect on improving rule of law institutions in the long-term. While the findings

are inconclusive regarding the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law in post-conflict settings in the long-term, they still have important applications for the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. Even though UN peacekeeping spends significant effort and time rebuilding the rule of law in post-conflict states, their impact is difficult to determine.

Although the empirical results do not provide significant evidence for the research question, there is evidence that amnesty measures as a post-conflict justice mechanism can harm the quality of rule of law in a post-conflict state. This particular finding serves as support for the findings of Lie, Binningsbø, and Gates, who find that amnesty measures negatively affect the overall durability of peace in a post-conflict environment. It also has implications for policy makers deciding what post-conflict justice mechanisms will most benefit a society in the short-term and long-term: Amnesty measures could convince armed groups to put down their arms in the immediate end of a conflict, but may have negative implications for the quality of rule of law in the post-conflict environment.

The “non-findings” of this empirical analysis complement the findings of the qualitative studies carried out by the Stimson Center that evaluate the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping in reforming and supporting the rule of law. UN peacekeeping theoretically has the capability and necessary mandate to improve the rule of law in a post-conflict state, but it is difficult for them to make a decisive positive impact because of several practical realities. The physical environments in which missions deploy most obviously pose difficult challenges to logistics, but also to the efficient use of resources. Resources may be poured into a mission's efforts to improve the rule of law, but if the mission's tasks are not finely tuned to the regional and domestic challenges and frameworks that guide society, those resources could end up going to waste. Ultimately, this could reduce the positive impact UN peacekeeping on the rule of law.

The main policy implication of this study is that smarter peacekeeping operations are needed, not just an increase in resources or stronger mandates. It is clear that throwing any amount of resources at a problem will not automatically rebuild the rule of law. Using resources effectively is crucial to long-term success in rebuilding and restoring the rule of law. One such way in which UN peacekeeping missions can improve their effectiveness in reforming the rule of law is by

effectively using donor funds to reach both short-term and long-term goals. UN peacekeeping missions should continue to focus on short-term goals, but they should also organize partnerships to help reach longer-term goals. There needs to be a strategic plan if any of the UN's quick impact projects on improving the rule of law are to actually make a difference in substantively improving the rule of law. Short-term achievements are inherently undermined by the fact that progress is needed in longer-term goals for the short-term achievements to mean anything in long run.

Secondly, right now the UN is focusing on the individual capacity of rule of law officials—police, corrections officers, and justice sector personnel like judges and lawyers—and the institutional capacity of rule of law institutions. More focus should be placed on institutional integrity if the mechanisms proposed in the theoretical portion of this paper are to actually work. Simply put, focusing on improving the institutional integrity and reliability of rule of law institutions will alleviate distrust of these institutions and lead to their more frequent use by the public. Meanwhile, UN peacekeeping components should consider a policy approach to customary justice mechanisms at the start of a mission as a crucial element that can promote accessibility to justice.

Thirdly, it is also important that UN peacekeeping work on improving coordination between police, justice, and corrections sectors of rule of law institutions. It is clear that one sector affects the other, and one challenge that a sector faces will ultimately influence how effective another sector is in carrying out its essential functions. By improving information sharing, each sector could potentially improve coordination of activities and prevent issues such as overcrowding of prisons or overloading of court dockets.

There is much room for future research on the relationship between UN peacekeeping and the rule of law. As mentioned in the discussion, a major limitation of this study was the relatively small sample size. Future research on this topic should obtain more data for analysis by, for example, looking at lower levels of conflict. This would entail extending the data set from only civil wars to include cases of internal strife that maintained a lower level of hostility than a civil war. Another way in which future research could expand upon this study is by exploring alternative measures of the dependent variable of rule of law. A major limitation of the World Bank measure was its time frame. It only started releasing the rule of law scores starting in

1996. This time frame limited the number of cases I could use from the original Doyle and Sambanis data set.



While the CIM measure, calculated from IMF data, had a much larger time frame than the World Bank data (I was able to get data dating back to 1946), the CIM measure does have downfalls as a proxy for the rule of law. The creators of the CIM value describe CIM as a measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. Although property rights and the enforceability of contracts are important aspects of the rule of law, they do not completely align with the definition of rule of law presented at the start of this paper. Importantly, CIM functions as a measure that combines both legal institutional and non-legal institutional factors. It can be difficult to tell whether or not societies with high CIM values have faith in legal methods that enable more business transactions or if they have faith in legal methods that hold all persons, institutions and entities, including the government itself, accountable to laws that are equitably enforced and consistent with international human rights norms. Thus a future avenue of research on this relationship would have to look into finding a measure of the rule of law that has a larger time frame for conflicts, in addition to content validity. This means that the data should have a higher degree of correspondence with the concept of rule of law and the measurement technique should include all aspects of the rule of law, as defined by the researcher.

Even though there is uncertainty in the results of the empirical findings, the end result of UN peacekeeping not having any obvious effect on the rule of law in a post-conflict setting is disconcerting. There is an expectation in the international community that UN peacekeeping, given all the time and resources it employs, has at least some positive effect on the rule of law. Ultimately, there is no detectable positive impact is a cause for concern. More importantly, it provides grounds for the UN and international peacebuilding community to evaluate how UN peacekeeping missions can better effectively utilize resources to rebuild the rule of law and make sure that post-conflict societies are safe and secure. The rule of law is necessary for the stability of societies, especially those emerging from conflict. Thus it will be a challenge not just for UN peacekeepers, but also for the peacebuilding community, to focus not just on the short-term capacity needs, but also on building effective institutions that can prevent infractions and breakdowns of the rule of law that lead to conflict in the first place.

APPENDIX

Description of Matching Methodology

With Coarsened Exact Matching, there are two ways to coarsen the data. One way is to run the automatic binning algorithm, while the other way involves self-defining cut points and bins for each control. The automatic binning results in more bins, but fewer bins will actually have matched cases. Using fewer cases allows for a better comparison of exact matches, as there are fewer cases. Thus, using the automatic algorithm provides matching analysis with better internal validity. Using pre-determined cut points allows for more observations to have matches and for a larger set of cases to be analyzed in a weighted regression. Using the pre-determined cut points, however, can result in more coarsening of the data, and involve more cases in the weighted regression analysis that are not an exact match. Thus, using the pre-determined cut points method will result in a higher external validity, but lower internal validity of the weighted regression. In this study, I run the matching analysis with both the automatic binning algorithm and the pre-determined user defined cut points method.



Results from regression with difference in World Bank rule of law scores

Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘.’ 1

Standard errors are in parentheses

Significant results are colored yellow

Table 7: PCJ Amnesty

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-1.20E-02 (1.285e-02)	-6.067E-03 (3.512e-05)	-1.09E-02 (1.183e-02)	-9.04E-03 (1.199e-02)	-8.46E-03 (1.222e-02)	-6.96E-03 (1.233e-02)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	2.35E-05 (2.342e-05)	1.500E-05 (2.281e-05)	3.05E-05 (2.083e-05)	1.25E-05 (2.081e-05)	1.64E-05 (2.161e-05)	2.01E-05 (2.024e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	-3.89E-05 (4.054e-05)	-2.365E-05 (3.512e-05)	-4.38E-05 (3.375e-05)	-2.36E-05 (3.258e-05)	-2.15E-05 (3.657e-05)	-2.12E-05 (3.480e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	-8.68E-04 (9.652e-04)	-3.827E-04 (8.216e-04)	-6.64E-04 (8.163e-04)	-6.21E-04 (8.489e-04)	-3.01E-04 (8.580e-04)	-2.97E-04 (8.405e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	1.15E-04 (3.054e-04)	6.793E-05 (2.939e-04)	1.85E-04 (2.548e-04)	4.77E-05 (2.641e-04)	9.52E-05 (2.655e-04)	5.60E-05 (2.851e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	8.47E-02 (7.155e-02)	3.509E-02 (5.287e-02)	6.31E-02 (5.356e-02)	6.45E-02 (5.838e-02)	3.00E-02 (5.931e-02)	3.96E-02 (5.301e-02)
Amnesty measures present? (pcj.amnesty)	-0.123. (6.846e-02)	-7.915E-02 (1.196e-01)	-9.863E-02. (5.610e-02)	-8.46E-02 (5.674e-02)	-6.09E-02 (5.180e-02)	-5.26E-02 (5.347e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	-2.271E-02 (7.106e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	1.07E-01 (7.860e-02)	NA	1.07E-01 (7.190e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	-9.74E-02 (1.107e-01)	NA	NA	-1.02E-01 (1.028e-01)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	9.91E-03 (8.802e-02)	NA	NA	NA	2.66E-02 (8.220e-02)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	-3.28E-03 (1.745e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	-7.87E-02 (1.651e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and amnesty (un2int*pcj.amnesty)	NA	3.029e-02 (1.285e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 8: SSRI

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-8.56E-03 (2.487e-02)	-6.721e-03 (1.961e-02)	-1.46E-02 (2.092e-02)	-1.29E-02 (2.142e-02)	-1.61E-02 (2.237e-02)	-2.00E-02 (2.036e-02)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	4.36E-05 (3.524e-05)	3.181e-05 (3.726e-05)	4.85E-05 (3.118e-05)	3.69E-05 (3.297e-05)	4.52E-05 (3.103e-05)	4.92E-05 (3.024e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	-2.98E-05 (5.027e-05)	-2.257e-05 (4.481e-05)	-4.56E-05 (4.240e-05)	-3.34E-05 (4.192e-05)	-4.08E-05 (4.526e-05)	-2.30E-05 (4.286e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	-7.03E-04 (1.562e-03)	8.711e-06 (1.091e-03)	-3.08E-04 (1.199e-03)	-4.61E-04 (1.299e-03)	4.08E-06 (1.119e-03)	2.22E-04 (1.053e-03)
War duration in months (wardur)	-7.60E-05 (3.680e-04)	1.598e-05 (3.503e-04)	1.74E-04 (2.880e-04)	7.90E-05 (3.016e-04)	1.51E-04 (2.926e-04)	-1.81E-05 (3.166e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	6.34E-02 (9.434e-02)	1.807e-02 (8.352e-02)	3.50E-02 (8.577e-02)	6.08E-02 (8.824e-02)	4.33E-02 (8.567e-02)	5.09E-02 (8.299e-02)
Security sector reform present? (SSRI)	3.87E-02 (1.433e-01)	-1.77E-02 (1.821e-01)	6.637e-02 (9.376e-02)	-5.48E-02 (9.366e-02)	-3.79E-02 (1.259e-01)	-2.56E-02 (9.259e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	-2.111e-02 (9.750e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	1.99E-02 (9.441e-02)	NA	5.29E-02 (8.649e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	-1.18E-01 (1.652e-01)	NA	NA	-1.00E-01 (1.527e-01)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	-1.10E-01 (1.597e-01)	NA	NA	NA	-1.23E-02 (1.365e-01)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	-2.42E-01 (2.239e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	-2.00E-01 (1.838e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and SSR (un2int*SSRI)	NA	-9.723e-02 (1.999e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 9: No PCJ Amnesty or SSRI

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
logcost (log of deaths during conflict)	-3.07E-03 (1.241e-02)	-2.81E-03 (1.165e-02)	-4.07E-03 (1.161e-02)	-3.75E-03 (1.171e-02)	-4.21E-03 (1.175e-02)	-3.02E-03 (1.166e-02)
rgdpcaps (rGDP per capita)	2.20E-05 (2.451e-05)	9.68E-06 (2.248e-05)	2.33E-05 (2.123e-05)	1.62E-05 (2.115e-05)	1.66E-05 (2.177e-05)	2.03E-05 (2.023e-05)
Develop (electricity consumption per capita)	-1.65E-05 (4.040e-05)	-1.55E-05 (3.315e-05)	-2.71E-05 (3.366e-05)	-1.93E-05 (3.321e-05)	-1.74E-05 (3.667e-05)	-1.37E-05 (3.393e-05)
elf (ethnic fractionalization)	-4.60E-04 (9.825e-04)	-4.79E-04 (8.231e-04)	-5.66E-04 (8.465e-04)	-5.09E-04 (8.652e-04)	-3.72E-04 (8.621e-04)	-2.91E-04 (8.399e-04)
wardur (war duration in months)	2.65E-05 (3.157e-04)	-8.27E-07 (2.864e-04)	1.32E-04 (2.631e-04)	8.02E-05 (2.693e-04)	9.08E-05 (2.674e-04)	1.72E-05 (2.821e-04)
treaty (Was there a peace treaty?)	2.78E-02 (6.719e-02)	3.63E-02 (5.436e-02)	2.21E-02 (5.014e-02)	2.29E-02 (5.249e-02)	1.11E-02 (5.750e-02)	2.28E-02 (5.014e-02)
un2int (UN presence)	NA	-5.34E-02 (6.317e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
untype 2 (UN observer missions)	3.93E-02 (7.213e-02)	NA	4.80E-02 (6.603e-02)	NA	NA	NA
untype 3 (traditional UN PKO missions)	-2.43E-02 (1.078e-01)	NA	NA	-3.32E-02 (9.405e-02)	NA	NA
untype 4 (multidimensional PKOs)	7.18E-03 (9.217e-02)	NA	NA	NA	1.84E-02 (8.250e-02)	NA
untype 5 (peace enforcement UN missions)	-1.14E-01 (1.709e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	-1.22E-01 (1.589e-01)

Results from regression with difference in CIM VALUES

Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘.’ 1

Standard errors are in parentheses Significant results are colored yellow

Table 10: All controls (Amnesty and SSR at the same time)

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-2.451e-02. (1.246e-02)	-2.325e-02. (1.214e-02)	-1.838e-02 (1.161e-02)	-1.994e-02. (1.135e-02)	-1.806e-02 (1.133e-02)	-1.712e-02 (1.121e-02)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	-1.172e-05 (2.006e-05)	-7.066e-06 (1.964e-05)	-1.161e-05 (1.896e-05)	-9.624e-06 (1.866e-05)	-1.504e-05 (1.902e-05)	-1.304e-05 (1.867e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	2.508e-05 (4.494e-05)	1.004e-06 (3.559e-05)	4.679e-06 (3.451e-05)	1.670e-06 (3.419e-05)	1.824e-05 (4.268e-05)	6.812e-06 (3.658e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	2.193e-03* (1.012e-03)	1.529e-03. (8.831e-04)	1.609e-03. (8.839e-04)	1.746e-03. (8.825e-04)	1.733e-03. (9.372e-04)	1.588e-03. (9.059e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	1.168e-04 (2.999e-04)	2.389e-04 (2.713e-04)	1.051e-04 (2.507e-04)	1.757e-04 (2.574e-04)	2.596e-05 (2.772e-04)	7.928e-05 (2.654e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	4.421e-02 (6.752e-02)	6.682e-02 (6.313e-02)	7.826e-02 (5.971e-02)	6.280e-02 (5.765e-02)	6.615e-02 (5.888e-02)	7.279e-02 (5.827e-02)
Amnesty measures present? (pcj.amnesty)	3.773e-02 (6.172e-02)	5.721e-02 (7.494e-02)	1.083e-02 (5.636e-02)	1.963e-02 (5.227e-02)	8.247e-04 (4.951e-02)	3.217e-04 (4.980e-02)
Security sector reform present? (SSRI)	-1.122e-01 (1.189e-01)	-4.795e-02 (1.558e-01)	-3.550e-03 (7.309e-02)	-9.539e-03 (7.006e-02)	-3.016e-02 (9.951e-02)	6.264e-03 (6.997e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	1.049e-01 (7.141e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	-1.788e-02 (8.280e-02)	NA	-3.092e-02 (7.621e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	1.610e-01 (1.135e-01)	NA	NA	1.031e-01 (9.672e-02)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	1.595e-01 (1.631e-01)	NA	NA	NA	6.598e-02 (1.315e-01)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	6.228e-02 (1.858e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	-1.706e-02 (1.667e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and amnesty (un2int*pcj.amnesty)	NA	-1.345e-01 (1.107e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA
Interactive term on UN presence and SSR (un2int*SSRI)	NA	3.408e-02 (1.771e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 11: Controls + Amnesty control (no SSRI)

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-1.860e-02* (8.753e-03)	-2.011e-02* (8.584e-03)	-1.590e-02. (8.294e-03)	-1.810e-02* 8.410e-03	-1.597e-02. (8.292e-03)	-1.587e-02. (8.333e-03)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	-9.044e-06 (1.529e-05)	-5.784e-06 (1.376e-05)	-7.860e-06 (1.392e-05)	-6.461e-06 (1.378e-05)	-9.742e-06 (1.491e-05)	-7.791e-06 (1.393e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	-3.176e-06 (3.228e-05)	-8.838e-06 (2.812e-05)	-3.944e-06 (2.785e-05)	-6.995e-06 (2.759e-05)	7.786e-07 (3.023e-05)	-4.013e-06 (2.918e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	1.460e-03* (7.105e-04)	1.302e-03. (6.580e-04)	1.299e-03. (6.695e-04)	1.457e-03* (6.717e-04)	1.328e-03. (6.699e-04)	1.301e-03. (6.862e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	1.879e-04 (2.495e-04)	2.442e-04 (2.234e-04)	1.328e-04 (2.144e-04)	2.010e-04 (2.198e-04)	1.026e-04 (2.235e-04)	1.310e-04 (2.257e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	4.333e-02 (4.889e-02)	5.899e-02 (4.608e-02)	6.057e-02 (4.334e-02)	5.136e-02 (4.315e-02)	5.410e-02 (4.562e-02)	5.937e-02 (4.330e-02)
Amnesty measures present? (pcj.amnesty)	1.706e-02 (4.557e-02)	4.434e-02 (5.443e-02)	1.072e-02 (4.115e-02)	1.875e-02 (3.802e-02)	4.184e-03 (3.728e-02)	5.856e-03 (3.732e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	9.143e-02 (5.736e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	-3.367e-03 (6.067e-02)	NA	-1.393e-02 (5.512e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	1.017e-01 (8.629e-02)	NA	NA	9.602e-02 (8.272e-02)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	3.763e-02 (8.584e-02)	NA	NA	NA	2.842e-02 (7.801e-02)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	2.642e-02 (1.478e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	7.336e-03 (1.424e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and amnesty (un2int*pcj.amnesty)	NA	-1.156e-01 (8.376e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 12: Controls + SSRI control (No Amnesty)

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-7.612e-03 (7.135e-03)	-7.114e-03 (6.880e-03)	-5.938e-03 (6.916e-03)	-6.998e-03 (6.961e-03)	-6.355e-03 (6.875e-03)	-5.922e-03 (6.882e-03)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	-2.023e-05 (1.400e-05)	-1.870e-05 (1.392e-05)	-1.721e-05 (1.327e-05)	-1.673e-05 (1.320e-05)	-2.004e-05 (1.373e-05)	-1.726e-05 (1.327e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	1.486e-05 (2.871e-05)	1.366e-05 (2.450e-05)	1.546e-05 (2.459e-05)	1.015e-05 (2.520e-05)	2.359e-05 (2.674e-05)	1.443e-05 (2.564e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	6.884e-04 (5.557e-04)	5.172e-04 (5.154e-04)	6.313e-04 (5.348e-04)	6.893e-04 (5.158e-04)	6.871e-04 (5.173e-04)	6.141e-04 (5.224e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	4.114e-05 (1.961e-04)	3.864e-05 (1.706e-04)	-4.375e-06 (1.672e-04)	4.224e-05 (1.746e-04)	-4.061e-05 (1.730e-04)	3.885e-06 (1.769e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	1.150e-02 (4.280e-02)	7.976e-03 (4.023e-02)	2.484e-02 (4.065e-02)	2.193e-02 (3.815e-02)	2.128e-02 (3.831e-02)	2.379e-02 (3.856e-02)
Security sector reform present? (SSRI)	-2.823e-02 (5.553e-02)	-2.501e-02 (6.486e-02)	-3.682e-03 (4.713e-02)	-2.979e-03 (4.520e-02)	-2.380e-02 (5.275e-02)	-4.203e-03 (4.591e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	3.650e-02 (3.469e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	1.067e-02 (4.444e-02)	NA	-1.205e-03 (4.281e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	5.576e-02 (5.710e-02)	NA	NA	4.577e-02 (5.402e-02)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	6.889e-02 (7.797e-02)	NA	NA	NA	5.627e-02 (7.456e-02)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	6.872e-02 (1.398e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.774e-02 (1.315e-01)
Interactive term on UN presence and amnesty (un2int*SSRI)	NA	3.286e-02 (8.270e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 13: Controls sans Amnesty and SSR controls

IV/Controls	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
Log of deaths during conflict (logcost)	-6.272e-03 (5.461e-03)	-6.333e-03 (5.278e-03)	-5.675e-03 (5.298e-03)	-6.063e-03 (5.338e-03)	-5.599e-03 (5.284e-03)	-5.731e-03 (5.303e-03)
rGDP per capita (rgdpcaps)	-1.527e-05 (1.106e-05)	-1.286e-05 (1.016e-05)	-1.312e-05 (1.032e-05)	-1.287e-05 (1.024e-05)	-1.516e-05 (1.082e-05)	-1.328e-05 (1.028e-05)
Electricity consumption per capita (develop)	1.048e-05 (2.109e-05)	9.620e-06 (1.860e-05)	9.613e-06 (1.877e-05)	7.706e-06 (1.909e-05)	1.368e-05 (2.001e-05)	8.861e-06 (1.926e-05)
Ethnic fractionalization (elf)	5.225e-04 (4.339e-04)	4.672e-04 (4.127e-04)	5.109e-04 (4.180e-04)	5.278e-04 (4.150e-04)	5.366e-04 (4.160e-04)	4.975e-04 (4.221e-04)
War duration in months (wardur)	4.380e-05 (1.630e-04)	5.271e-05 (1.447e-04)	2.146e-05 (1.436e-04)	4.371e-05 (1.496e-04)	2.338e-06 (1.469e-04)	2.874e-05 (1.496e-04)
Was there a peace treaty? (treaty)	5.075e-03 (3.144e-02)	4.692e-03 (2.881e-02)	1.821e-02 (2.701e-02)	1.620e-02 (2.682e-02)	1.216e-02 (2.855e-02)	1.744e-02 (2.698e-02)
UN presence (un2int)	NA	3.003e-02 (2.583e-02)	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN observer missions (untype 2)	9.343e-03 (3.573e-02)	NA	2.655e-04 (3.374e-02)	NA	NA	NA
Traditional UN PKO missions (untype 3)	3.008e-02 (4.651e-02)	NA	NA	2.271e-02 (4.405e-02)	NA	NA
Multidimensional PKOs (untype 4)	3.667e-02 (5.397e-02)	NA	NA	NA	2.953e-02 (5.140e-02)	NA
Peace enforcement UN missions (untype 5)	3.880e-02 (1.191e-01)	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.983e-02 (1.148e-01)

Summary Statistics for World Bank Rule of Law dataset

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
develop	691.2512	1076.5450407	14.000000	5387.00000	65
difference.wbgi.rle	0.02015772	0.1538614	-0.454220	0.4546193	43
elf	51.20690	29.9764578	0	93.00000	58
logcost	12.46568	2.2113066	6.907755	15.6718100	65
pcj.amnesty	0.3846154	0.4902903	0	1	65
rgdpcaps	1624.0	1408.5310353	130.000000	5827.00000	63
SSRI	0.1666667	0.3761774	0	1	54
treaty	0.4153846	0.4966232	0	1	65
un2int	0.5230769	0.5033541	0	1	65
untype2	0.1846154	0.3910046	0	1	65
untype3	0.07692308	0.2685431	0	1	65
untype4	0.1076923	0.3124038	0	1	65
untype5	0.03076923	0.1740358	0	1	65
wardur	107.8154	108.4184446	1	600.00000	65

Summary Statistics for CIM values dataset

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
CIM.difference.11.10	-0.01169318	0.09989931	-0.8950195	.09367647	94
develop	549.41978529	863.4991	10	5387.000	119
elf	47.79464286	30.45633	0	93.0000	112
logcost	12.04126899	2.357759	6.9077550	15.67181	118
pcj.amnesty	0.37179487	0.4864121	0	1	119
rgdpcaps	1424.68141593	1321.930	65	5832.000	78
SSRI	0.11764706	0.3237808	0	1	113
treaty	0.29411765	0.4575717	0	1	102
un2int	0.36974790	0.4847775	0	1	119
untype2	0.14285714	0.3514067	0	1	119
untype3	0.06722689	0.2514734	0	1	119
untype4	0.05882353	0.2362890	0	1	119
untype5	0.02521008	0.1574255	0	1	119
wardur	81.00840336	94.08322	1	600.0000	119

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LA VIE AVEC L'ASTHME: ANALYSIS OF ASTHMA SUSCEPTIBILITY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IMMIGRANT AND NATIVE POPULATIONS IN FRANCE

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ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the differences in asthma prevalence between the native-born French population and the immigrant population in an effort to measure the effect of nativity on the likelihood that an individual is asthmatic. Previous research has shown that immigrants report better health than the native population, which is a phenomenon known as the immigrant health paradox. Yet, significant research also suggests that populations with low socioeconomic status, as immigrants tend to be, are more prone to asthma than populations of higher socioeconomic status. Using the 2003 cycle of the *Enquête Santé*, I created models to estimate the influence of one's immigrant status on the likelihood of being asthmatic, as well as generating models to measure the effect of immigrant status on severity of one's asthma. My studies ultimately showed that immigrants in France are less likely to be asthmatic than the native-born population. Similarly, immigrants tend to have a lower propensity to have severe asthma. These results affirm the findings of previous studies on the immigrant health paradox and suggest that immigrants have better respiratory health than the native population.

Disparities in health status continue to plague societies, despite attempts to create health systems that provide individuals with equal access to care. Immigrant status is one integral factor that shapes inequalities among individuals' health. Extensive health research in the United States has established that, on the whole, immigrants tend to have better health than the native population. Studies that compare immigrant health to that of the native population report that, despite having lower socioeconomic status, immigrants are likely to have longer life expectancies and lower rates of chronic diseases than the native population.¹ Though this "immigrant health paradox" is a widely accepted phenomenon in North America, limited research has investigated this topic elsewhere in the world. France is a particularly interesting case to study nativity-related health questions because of its large immigrant population and because all residents, both native-born and immigrant, have access to the complimentary French health care system, which should theoretically alleviate many of the health inequalities. Yet, health inequalities persist in France, suggesting that other factors, such as nativity status, may influence health and access to care.

Although French research has not compared the

health status of native and immigrant populations, researchers have analyzed the effect of socioeconomic status on individuals' health. More specifically, epidemiologists, sociologists, and other health researchers have identified asthma as a chronic disease that disproportionately affects individuals of low socioeconomic status. Over the past 30 years, the prevalence of asthma has increased dramatically. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that currently around 235 million people worldwide are asthmatic.² As a result of this increase, the causes, distribution, and treatment of asthma have become important areas of research. In recognition of the seriousness of the public health problem posed by asthma, WHO founded the Global Initiative for Asthma (GINA) to investigate methods to control and decrease the prevalence of asthma. France has demonstrated its dedication to studying asthma by conducting various health surveys, such as the *Enquête Santé* (Health Study) and the Health, Health Care and Insurance Survey, which both designate specific sections of their questionnaires to the investigation of the state of asthma in France, in order to better understand the trends of asthma affliction. Despite the extensive data analysis, almost none of this research studies the influence of immigrant sta-

tus on individuals' respiratory health.

In this study, I examine the effect that nativity has both on the likelihood that an individual living in France is asthmatic and on the severity of an individual's asthma. With these methods, I hope to combine the research on the immigrant health paradox with the research on social aspects of asthma prevalence to analyze whether immigrants in France, despite socioeconomic factors, report better respiratory health than the native French population. To address this question, I analyzed data collected in the 2003 cycle of the *Enquête Santé* (Health Study).³ My results indicate that native-born French citizens are more likely to be asthmatic than immigrants are. Within the asthmatic population, the natives are likely to have more severe, uncontrolled asthma than immigrants. These results support the immigrant health paradox in that the immigrant population tends to report better respiratory health than the native population of the host country.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In an age in which people are constantly migrating, the status of immigrant health poses a question of great significance to researchers and policy makers. One might expect that immigrants would tend to have worse health than the native population due to lower socioeconomic status or lack of knowledge about the health care system.⁴ Yet, much of the research on immigrants' health supports the "immigrant health paradox." The theory behind this phenomenon states that immigrant populations tend to be in better health than the native population of their host country.⁵ The paradoxical nature of this phenomenon lies in the fact that despite socioeconomic disadvantages, immigrant populations still prove to have better bills of health than native populations.

Hispanic immigrants in the United States present a prime example of this, so much so that the immigrant health paradox is often simply referred to as the "Hispanic paradox." Despite Hispanic immigrants' low socioeconomic status, they generally report better health than native-born U.S. populations. In Cagney et al's study, Hispanic immigrants have lower propensity to have respiratory problems than other racial groups.⁶ However, this health benefit disappears in second-generation immigrants, who report worse health than U.S.-born whites. In addition, Hispanic immigrants and U.S.-born Hispanics living outside an urban enclave of other Hispanic immigrants experi-

ence higher rates of asthma and breathing problems. In another study, the Mexican-American population reports a higher mortality rate than both white Americans and their immigrant counterparts.⁷ In both studies, immigrant populations who are more closely connected to their immigrant roots, either by their community or recency of migration, are ultimately in better health. Because place of origin is the main difference between the Hispanic immigrants and U.S.-born Hispanics, nativity seems to be a significant predictor of an individual's health. Similar studies have compared the health of Asian-Americans to that of Asian immigrant populations. These studies provided comparable results to those that analyzed Hispanic health, again highlighting the importance of nativity on predicting an individual's health.⁸

Several hypotheses attempt to explain this immigrant health benefit. First, the healthy migrant effect hypothesizes that individuals who migrate have better health than those in their country of origin, so that overall, the healthiest individuals compose a majority of the migrating population.⁹ Similarly, the salmon-bias effect hypothesizes that ill and elderly immigrants return to their home country to take care of themselves.¹⁰ As a result, populations of immigrants in a host country report better health than the native population because only the healthiest stay in the host country. Both of these hypotheses are based on identifying the immigrant health benefit as a sampling bias, thereby nullifying the possible existence of an actual immigrant health benefit. Support for both these hypotheses about migrant selection is mixed.¹¹

A third hypothesis suggests that immigrant health benefits relate to acculturation effects. Research has shown that immigrants' health diminishes with increased acclimation to the host country. Immigrants' diets, participation in physical activity, and conceptions of health ultimately end up shifting and reflect American practices after an extended stay. Mothers of Hispanic origin report that they cooked more processed foods and walked less after moving to the United States. Immigrants who become acculturated to American lifestyles are more susceptible to obesity and generally lead less healthy lifestyles than they would have in their home countries.¹² After prolonged stay in the United States, immigrants' health status converges to that of the native population as immigrants alter their lifestyle and become enveloped in American culture. This suggests that immigrants' live

healthier lives before coming to United States, thus having better health than native-born Americans. In addition, the host country, specifically the United States, is generally more polluted than immigrants' country of origin, so they often become exposed to more toxicants that wear on their health. That is to say, immigrants have better health than the native population because they have maintained healthier lifestyles before their migration. This hypothesis posits that on average, immigrants are healthier than the native population because their lifestyles in their home country benefit their health more than the American lifestyle. In contrast to the first two hypotheses introduced, the acculturation hypothesis synthesizes the impact that length of stay has on immigrants' health and suggests that lifestyle, not the health of those who elect to migrate, determines the average health of the immigrant and native populations. Essentially, immigrants have better health because they take better care of themselves.

Studies consistently reported that immigrants have longer life expectancies as well as lower rates of mortality, heart disease, and hypertension than native-born individuals.¹³ However, in all the different immigrant health studies published on a wide range of diseases and health problems,¹⁴ Huh et al (2008) produced one of the only studies that analyzed the relationship between nativity and asthma. Their results indicated that immigrants had lower prevalence rates for asthma than did their U.S.-born counterparts. These results support the immigrant health paradox, but little work has been done to expand on their findings. Literature on the relationship between asthma and socioeconomic status, on the other hand, is abundant.

Asthma is a chronic respiratory disease highly correlated with exposure to air pollutants and toxicants. Individuals who live and work in areas with high concentrations of air pollutants are at higher risk for exhibiting asthmatic symptoms because the levels of exposure provoke asthma.¹⁵ Typically, individuals from low socioeconomic backgrounds tend to live in areas with higher concentrations of air pollutants and, as a result, asthma disproportionately affects individuals of low socioeconomic and minority backgrounds.¹⁶ Because of the strong correlation between asthmatic symptoms and socioeconomic status, asthma is often called a poor man's disease.

Individuals of low socioeconomic status not only are more likely to be asthmatic, but within the

asthmatic population, they are more likely to have more severe and more persistent symptoms than asthmatics of higher socioeconomic status. Based on the standards established by GINA, Afrite et al. analyzed the severity of the French population's asthma as influenced by various socioeconomic factors. The likelihood that an individual would have uncontrolled asthma symptoms increased dramatically for those with lower incomes and lower levels of education.¹⁷ These findings build upon the accepted notions that asthma is related to socioeconomic status and intensify its influence. As immigrants are often minorities in the host country, are of low socioeconomic status, and live in more densely populated and polluted areas, the pairing of asthma and immigrant health raises the question of whether the immigrant health effect provides a better estimation of immigrants' asthma than socioeconomic status.

Because immigrant health research depends entirely on access to data on individuals' nativity status, such research is extremely limited in France due to restrictions on the collection of individuals' ethnic information. Nonetheless, recent work published in France analyzes the relationship between immigrant and native-born French populations' health.¹⁸ The findings from Jusot et al. (2011) support the immigrant health paradox, but reiterate the necessity to control for socioeconomic status in order to observe the complete effect of nativity status on health. Berchet compared the uses of the French health care system by the immigrant and the native French populations.¹⁹ Her results indicated that the native and immigrant populations used health services differently, despite the fact that all French inhabitants have free access health care. Since 1945, all residents in France have had access to health care coverage from the government, paid for with income taxes, although individuals also have the choice to seek private medical care.²⁰ The system grants individuals the ability to visit doctors and hospitals for inexpensive treatment. Immigrants are also covered through the national French health care system with proof of legal residence or asylum in France.²¹ Despite both populations having complimentary access to general practitioners through the French health care system, immigrants are less likely than the native French population to take advantage of those services. Berchet argued that these results represent first access barriers to health care that immigrants experience. Because of language barriers and social exclusion,

immigrants ultimately have more difficulty visiting health services. Conversely, research supporting the immigrant health paradox may indicate that immigrants do not require medical services as frequently.

Analysis of French data on asthma and nativity could provide one of two results. First, one could find that the immigrants are less affected by asthma than the native French population, which would support the immigrant health paradox. Second, results could indicate that immigrants are more affected by asthma than the native French population because they do not have ready access to health care as indicated by Berchet's findings, are generally of low socioeconomic status, and are concentrated in more populated and polluted areas, thereby predisposing them to being more susceptible to asthma symptoms.

METHODS SECTION

This study addresses two research questions:

1. Are individuals born in France more likely to be asthmatic than individuals who have immigrated to France?
2. Of the currently asthmatic population, is the native French population more likely than the immigrant population to have severe asthma symptoms, in respect to the standards set by the Global Initiative for Asthma (GINA)?

The first research question addresses whether the native French population is more affected by asthma than the immigrant population. The second question investigates, more specifically, the relationship between the severity of an individual's asthma and their nativity status. The measure of asthma severity allows for a more nuanced analysis of the state of individuals' asthma based on how many symptoms respondents report. The literature review generates two sets of competing, yet equally valid hypotheses:

- 1a. My results could indicate that a higher percentage of the native-born French population are asthmatic, supporting the immigrant health paradox.
- b. My results could also indicate that a lower percentage of the native-born French population is asthmatic, supporting research on the prevalence of asthma in individuals with low socioeconomic status.

2a. My results could indicate that asthmatics who are native to France have more severe asthma than asthmatics who have immigrated to France, supporting the immigrant health paradox.

b. My results could indicate that asthmatics that are native to France have less severe asthma than asthmatics that have immigrated to France, supporting research on the prevalence of asthma in individuals with low socioeconomic status.

To answer these questions, I analyzed survey data from the *Enquête Santé* collected in 2002-03 by l'Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies). This French study is conducted every ten years, focusing on the Nord-Pas de Calais, Picardie, Champagne-Ardenne, Ile-de-France, and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur regions. About 112,000 individuals, eighteen years and older from 40,000 different households, participated in this cycle of the study.²² The survey includes extensive data on individuals' health care use, health status, and health history, as well as respondents' socioeconomic and nativity status. Not only is this one of the only French datasets that collects data on respondents' health and nativity status, but it also aptly measures a wide sample of French residents, making this attractive data for my research question.

To identify the asthmatic population, I created two variables. Respondents who had an asthma attack in the last twelve months or were currently taking asthma medication were coded as "currently asthmatic." Respondents who reported ever having an asthma attack in their lives were coded as "lifetime asthmatics." The currently asthmatic variable served as my dependent variable in Question 1. I created an index variable using four other questions related to respondents' asthmatic symptoms to measure the level of severity of individuals' asthma. The measure has three levels of severity, depending on the level of control individuals had over their symptoms. The standards used were based on those published by GINA, which created an index variable with three ordered response categories: controlled, partially controlled, and uncontrolled.²³ A higher GINA score reflects that an individual had more severe and less controlled asthma. The asthma control index variable served as the dependent variable in Question 2.

Equation 1 presents my model for addressing Question 1:

$$\text{ASTHMA} = \beta_1 \text{NATIVE}_1 + \beta_2 \text{DEM} + \beta_3 \text{SES} + \beta_4 \text{HEALTH} + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

Where:

- ASTHMA is the likelihood that an individual is asthmatic based on influencing independent variables.
- NATIVE_1 is the focus variable of E1 reporting the influence that being born in France has on the odd ratio that an individual has asthma.
- If β_1 is larger than 1, this suggests that being native-born French increases the likelihood that an individual is asthmatic.
- If β_1 is less than 1, then the coefficient suggests that being native-born French decreases the likelihood that an individual is asthmatic.
- DEM, SES, and HEALTH are vectors of multiple variables.
- DEM corresponds to a group of demographic control variables, including respondents' age, gender, and urbanity of their residence.
- SES corresponds to a group of socioeconomic control variables, including the respondent's employment status, respondent's family income, and respondent's level of education.
- HEALTH corresponds to a group of health control variables, including respondent's self-reported health status and whether the respondent has health coverage.

To estimate Equation 1, I employ logistic regression, which is ideal for estimating the probability between binary outcomes, such as whether or not an individual is asthmatic. Results are given as odds ratios, which is the increase or decrease in the odds that an individual is asthmatic based on a one-unit change in the independent variable.

Equation 2 presents my model for addressing Question 2:

$$\text{CONTROL} = C + \beta_1 \text{NATIVE}_2 + \beta_2 \text{DEM} + \beta_3 \text{SES} + \beta_4 \text{HEALTH} + \varepsilon \quad (2)$$

Where:

- CONTROL is the level of control that a currently asthmatic individual has over his/her asthma symptoms, in respect to the GINA standards.
- NATIVE_2 is the focus variable of E2 reporting the influence that being born in France has on asthmatics' control of their symptoms.
- If β_1 is positive, this suggests that being native-born French increases the likelihood that one has severe, uncontrolled asthma.
- If β_1 is negative, then the coefficient suggests that being native-born French decreases the likelihood that an individual has severe, uncontrolled asthma.
- Again, DEM, SES, and HEALTH are vectors of multiple variables.
- DEM corresponds to a group of demographic control variables, including respondents' age, gender, and urbanity of their residence.
- SES corresponds to a group of socioeconomic control variables, including whether the respondent is employed, respondent's family income, and respondent's level of education.
- HEALTH corresponds to a group of health control variables, including respondent's self-reported health status and whether the respondent has health coverage.

I used both ordinary least squares (OLS) and multinomial logistic regression to estimate Equation 2. OLS presents a simple, straightforward estimate of the impact of the independent variables on asthmatics' control of their asthma based on the GINA scale. OLS assumes that the dependent variable is continuous, though it is actually an ordinal variable based on the level of control of respondents' asthma. Multinomial logistic regression recognizes that the dependent variable is categorical, so it captures the difference in the likelihood that an individual has controlled asthma versus partially controlled or uncontrolled asthma. Only respondents who are currently asthmatic are included in this model.

The demographic, socioeconomic, and health variables I include in my models are standard in studies that analyze health inequalities.²⁴ Refer to Table 1 for descriptions of all the variables included in both models.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Variable Name	Variable Description	Variable Type	Codes	Percent
Native	Whether respondent was born in France; Dummy	Focus independent	1=French-born	90.8%
			0=Foreign born	9.2
Gender	Respondent's gender Dummy	Demographic	1=Male	40.6
			0=Female	59.4
Age	Respondent's age at time of interview (years)	Demographic	Continuous	Mean: 52.7 yrs SD: 17.8
Urbanity	Size of the town in which respondent lives*	Demographic	Rural	23.5
			Town	29.7
			City	29.0
			Paris	17.9
Employment	Whether respondent is employed Dummy	Socioeconomic	1=Employed	45.0
			0=Not in workforce, unemployed	55.0
Income	Household yearly income (Euros)	Socioeconomic	Continuous	Mean= 27,639 € SD= 19,727
Education	Highest degree respondent has earned**	Socioeconomic	0=No degree or education	20.8
			1=CEP/DFEO, Equivalent to elementary school diploma	17.1
			2=BEPC, Equivalent to middle school diploma	6.8
			3=CAP/BEP, Equivalent to pre-professional high school diploma	20.9
			4=Bac technique, Equivalent to technical high school diploma	4.3
			5=Bac général, equivalent to pre-college high school diploma	9.4
			6=Bac + 2, equivalent to completing a BA	10.5
			7=Supérieur à Bac + 2, Equivalent to completing a MA or higher	10.2
Coverage	Whether respondent has health care coverage; Dummy	Health	1=Yes	91.5
			0=No	8.5

*Coded as 3 separate dummy variables, rural is excluded as control

**Treated as continuous variable in regressions

RESULTS

About 6 percent of the sample is asthmatic, which early matches the French national average (6.7 percent).²⁵ Just over 9 percent of the sampled population was foreign-born, which is also comparable to the national average (10.7 percent). These statistics suggest that the sample from this study is fairly representative of the French population, at least with respect to the two main areas of interest in this study. The sample had a majority female (59.4 percent), which is consistent with research that shows that women live longer than men. The mean age of respondents at the time of their interview was 52.7 years, though this older mean age may be a result of only including respondents over the age of eighteen.

Cross-tabulations between the nativity and asthmatic variables created a basic picture of the composition of asthmatic population. Within the native-born French population, 6 percent were asthmatic, and 9.3 percent reported having ever been asthmatic. Only 5 percent of the immigrant population reported being currently asthmatic, and 7.2 percent reported having ever been asthmatic (Table 2). These results indicate that the percentage of the native French population that is asthmatic is larger than that of the immigrant population. Both of the distributions within the current and lifetime asthmatic populations were statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 0.00$). Of the currently asthmatic

population, a larger percentage of the immigrant population had controlled asthma symptoms than the native French population did (0.93 percent of native-born French and 2.3 percent of immigrants, $\chi^2 = 0.011$, Table 3). Of lifetime asthmatics, 1.7 percent of native-born French and 2.4 percent of immigrants had controlled asthma at the time of the survey, but these cross tabulations were not statistically significant. The immigrant population reports better respiratory health than the native-born French population, despite being less likely to have health coverage (93 percent of native French covered, 75 percent immigrant, Table 4).

Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients for Equation 1. Throughout the model iterations, individuals native to France report an increased likelihood of being asthmatic, and each coefficient was statistically significant. The basic model shows that being born in France makes an individual 1.22 times more likely to be asthmatic than immigrants. When adding in the demographic variable controls, native French are only 1.214 times more likely to be asthmatic. Controlling for demographic and socioeconomic variables, French-born individuals are 1.282 times more likely than immigrants to be asthmatic. For French-born individuals, the odds of being asthmatic are 1.327 times greater than for immigrants when controlling for demographic, socioeconomic, and health variables. These results support the hypothesis that the native

Table 2: Percent of French-born and immigrant populations that are asthmatic

	Currently Asthmatic		Ever Asthmatic	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
French Born (%)	5.99	94.01	9.36	90.64
Immigrant	4.97	95.03	7.18	92.82
$\chi^2 = 0.00$	N = 112,535			

Table 3: Percent of French-born and immigrant current asthmatics with controlled, partially controlled and uncontrolled asthma

	Level of asthma control, currently asthmatic		
	Controlled	Partially controlled	Uncontrolled
French Born (%)	0.93	5.00	94.07
Immigrant	2.32	5.22	92.46
$\chi^2 = 0.011$	N = 6,639		

Percent of French-born and immigrant lifetime asthmatics with controlled, partially controlled and uncontrolled asthma

	Level of asthma control, ever asthmatic		
	Controlled	Partially controlled	Uncontrolled
French Born (%)	1.73	4.08	94.2
Immigrant	2.41	4.28	93.3
$\chi^2 = 0.375$ (not significant)	N = 10,312		

Table 4: Percent of French-born and immigrants with health care coverage

	Health care coverage	
	Yes	No
French Born (%)	93.2	6.8
Immigrant	75.0	25.0
$\chi^2 = 0.000$	N = 112,534	

Table 5: Coefficients for equation 1, Whether or not an individual has asthma, Logistic

E1 Logistic	Odds Ratios			
	Basic Model, 1 (p-value)	2	3	4
Native	1.218* (0.000)	1.214* (0.000)	1.282* (0.000)	1.327* (0.000)
Age	-	0.993* (0.000)	0.988* (0.000)	0.982* (0.000)
Gender	-	0.936* (0.011)	0.970 (0.251)	1.020 (0.445)
Town	-	1.098* (0.008)	1.089* (0.016)	1.068 (0.065)
City	-	1.085* (0.023)	1.083* (0.026)	1.061 (0.097)
Paris	-	1.034 (0.421)	1.091* (0.039)	1.078 (0.076)
Employment	-	-	0.745* (0.000)	0.775* (0.000)
Income	-	-	0.999* (0.027)	1 (0.591)
Education	-	-	0.976* (0.000)	1.001 (0.869)
Coverage	-	-	-	1.091 (0.069)
Health	-	-	-	0.422* (0.000)

Significant at 95% CI: *

N = 110,150

French population is more likely to be asthmatic than the immigrant population.

When all controls for Equation 1 are included, employment, good health, and, strangely enough, older age each lower the odds that an individual will be asthmatic. The odds that an individual would be asthmatic increased for individuals who were male and lived in more populated areas when controlling for all other demographic, socioeconomic, and health variables. In Model 4, education and income had almost no effect on the odds of whether an individual would be asthmatic, which may result from multi-collinearity between the variables because they measure similar aspects of individuals' socioeconomic status, thereby canceling out the individual influence the variables may have. In this fourth model, only nativity, age, employment, and health status had statistically significant coefficients, though in Models 2 and 3, the urbanity of where a respondent lived was a significant predictor of whether an individual has asthma.

The results from Equation 2 indicated that nativ-

ity status had a statistically significant effect on predicting the level of severity of an individuals' asthma (Table 6). In Models 1-4 (OLS regression), the nativity variable coefficient was consistently positive and significant at the 95 percent confidence level, which suggests that being native French makes asthmatics more likely to have more severe, uncontrolled asthma. As more control variables were added to the models, the nativity coefficient became larger. In the basic model, being native French increased an individual's asthma severity score by 0.03 units. In Model 2, being native French increased an individual's reported asthma severity score by 0.033 units when controlling for demographic variables. When controlling for demographic and socioeconomic variables, being a native as opposed to an immigrant increased the severity of an individual's asthma by 0.0336 units. The fourth model—including demographic, socioeconomic, and health control variables—reported that being native French increased the severity of an individual's asthma by 0.034 units. These results suggest that if an asthmatic

Table 6: Coefficients for equation 2, Severity of Individuals' Asthma, OLS

E2₁ OLS	Basic Model (p-value)	2	3	4
Constant	2.90* (0.000)	2.85* (0.000)	2.84* (0.000)	2.83* (0.000)
Native	0.030* (0.026)	0.033* (0.017)	0.0336* (0.015)	0.034* (0.014)
Age	-	0.001* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)
Gender	-	-0.005 (0.501)	-0.008 (0.305)	-0.005 (0.532)
Town	-	0.018 (0.075)	0.017 (0.083)	0.013 (0.202)
City	-	0.007 (0.517)	0.004 (0.643)	0.001 (0.907)
Paris	-	0.008 (0.521)	0.008 (0.486)	0.008 (0.520)
Employment	-	-	0.016 (0.064)	0.014 (0.116)
Income	-	-	-6.72 e ⁻⁰⁷ * (0.001)	7.04e ⁻⁰⁷ * (0.001)
Education	-	-	0.003* (0.074)	0.003 (0.125)
Coverage	-	-	-	0.026 (0.052)
Health	-	-	-	-0.005 (0.532)

Significant at 95% CI: *

N = 6,610

is native-born French, he/she is more likely to have severe asthma characterized by more uncontrolled asthma symptoms. Controlling for demographic, socioeconomic, and health variables makes this effect more pronounced.

Older age, living in a more populated area, and not having health insurance slightly increased the severity of an individual's asthma when controlling for all other demographic, socioeconomic, and health variables. Most of the estimated coefficients in this set of models were small and statistically insignificant at the 95 percent confidence level, which limits the practical importance of the impact of these variables on the predicting model.

As shown in the results from the OLS analysis of Models 1-4, the results from the E2 multinomial logistic regression indicated that there is a higher probability that the native-born French population would have uncontrolled asthma symptoms than the immigrant population does (Table 6). In the basic model (Model 5), being native French increases the log odds of uncontrolled versus controlled asthma by 0.931 units and increases the log odds of partially controlled

versus controlled asthma by 0.870 units. Controlling for demographic variables and being native French, as opposed to immigrant, increase the log odds of uncontrolled versus controlled asthma by 1.07 units, and increases the log odds for partially controlled versus controlled asthma by 0.992 units. When both demographic and socioeconomic control variables are included in the model, the log odds of uncontrolled versus controlled asthma increased by 1.156 units for native French individuals, and the logs odds of partially-controlled versus controlled asthma increased 1.68 units for native French individuals as opposed to immigrant individuals. Finally, when controlling for all demographic, socioeconomic, and health variables, individuals born in France increased the log odds of uncontrolled versus controlled asthma by 1.067 units and increased the logs odds of partially-controlled versus controlled asthma by 0.987 units. As exhibited in the OLS models, being part of the native-born French population increases the likelihood that an asthmatic will have severe, uncontrolled asthma. This effect becomes more pronounced when controlling for demographic, socioeconomic, and other control variables.

Table 7: Coefficients for equation 2, Asthmatics’ control of their asthmatic symptoms, Multinomial logistic

E2: Multinomial logistic	Partially Controlled (vs. Controlled)				Uncontrolled (vs. Controlled)			
	Basic Model, 5 (p-value)	6	7	8	Basic Model, 5 (p-value)	6	7	8
Constant	0.81* (0.019)	0.02 (0.977)	0.984 (0.170)	0.16 (0.835)	3.68* (0.000)	2.43* (0.000)	2.932* (0.000)	2.34* (0.001)
Native	0.870* (0.021)	0.992* (0.011)	1.156* (0.003)	0.987* (0.013)	0.931* (0.004)	1.070* (0.001)	1.168* (0.000)	1.067* (0.002)
Age	-	0.009 (0.262)	-0.001 (0.942)	-0.004 (0.702)	-	0.018* (0.012)	0.015 (0.068)	0.012 (0.177)
Gender	-	-0.562* (0.038)	-0.495 (0.074)	-0.511 (0.066)	-	-0.467 (0.058)	-0.471 (0.062)	-0.435 (0.085)
Town	-	0.302 (0.385)	0.261 (0.459)	0.301 (0.396)	-	0.480 (0.121)	0.432 (0.168)	0.389 (0.216)
City	-	1.133* (0.003)	1.084* (0.005)	1.203* (0.002)	-	0.915* (0.010)	0.844* (0.019)	0.881* (0.015)
Paris	-	0.673 (0.097)	0.840* (0.041)	1.059* (0.012)	-	0.573 (0.119)	0.657 (0.076)	0.801* (0.035)
Employment	-	-	-0.227 (0.451)	-0.309 (0.312)	-	-	0.035 (0.899)	-0.061 (0.827)
Income	-	-	-9.47e ⁻⁶ (0.051)	-9.36e ⁻⁶ (0.055)	-	-	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
Education	-	-	-0.103 (0.112)	-0.114 (0.089)	-	-	-0.028 (0.633)	-0.040 (0.514)
Coverage	-	-	-	1.328* (0.001)	-	-	-	1.148* (0.000)
Health	-	-	-	0.163 (0.662)	-	-	-	-0.180 (0.511)

Significant at 95% CI. *

N = 6, 610

Controlled asthma is the reference group

Controlling for all other demographic, socioeconomic, and health variables, individuals who live in a more populated area have an increased likelihood of having uncontrolled asthmatic symptoms. Not having health insurance also increased the likelihood that an individual would have uncontrolled asthma. Relative to females, males had lower log odds ratios when all controls were included. This suggests that males have less severe, better-controlled asthma than females. Individuals who were employed and had more education were less likely to have severe asthma symptoms. Though the coefficients of the control variables were less important for these research questions, which primarily address the effect that nativity has on asthma, they still provide important information for understanding the whole model.

DISCUSSION

In this study, I analyzed the applicability of the immigrant health paradox to French immigrants for the case of asthma, a disease that disproportionately affects individuals living in poor, urban areas. My results support the nativity effect of immigrants on

health outcomes and the immigrant health paradox. French immigrants were less likely to be asthmatic and generally reported better respiratory health than the native French population. Native French individuals had a higher odds ratio to be asthmatic relative to immigrants. Within the currently asthmatic population, the native French population was more likely to have severe, uncontrolled asthma than the immigrant population. Both of these trends were statistically significant when controlling for the effect of demographic, socioeconomic, and health variables. Although the coefficients were generally small, nativity consistently had a statistically significant effect on determining an individual’s respiratory health. Also important to note, the entire influence that nativity has on an individual’s health is partially muted by his or her demographic, socioeconomic, and health characteristics. By controlling for these variables, we are able to see that despite having lower socioeconomic status, worse health coverage, and living in more urban areas, immigrants still report better respiratory health than the native French. Ultimately, my research indicated that the combined impact of nativity and socioeconomic

status influence an immigrant's health. These results more strongly affirm my hypotheses that conjectured that the immigrant health paradox and nativity have a stronger influence on determining the likelihood that an individual would be asthmatic and the severity of their asthma than one's socioeconomic status.

As such, these results more strongly support my proposed Hypotheses 1a and 2a.

In the estimated models, the various control variables did not introduce much variation into the models, and their coefficients were often statistically insignificant. It is surprising that, given the extensive research supporting the hypothesis that poorer, less educated individuals are more affected by asthma, neither of these variables had a practically significant impact on determining whether an individual is asthmatic or on predicting the severity of an individual's asthma. Perhaps this may result from a diagnostic effect, in that individuals of higher socioeconomic status and more education are more likely to go to the doctor and have their asthma diagnosed, thereby creating a larger sample of asthmatics of higher socioeconomic status.

In the models for both questions, not having health coverage increased the likelihood that an individual would show asthmatic symptoms. A large portion of the French immigrant population did not have health insurance at the time of the survey (25 percent), which puts them at risk for having worse respiratory health. Though immigrants have better respiratory health than the native population, they may lose these health advantages over time because of a combined impact of obstructed access to health care and acculturation. Over extended time, without reliable access to doctors and other health services, immigrants' health benefits may diminish. If this is the case, then policy makers should investigate how they might restructure the health care system to facilitate immigrants' access to services to aid the preservation of immigrants' good health.

Currently, health reforms seem to be mostly instituted on a regional level, but are starting to take into account inequalities resulting from nativity. For example, the Agence Régionale de Santé (ARS) of l'Ile-de-France has recently instituted a public health plan to address its local health problems, focusing on the vast health disparities that result from socioeconomic inequalities.²⁶ The plan also notes that large immigrant populations in the region necessitate the inclu-

sion of health frameworks that address nativity effects on health. To resolve health inequalities, ARS aims to increase available information on health services provided to the public and on how the system of health care coverage functions in Ile-de-France, so that individuals are better equipped to use the system. Such policies, if implemented well, may be an appropriate approach to addressing health care inequalities. Considering that disease control is related to understanding how to use the health care system effectively, this plan could greatly aid immigrants who are currently unfamiliar with the French health system to better maintain their good health status. With more information provided, a wider, more diverse portion of the native French would also be encouraged to take advantage of services, so that they are more effectively use health care services. Though France has historically ignored ethnic differences for the sake of equality, this strategic plan suggests that policy makers are beginning to consider nativity and ethnicity an important determiner of individuals' health. This policy change corroborates the implications of this study, stressing the important influence that nativity has on one's health.

LIMITATIONS

The sampled population is fairly representative of the whole French population, as previously noted, so the results from Equation 1 should be generalizable. Problems with the results may lay in the index variable that measures asthmatics' control over their symptoms. The estimated OLS models for Equation 2 produced small coefficients. These coefficients were small, largely as a result of the lack of variation in the dependent variable. The dependent variable is on a scale that ranges from 1 to 3 (controlled, partially controlled, and uncontrolled asthma). The lack of variation within the actual variable did not allow for very large coefficients in the independent variables. Secondly, the proportion of asthmatic respondents with uncontrolled asthma in the sample was very large. This distribution results from the way the index variable was created.²⁷ As a combined effect of how I created the variable and the total number of symptoms that asthmatics reported having, the variable measuring level of asthma control has a distribution skewed towards the uncontrolled asthma response category.

In Equation 2, Models 1-4, each of the nativity variable coefficients was statistically significant,

though they may not be practically significant. The increase of 0.034 units in an individual's uncontrolled symptoms is equivalent to about 1/10 of a standard deviation for the dependent variable ($SD_{GINA \text{ level of control}} = 0.294$). Even in respect to the amount of variation observed in the dependent variable, nativity did not produce a substantial effect on the model.

FUTURE RESEARCH

Because this study may not have accurately captured the question of control that individuals have over their asthma symptoms, future research with different, more recent data may provide further insight into the question of control of asthma. As studies in the United States have found that immigrants' home country contributes further information to health status, future research could analyze the effect of region of origin on French immigrants' asthma cases. A comparison between French and American immigrants' asthma would allow for a comparison of the different health care systems and their effectiveness in servicing the needs of both the native and immigrant populations in countries with significant immigrant populations.

CONCLUSION

My findings suggest that nativity contributes significant information to the understanding of public health inequalities in France. Results support the immigrant health paradox, suggesting that the phenomenon perhaps has universal applicability. Given this analysis, nativity is shown to be a more significant predictor of health than one's socioeconomic status, suggesting that French researchers and policy analysts should more actively consider the implications of the health care system on the entire population's health, both native French and immigrant. It is recommended that public policy aim to maintain immigrants' health benefits by improving their access to health care coverage and by increasing information available on asthma control for the native French population. This is needed so that both populations may better control their asthma, especially considering the potential threat of acculturation to immigrants' health if they cannot maintain a healthy lifestyle in France.

APPENDIX

I created three variables to measure respondents' asthma. The first measured whether a respondent was asthmatic at the time of the survey, which served as the dependent variable for Equation 1. The second measured if the respondent had ever been asthmatic during his or her life. The third variable measured the "level of control" that a currently asthmatic respondent had over his or her asthma symptoms, which served as the dependent variable for Equation 2. I used the Global Initiative for Asthma's (GINA) guidelines to determine the categories included in my variables.

Currently Asthmatic Population

GINA definition: Individual experiences restricted airways that limits air flow

Included ENS variables:

-Whether respondent had an asthma attack in the last 12 months²⁸ (asj5/asv21)²⁹

-Whether respondent is currently taking asthma medication (asj6/asv22)

Coding:

If a respondent answered "yes" to either of these questions, they were counted as "currently asthmatic."

Lifetime Asthmatic Population

GINA definition: Whether individual has ever experienced restricted/inflamed airways that limit air flow

Included ENS variables:

Whether respondent has ever had an asthma attack (asj8/asv24)

Coding:

If a respondent answered "yes" to this question, they were counted as "lifetime asthmatic." If a respondent was counted as "currently asthmatic," they were automatically included in the lifetime asthmatic population.

Level of control of asthma symptoms

GINA definition:

Controlled (Intermittent) –

- a. Symptoms less than once a week
- b. Nocturnal symptoms not more than twice a month
- c. Normal lung function between episodes

Partially controlled (Moderate persistent) –

- a. Symptoms more than once a week
- b. Nocturnal symptoms more than twice a month
- c. Normal lung function between episodes

Uncontrolled (Persistent) –

- a. Symptoms daily
- b. Frequent exacerbations
- c. Frequent nocturnal asthma symptoms

Included ENS variables:

- Whether respondent has moments of wheezing in the last 12 months (asj1/asv17)
- Whether respondent has woken up due to breathing problems in the last 12 months (asj2/asv18)
- Whether respondent has woken up short of breath in the last 12 months (asj3/asv19)
- Whether respondent has ever woken up coughing in the last 12 months (asj4/asv20)

Coding: Only currently asthmatic respondents were included in the variable.

- Counted as controlled if respondent answered “no” to all four questions
- Counted as partially controlled if respondent answered “yes” to 1 or 2 of the questions
- Counted as uncontrolled if respondent answered “yes” to at least 3 of the questions

As the questions used to create the index variable ask about experiences over the past year, as opposed to the last week or month, this may cause the disproportionately large number of respondents who are counted as having uncontrolled asthma.

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MAKING IT PERSONAL: HOW ANTI-FRACKING ORGANIZATIONS FRAME THEIR MESSAGES

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ABSTRACT

Within the past five years, the anti-fracking movement has emerged from relative obscurity to dramatically shift the social and political dialogue surrounding hydraulic fracturing. The extensive body of framing literature suggests that collective action frames play an important role in building social movements such as the one against fracking. While many scholars have studied the types and utility of collective action frames, few have investigated the role of the intended audience in creating them. This study finds that the relationship between the organization and the audiences it targets is an essential piece of the frame creation process, and by extension, an integral part of the anti-fracking movement. Examination of recent history preceding the movement reveals events that were necessary but not sufficient to coalesce people around the anti-fracking cause. Through ethnographic research at an environmental organization and interviews with those who work with other groups involved in the anti-fracking debate, I establish a theory about how these organizations develop the framing techniques that influence public understanding of fracking. I propose a frame creation process that outlines the relationship between three components: backstage strategizing, front stage testing grounds, and front stage official messages.

I. THE FRACKING DEBATE

In towns all over America, residents receive offers from oil and gas companies that want the right to extract fossil fuels from below their property. Within the past five years, innovations in the process of hydraulic fracturing—or “fracking,” as it is popularly known—have made it economically feasible to extract oil and gas that was once considered irretrievable. As a result, modern day boomtowns have sprung up in rural and suburban areas across the country. State and local governments, oil and gas companies, and private landowners have reaped considerable financial rewards since the proliferation of fracking. Despite this economic windfall, fracking is surrounded by controversy.

The process of hydraulic fracturing involves drilling horizontally through layers of rock—usually shale—that contain pockets of oil and gas. Once the well is drilled, a cocktail of brackish water and chemicals is pumped below the earth’s surface to cause fractures within the shale, thus freeing the oil and gas to be retrieved. Beginning approximately five to six years ago, reports started to surface about complica-

tions near newly fracked sites. People complained of contaminated water wells, land, and air that resulted in a host of negative health effects and diminished property values. In response, environmental groups joined the growing chorus of people who wanted to end fracking.

The debate surrounding fracking has become increasingly heated in recent years. At the core of this debate are two groups with competing interests vying for social and political power. On one side are those who champion the benefits of harnessing trillions of dollars worth of oil and natural gas accessible thanks to recent technological advances. On the other side are those who worry about the adverse effects to the environment, to property values, and to the health of those living in proximity to fracking sites. With the stakes high on both sides, groups have begun mobilizing to make their messages heard.

In this paper, I examine the methods through which anti-fracking organizations attempt to make people feel compelled to join the cause. I begin by outlining recent historical events that provided the foundation for the anti-fracking movement. I argue

that these elements were necessary but not sufficient to incite an organized social movement against fracking. Data I collected through ethnographic research at a New York City area environmental organization and interviews with employees of other local groups involved in the anti-fracking movement suggests that these organizations learn to cater their messages to target audiences through a common frame creation process. Through this frame creation process, organizations have been able to adapt anti-fracking messages that resonate with their desired audiences, thus propelling the movement forward. I define details of the frame creation process and outline the frames used by the organization where I conducted an ethnographic study.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Collective Action Frames

In an effort to persuade people to mobilize for a cause, organizations explain facts in ways that emphasize certain aspects and encourage particular reactions. In their article, *Framing Processes and Social Movements*, Benford and Snow refer to the strategic presentation of messages as “framing.”¹ Framing activities that seek to inspire collective action of those who hear their messages are referred to as “collective action frames.”

Though members are not always conscious of the frame creation processes within their organizations, the framing techniques they employ are no accident. They are a deliberate attempt to shape a listener’s ideas about an issue so that they will take action. “Frames are developed to achieve a specific purpose—to recruit new members, to mobilize adherents, to acquire resources, and so forth,” which are all central activities to any organization.² The potential payoff of effective frames gives organizations a strong incentive to spend time and energy to construct the most compelling frames possible.

Anti-fracking organizations, like many social movement organizations, often use the “injustice frame,” which identifies victims and “amplifies their victimization” to convey their messages.³ Most commonly, fracking-caused contamination of common resources is presented as the injustice, and people and animals who risk illness when they come into contact with the contamination are the victims. Variations on this frame have proven to be an effective method for mobilizing people for the anti-fracking cause.

As organizations have gathered more information about the threat posed from byproducts of fracking, they have been able to expand their repertoire of frames. This is because new research into the ill effects of fracking creates a wider array of issues that can be “plausibly connected to one another,” something Gerhards and Rucht recognize as being key to reaching more people.⁴ They explain that the “larger the range of problems covered by a frame, the larger the range of social groups that can be addressed with the frame and the greater the mobilization capacity of the frame.”⁵ Anti-fracking organizations have been diligent in ensuring that they capitalize on the widening range of framing possibilities by tying together new scientific research and stories of contamination in a host of ways, each one catered to an audience they want to mobilize.

There has been exhaustive research attention directed to the types of frames utilized by organizations, but there has been little, if any, research into the processes by which these frames are created. Given the ubiquity of collective action frames, it is worth exploring how they come to be. Though “it has long been taken as a given in communication studies that the target of the message can affect the form and content of the message,” research on such “audience effects,” which seem to be a vital component in anti-fracking frame creation, is also sparse.⁶ To this end, Benford and Snow suggest that, “the dynamic relationship between collective action frames and audiences warrants additional analytical attention from movement researchers.”⁷

Framing Contests

“Framing contests” occur when organizations and their detractors create competing frames as a means of discrediting the other. Much of the work on framing contests describes them in an inter-organizational context at a movement-wide level.⁸ However, in her 2008 work, *Framing Contests: Strategy Making Under Uncertainty*, Sarah Kaplan expands the understanding of framing contests by examining them at the intra-organizational level. To understand how they affect outcomes within the organization, she explores the “political process by which one frame rather than another comes to predominate and the ways these frames influence strategy making.” She suggests that actors within an organization try to “transform their own cognitive frames into the organization’s pre-

dominant frames through their daily interactions.” In much the same way that organizations attempt to make their frames resonate with a specific audience in order to bring about a desired outcome, individual actors within an organization attempt to legitimate their frames as a method to gain authority within the strategic decision making process.

In contrast to other social movements, “frame resonance disputes” are conspicuously absent from the anti-fracking movement.⁹ Such disputes occur when organizations publicly disagree on “how reality should be presented so as to maximize mobilization” around a cause.¹⁰ At the movement level, anti-fracking organizations actively debate the merits of policy approaches to end fracking, but I found no evidence of frame resonance disputes. Activists in the anti-fracking movement seem to welcome any effective strategies for recruiting participants, regardless of whether the techniques align with the methods their organization pursues. This suggests that the framing contests within the anti-fracking movement occur at an intra-organizational level. Thus, Kaplan’s understanding of framing contests within organizations aligns with the findings of my ethnographic and interview research, which suggest that the proliferation of certain collective action frames is the result of framing contests within anti-fracking organizations—not at a movement level.

Front stages and backstages

In outlining the framing process employed by organizations, I build on Erving Goffman’s theories of front stage and backstage.¹¹ The act of employing a frame would be akin to members of the organization adjusting their behavior to adapt to varying front stage environments before unique audiences. The work that goes into determining which frames are most relevant and advantageous in a given situation would be understood as happening backstage. Employees and volunteers carry out the business of the organization in all arenas. They are the faces that teach classes at elementary schools, present findings to politicians, give lectures to community members, and strike up conversations at an event. They are also the ones who analyze their interactions with the people they meet, decide how a website should be constructed, choose advertising and media messages, allocate funds, and outline organizational objectives. The organization itself is the product of their combined efforts.

III. ETHNOGRAPHIC AND INTERVIEW RESEARCH Ethnographic Study of Environmental Organization

The environmental organization where I conducted my research is located near Manhattan. The stated objective of the organization is to present scientific data about health effects of environmental toxins to legislators and the public in a way that is easily understandable. In doing so, the organization hopes to affect legislative and behavioral change. In practice, the nine employees spend their days orchestrating projects aimed at increasing awareness about environmental issues, raising funds, and recruiting volunteers. Each project highlights one of a handful of causes—such as anti-fracking, dangers of lawn pesticides, or nutrition—presented in a way that resonates with a specific audience.

While conducting my site visits, I often sat at the reception desk or at one of the administrative desks behind it. This central location afforded me the opportunity to easily hear conversations—and when appropriate join them or ask questions about what I had easily overheard—in the reception area, a director’s office, and the break area. While in the reception area, I used a participant-observation research approach, sometimes just listening to what happened around me and other times engaging in one-on-one and group conversations.

On the occasions when I was not in the reception area, I edited podcasts in the recording studio located down a hallway adjacent to the break room. The relative isolation of the recording studio from the goings-on in the office provided a good setting for informal interview situations, especially pertaining to the projects I was editing. For whatever reason—potentially the private setting, the lack of distractions, hearing the subject matter of the radio shows, or any combination of these and other factors—both directors of the organization, Debbi and Dave, seemed the most free to speak in depth about plans, motivations, and goals when in the studio. Most of what I learned about deliberate framing practices came from conversations conducted here.

Clear patterns emerged in the way that environmental issues were presented to specific audiences. Given that the group ensures its survival by influencing people to give time and money to support their causes, this made sense. Tailored messages were communicated on front stages such as marketing materials, radio and television spots, and face-to-face inter-

actions with potential donors and volunteers. Each audience received a different front stage performance by the organization, which was orchestrated with the intention of making the issue feel personal. The organization carefully executed these activities after formal and informal backstage research, planning, and strategizing. The result was a series of drastically different frames for the same environmental issues, each designed to resonate with a specific demographic. My research outlines several of the most commonly targeted audiences and the logic behind the frames constructed to reach them.

Interviews with Employees of Organizations in Anti-fracking Movement

Interviews were conducted in January through March with eight people from anti-fracking organizations not directly affiliated with the one where I conducted fieldwork. The purpose of these interviews was to ascertain whether findings from site visits could be generalized to the wider anti-fracking movement within New York. Questions sought to prompt the interviewees to frame fracking in several different ways and to explain how their organization determines which frames to use with whom.¹² The results suggest strong similarities in the process that produces frames used at environmental organizations.

Five anti-fracking organizations were represented in the interviews. Of those interviewed, six work at organizations with environmental goals beyond fracking, and two work for an organization whose sole purpose is to ban fracking. All have offices within the greater New York City area and have operations that extend throughout New York State, and in some cases into western Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The titles of those interviewed varied, but all of them were in organizing roles that brought them face-to-face with the public to some extent. Four interviewees spent the majority of their time interacting with the public in canvasser-type positions. The remaining four worked in their organization's New York City office but regularly attended events (usually more than one per week) where they interacted with volunteers, members, and the general public.

IV. FOUNDATION FOR ANTI-FRACKING MOVEMENT

The Rise of a Movement

Just five years ago, few people knew anything

about hydraulic fracturing. Though the technique had been used in isolated cases in Texas beginning in the late 1990s and more widely by the mid-2000s, it attracted little attention.¹³ In 2004, oil and gas companies began testing the process on the Marcellus Shale formation in Pennsylvania, and just four years later, the state was experiencing the beginnings of an oil boom.¹⁴ The implementation of fracking has created similar oil and gas booms around the country. States like Texas, Oklahoma, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Colorado, each with very different histories of oil and gas extraction, have seen their economies boosted by revenues generated through fracking.¹⁵

Despite the potential for huge financial gain, the number of fracking detractors has been steadily growing. Groups opposed to fracking have sought legislative action against the practice, and, in a few instances, they have proven successful. In 2008, New York became the first American state to institute a moratorium on fracking, which remains in effect; in 2011, France became the first country to ban the practice. It is clear that a national ban on fracking is unlikely in the United States any time soon, but anti-fracking organizations have been diligently pursuing regulatory changes at state and local levels. Newspaper searches of "hydraulic fracturing" reveal countless efforts to halt fracking in towns and states across America.

From Sustainability Issue to Public Health Threat

According to several people I interviewed, the argument against fracking is much different today than it was when the practice first came to the attention of environmentalists. Alan, a regional director at an environmental organization with several national chapters, recalled when he first heard about hydraulic fracturing while working as an environmental lobbyist in Colorado.¹⁶ A colleague of his explained that petroleum companies had developed a new technique to extract oil and gas that would allow access to previously irretrievable fuel. At this point, the case against fracking was framed in the same manner as the one against conventional oil drilling. Alan's colleague's primary worry was that a new trove of fossil fuel would further America's dependence on it while lessening the incentive to produce clean renewable energy. When understood as just another method on the long list of fuel extraction techniques, fracking provided a limited number of reasonable framing options and failed to garner much attention.

All of this changed when people near fracking sites started to get sick. By 2009, there were isolated reports of townspeople with ailments such as digestive troubles, skin lesions, headaches, and unexplained neuropathy that seemed to be related to the fracking process. Landowners near fracking sites alleged that fracking on or near their property caused methane to seep into their homes, gas to bubble from the ground, and wells to become contaminated. Beyond the potential to cause illness, such mishaps threatened landowners' livelihoods by jeopardizing their most valuable investment: their property.¹⁷

Newly discovered negative consequences of fracking dramatically increased the number of frames that could be used to make a reasonable case against it. As Gerhards and Rucht theorize, the increased number of framing possibilities led more groups to mobilize for the cause.¹⁸ Fracking was no longer simply an issue of fossil fuel dependence; it could also be framed as an issue about public health, property protection, and environmental injustice. As such, the issue resonated even with those who would not identify themselves as environmentalists.

Several people I interviewed recalled learning about the fracking-related problems in rural Pennsylvania, which became widely known within the New York City environmental community. Sue, a volunteer coordinator at an environmental organization in New York City, explained the mood when residents of upstate New York began receiving visits from gas company representatives about leasing their mineral rights and fracking on their land. "People started hearing about all this crazy stuff happening in Pennsylvania, and when people realized it could happen in New York, too...that's when they really wanted to do something about it." As the facts about fracking changed, environmentalists scrambled to capture a wider audience with an anti-fracking message.

The June 2008 moratorium on fracking in New York State gave anti-fracking activists their first major political win. By all accounts of interviewees, this victory energized and galvanized the anti-fracking movement. It became the movement's goal to convince lawmakers to keep the moratorium in place and eventually ban fracking in New York, something that would require broader public support. The pieces of compelling arguments against fracking were there, but three people I interviewed expressed the sentiment that at this point, environmental groups were

still struggling to create a poignant message.

Gasland

Amidst accelerated fracking in Pennsylvania during 2009, a documentary filmmaker named Josh Fox created what is widely acknowledged as the most important piece of anti-fracking media to date. In it, Fox travels the country and interviews people who have experienced negative effects following fracking in their area. The documentary is filled with images of contaminated water from wells, people who report a host of health issues, citizens who feel betrayed by government agencies, scientists who explain the danger of chemicals used in fracking, and perhaps most famously, faucets that produce flammable water. The documentary unabashedly opposes fracking and uses injustice frames to depict its dangers.

The manner in which Fox presented the narratives of environmental injustice and potential ill health effects of fracking served as a template for how to effectively frame the anti-fracking argument. Within weeks of the movie's release, Gasland screening parties became a staple in the outreach efforts of many anti-fracking organizations. These events initially served as a means to excite existing members of the organizations, but soon became a way to introduce the anti-fracking message to people who may not have been familiar with it. Each interviewee had attended at least one, if not several, Gasland screenings and recalled the consistency with which the movie resonated with those who watched it. By many accounts, these screenings were one of the most reliable ways to produce the desired results: people who were concerned enough to give time and money. As such, they were often the first events an organization would host when it moved outreach efforts to a new area.

From Opportunity to Action

Though Gasland was an essential piece of the anti-fracking movement, a documentary alone is not enough to mobilize people. The many preexisting organizations that brought with them a framework to facilitate immediate action made the process of mobilizing people more expeditious than it may have otherwise been. Because they already had the pieces in place to distribute such a message—donors and volunteers sympathetic to such causes, infrastructure in different communities, and experience in mobilizing people—groups were able to orchestrate screen-

ing parties soon after the movie's release. As environmentalists, they saw fracking as an egregious threat to land, water, air, and those who inhabit it. On several occasions Debbi, a lifelong environmentalist and director of the organization where I conducted fieldwork, described fracking as, "the worst environmental issue we've ever seen." Her passionate attitude toward fracking provided a powerful motivation to put her organization behind fighting the practice.

By hosting Gasland viewings early in the mobilization effort in a new town, organizers received clues about what these people valued—information that hinted at which framing techniques might be successful. As Tom, a canvasser and organizer, explained, this was invaluable because the most difficult task when working in a new area was to determine which messages would resonate with the unfamiliar audience. Framing techniques that worked in one town would often not be convincing to people in the next town over. In listening to comments, answering questions, and eavesdropping on conversations between neighbors in an informal environment, organizers gained vital information about their target audience.

V. THE FRAMING PROCESS

Performances for Specific Audiences

Over the course of my site visits, it became clear that employees at the environmental organization catered their messages to the audience they were trying to reach. Each time an issue was explained, it took on a slightly new character. Distinct patterns eventually emerged as to how issues were explained—or framed—to certain demographics. Similar tactics were explained when interviewees discussed the approaches used by their respective organizations to target specific groups of people. Each organization, it seemed, catered their messages to the types of people they wanted to reach, in essence, performing differently for each audience.

The actions of those at the organization where I conducted my field research often suggested that they recognize the vital importance of carefully orchestrated framing strategies. In a particularly revealing exchange that occurred in front of four other employees and myself, Dave expresses his determination to maintain total control over the official messages of the organization. Though Dave and Debbi believe it is important for large donors to feel that they are a part of the organization, they are careful to draw lines. Do-

nors should feel that they are a part of decisions without actually being a part of them.

This distinction was brought to light when Sarah, the policy administrator, asked Dave if she should send a copy of a legislative proposal to an interested donor for suggestions before their meeting that afternoon. Upon hearing this, Dave abandoned his retreat to his office and went to her desk to explain why that was a terrible idea. He started by exclaiming, "You never want to ask for people's input because they'll give it to you, and then you have to use it!" He went on to clarify that if the donors' opinions differed from where he wanted the project to go, it could lead to "awkward situations." Dave wanted to avoid a circumstance where he would have to tell a donor "thanks, but no thanks" for his or her ideas. Even donors who give tens of thousands of dollars per year that pay salaries and fund projects have minimal input into the frame creation process. Their input is always heard, and suggestions are often utilized; but they do not have a definitive say in the strategies that are employed.

Dave's reaction to Sarah's desire to solicit donor input before an important meeting elucidates the importance placed on having control over frames used by the organization. The content of the legislative proposal presented issues through carefully orchestrated frames that would be most compelling to lawmakers. The process that led to choosing how the issues would be presented was the product of years of front stage testing, countless meetings, and hours of painstaking rewording and reorganizing of ideas. It is not surprising, then, that Dave did not want to risk losing control of the legislative proposal in the final moments before a meeting. The ability of the organization to achieve its objectives could be greatly influenced by the performance of the proposal, and its contents would not be determined on a whim.

Goals of the Performances

Those who work within anti-fracking organizations have very targeted goals when they connect with people. Their objectives are at least threefold in each encounter: increasing awareness, raising funds, and recruiting volunteers. In every interaction, they seek to make environmental issues personally relevant to their target audience, so that people will act. Exchanges that do not result in action do not benefit the organization. They need volunteers to execute their objectives, money to fund their projects, and help to

increase awareness of the issues in order to shift public opinion.

The goal of increasing awareness might not obviously suggest action, but within the organization where I conducted fieldwork, it does. Every message they communicate about environmental contaminants has intertwined within it a simple action that one can take to avoid it. Organizations seek to increase awareness about environmental risks, their likely outcomes, and their simple solutions. Benford and Snow would recognize these as examples of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing.¹⁹ In diagnosing a problem, giving a prognosis for its outcome, and suggesting simple preventative solutions, the organizations seek to motivate action. The campaign about BPA in plastics pursued by the group where I conducted field research shows these framing goals in practice. In their outreach efforts, they first isolate BPA as a problem, and then explain the endocrine and hormonal disruptions associated with repeated exposure. Next, they outline how this risk can be avoided by not putting hot food in plastic containers; and finally, they encourage people to tell their loved ones about BPA. The organization does not merely seek to inform those they reach; they hope to compel people to change their behavior and then tell their friends and family about it, too. Interviewees described similar approaches to intersecting awareness of the issues with action at their respective organizations.

Frame Creation Process

In conducting my fieldwork, it became clear that the framing patterns deployed at each organization were no accident. They came about through an informal process that encouraged successful frames to proliferate and unsuccessful ones to cease. Being on site allowed me to witness the way that casual conversations about interactions with the public actually served as information exchanges about framing techniques that had been more or less successful with a certain demographic. Over time it became apparent that these exchanges were what led to shifts in framing strategies.

Within the organization where I conducted fieldwork, Debbi and Dave have the final say about what messages go into their marketing and media campaigns. Their decisions are informed by not only their own, but also their employees' experiences in talking to people face-to-face. In practice, they give a high pri-

ority to acquiring this information. In every meeting I witnessed between Debbi, Dave, and their fieldworkers, there was a portion dedicated to what seemed like informal small talk about how things were going. But this outwardly casual conversation was actually an integral part of the decision making process at the highest levels of the organization. Once there were consistent reports that a frame had convinced people to join the organization's efforts, it gained credibility within the organization and began to be employed more broadly. The information learned during such conversations was often later referenced when making more formal strategic decisions about marketing and media messaging.

This process is outlined in Figure 1. It shows the cyclical relationship between backstage strategizing and the front stage testing ground. In backstage strategizing, employees of the organization generate ideas that are then implemented in the front stage testing ground, where employees interact one-on-one with those they are trying to persuade with their anti-fracking message. While engaged in these interactions, the environmentalists gain insight into the nuanced differences between framing strategies that are successful and those that are not. This information is then brought back to colleagues at the organization, who also share their experiences. As the colleagues converse, they parse through ideas and opinions about what went well, what could have gone better, and how they might more persuasively present their anti-fracking message to the desired audience. These ideas are then brought back to the field where they are tested. This cycle of information exchange continues until frames prove to be consistently successful. At this point, the frames are deployed as official front stage messages of the organization in advertising campaigns, speeches given at large events, and interviews given to medial outlets.

Front stage Testing Ground

One-on-one interactions between members of the environmental organizations and those they target with their anti-fracking message play a central role in frame creation. Such contact commonly happens within the context of canvassing efforts on street corners, while going door-to-door in a neighborhood, during conversations with event attendees, and while talking to local business owners, to name a few examples. In these scenarios, employees act on behalf of




Figure 1: the frame creation process

the environmental organizations as they carry out the business of persuading people.²⁰ While engaging with their audience, the environmentalists are keenly aware of their role as a representative of the organization and are constantly adjusting their behavior in an attempt to win over those with whom they speak. If we imagine the interactions in terms of Goffman's front- and backstages, these would be understood as the organization's front stage performances for individual members of the audience it seeks to influence.

When initially asked about how they chose to frame issues for certain audiences, most interviewees acted as if it was simply a matter of common sense. Tom, a canvasser and organizer, explained a sentiment I heard repeatedly when I asked interviewees how they decided which approach to take with certain types of people. He explained, "It's pretty simple. Everyone has individual self-interests. To make an issue seem important, you have to speak to whatever those interests are." While this seems like a basic rule that most persuasive people would understand, upon talking further, Tom revealed that learning about these self-interests was not actually as simple as utilizing

mere common sense.

He and his colleagues determined the interests of a group through an informal system of listening, drawing on past experience, learning from trial-and-error, and discussing their experiences with one another. Tom explained that when talking to new people, he would always start by closely listening for cues about the person's interests. Based on the cues he registered, he would employ arguments that people with similar interests had found compelling in the past. If he found that a particular rationale resonated, he would try to use it again when he came across another person with shared characteristics. He would then discuss his experiences—successes, failures, and surprises—with colleagues at the organization, often during informal conversations over dinner or drinks. In exchanging stories with colleagues, suggestions based on experience would be given about how to adjust messages for better results. Those suggestions would then be implemented in future one-on-one front stage situations. The more times a framing strategy was successful, the more it would be used, until it eventually became a standard within the organization.

In essence, the one-on-one interactions with people served as a front stage testing ground for framing techniques. As representatives of the environmental groups tried to persuade individuals about the dangers of fracking, they experimented with different persuasive strategies. During these exchanges, environmentalists represented their organizations to the constituents with whom they spoke. Because these exchanges occurred with one person at a time, the stakes were lower than they would have been during a speech to a crowd.

By all accounts, no one could accurately predict which frames would resonate with a certain group of people. Therefore, it makes sense that organizations would have a system in place that utilizes low stakes, real world testing before deploying official messages to large groups of people. A botched attempt to persuade an individual townspeople about the dangers of fracking, though disappointing, will not likely disrupt wider efforts; but a miscalculated town hall address or radio interview could severely limit the support an organization receives with a specific group of people. In order to avoid such setbacks, organizations have a system of frame testing that depends on a cyclical exchange of information between official members of the organization, via backstage interactions, and those who interact with people face-to-face on front stage testing grounds.

Though motivations for such a strategy can be reasoned, there are organizations that approach face-to-face interactions much differently. In *Activism, Inc.*, Dana Fisher describes a canvassing model employed by many progressive groups that outsources grassroots organizing efforts.²¹ Rather than being members or employees of the organizations they promote, canvassers are outsourced, are expected to stick to scripts when speaking on behalf of an organization, and are not asked for input during decision-making processes. As a result, canvassers often report feeling disengaged. Such a model stands in stark contrast to the practices of the anti-fracking organizations I studied where canvassers perform an essential and active role in the frame creation process.

Front stage Official Messages

The front stage official messages of organizations involved in the anti-fracking debate are the product of framing techniques. These messages explain an element of the anti-fracking cause in a way

that it is compelling to certain groups of people. They can take many forms but generally share two traits: they are available to public audiences and they employ a medium for communication (unlike the direct interaction between two individuals in front stage testing grounds). Traditional forms of advertising—radio and television commercials, newspaper ads, and billboards—are clear examples. Communications such as radio interviews, press releases, public speeches, and webpage content also carry front stage official messages. At this stage, frames that have proven consistently successful in front stage testing grounds are directed toward large public audiences.

Front stage official messages by nature necessitate a level of investment from the organization. The messages deployed are for public consumption and may be the only interaction many people have with the organization. Therefore, if the messages do not precisely execute the goals they seek to accomplish, the organization risks losing credibility with or making no impact on the audience they want to reach. The monetary cost often associated with pursuing front stage official messages also increases their significance. In light of these considerations, it makes sense that organizations would want to thoroughly test framing techniques before they are exercised on a platform where they have greater consequence.

Back stage Framing Contests

Sarah Kaplan's theory on framing contests says that actors within an organization attempt to "transform their own cognitive frames into the organization's predominant collective frames through their daily interactions," in order to legitimize themselves and their ideas within the organization.²² My research produced countless examples of backstage conversations about experiences in the field that could be understood as framing contests. These can take place within informal conversations between employees, in official meetings in a conference room, or in a myriad of other interactions within the organizational context. Regardless of the setting, when colleagues discussed their successes, failures, and ideas, they did so to teach, learn and create effective framing strategies. In this way, the results of backstage framing contests inform the strategies deployed on front stage testing grounds and in front stage official messages.

Cognitive frames of those within an organization play a central role in Kaplan's theory. Though she goes

into detail about how cognitive frames work within the context of framing contests, she does not explore mechanisms that create them. Expanding upon Kaplan's work, the frame creation model proposed in this paper identifies the front stage testing ground as an integral element that influences the cognitive frames activists bring to discussions at their respective organizations.

Environmentalists seem to engage in framing contests where pieces of frames come together to create a winning frame that is a hybrid of input from many people. The cyclical relationship between backstage framing contests and front stage testing grounds could be responsible for this result. Because the framing contest process has so many iterations, even if one person's frame "wins" in a specific instance, it is possible that another person's frame will prevail in the next interaction. Thus, the resultant frame would be a mixture of the two. Such a scenario may create an atmosphere where there is less political payoff for bringing in the triumphant frame than there would be if the framing contests occurred within a large board meeting attended by several important figures within the organization.

The possibility also exists that interviewees may have felt uncomfortable admitting a desire to see their ideas triumph over their colleagues', but my observations at the environmental organization support the idea of framing contests that result in composite strategies. Though Debbi and Dave, as directors of the organization, had the final say in which framing strategies would be used, they actively sought input from their employees and volunteers. Their criteria for determining which frame to employ weighed the frame's demonstrated effectiveness in the field much more heavily than the position of the person who suggested it. If the administrative assistant had success using a frame, it seemed to have the same chance of being implemented throughout the organization as one contrived by Debbi or Dave. Ultimately, the strategies that were employed represented pieces of a host of framing techniques that had proven consistently successful.

VI. FRAMES IN ACTION AT FIELD RESEARCH SITE

Variation in Audiences Sought by Anti-Fracking Groups

Differences between environmental organizations explain variation in the types of front stage official messages they pursue. Though these organiza-

tions pursue similar goals, they each have their own methods of reaching them. My findings show that while many organizations utilize similar framing practices in their front stage official messages, no two organizations have an identical set of audiences that they attempt to reach.²³ Many tried to reach similar sympathetic audiences—like mothers with young children—but none of the organizations targeted the exact same mix of people. This was likely due to differences in organizational missions, geography, and the types of people with whom the grassroots organizers could connect.

Though frames are created through the same process, the array of experiences in front stage testing grounds, backstage framing contests, and organizational objectives lead certain frames to take hold within some organizations and not others. By highlighting the frames used for specific audiences at the environmental organization where I conducted field research, I hope to draw an image of the types of frames used within the wider anti-fracking debate.

Framing Audiences

The organization where I conducted my ethnographic research was typical of those involved in the anti-fracking movement in that it pursues a broad range of environmental goals beyond just fracking. And as in other multi-cause organizations, anti-fracking projects have received the majority of the organization's efforts for the past two to four years. Some of the forthcoming examples allude to other issues that the environmental organization pursues, but all audiences have been or will be targeted through a similar frame with the anti-fracking message.

I found several examples of frames in action as they are utilized within the organization where I conducted research. In each of the examples, the organization takes a unique approach to conveying the message to its intended audience. The proportion of its efforts that goes toward promoting each frame is determined by how important its respective audience is to the organization at a given time and in a given setting. For example, Dave explained that most of their website caters to mothers of young children and community leaders because they are the people who most commonly visit the site with the intention of taking action. In Dave's experience, these two groups are not merely curious passersby; they usually go to the site to find out how to become involved with the orga-

nization. Information on the site seeks to strengthen these interest groups' commitment to the cause and hopefully inspire a higher than intended level of involvement.

Donors

As with any nonprofit organization, donors play the vital role of keeping the operation alive. Employees are deeply aware that their jobs depend upon the money that donors contribute to the organization and treat them accordingly. A special effort is made to make donors who regularly give larger amounts—one to ten thousand per year, on average—feel that they are a part of the backstage working process within the organization. Donors care about the cause and want to know that their money is being put to good use, so employees regularly give personalized updates on projects they may find interesting. These updates usually come in the form of calls or emails to let the donors know about upcoming projects and recent accomplishments. All interactions with donors are framed in ways that are meant to make them feel like they have special access to inside information about the organization's efforts and that their donations are being judiciously utilized. Based on my conversations with interviewees, this approach to interacting with donors is common among environmental organizations.

The annual fundraising dinner is the organization's largest event dedicated solely to interacting with their donors, and it allows the opportunity to deliver tailored front stage official messages directly to this important group. This year, the event was held in the formal banquet hall of a country club north of the city where some of the donors are members. Even in elaborate surroundings, Debbi and Dave drove home their front stage message for donors: they are good stewards of the money they are given. During their welcoming address, they were careful to highlight that the organization bore no expense to host the event and that employees even helped to prepare food so that a catering company would not have to be hired. All of this meant that the full one hundred dollars per plate paid by attendees went toward the organization's efforts. Upon hearing this, attendees clapped and could be heard praising the announcement.

Each of the formal presentations at the event seemed to be intended to make the donors feel like they had backstage access to the organization's

planned pursuits. The first presenter discussed how recent research on links between foods and cancer would inform a new series of radio shows. The second presenter outlined the not-yet-released findings from a study on the toxicity of fracking wastewater. The final presentation showed snippets of never-before-seen video from an upcoming media campaign centered on interviews with landowners whose land and water were contaminated by fracking.

When the video concluded, attendees were reminded about an upcoming legislative decision on fracking and were told that the organization wanted to run ads featuring the interviews with landowners in the weeks before the decision. Then they asked for donations. Within an hour, an announcement was made that the fundraising goal of thirty thousand dollars had been surpassed, which drew cheers from the crowd. Beyond that announcement, no other references were made to how much money was raised that night, but the cheery mood in the banquet hall would lead one to believe that the employees and donors were satisfied with the results of the evening.

Mothers of Young Children

Donors aside, the organization spends the majority of its time and effort trying to reach mothers of young children. Their interest in information about environmental contagions, eagerness to donate time and money to the organization, and their position as caretakers of a "vulnerable population" (as described by Dave) makes reaching them a top priority. The organization makes environmental issues personal to mothers by framing them in terms of what scientific studies suggest about ill health effects in children who are exposed to certain contagions. Though most of the referenced studies were not conducted on children—or even on humans at all—the organization draws linkages between their findings and some facet of childhood health, safety, or development. For most mothers, hearing about potential harm to their children is all the convincing they need to feel a personal threat. Once they conceive of the hazard as personal and somewhat imminent, then they are more willing to take some form of action to protect against it.

Several interviewees mentioned a similar approach to communicating with mothers about environmental issues through front stage official messages. Based on the accounts of two people, the child-centered approach that is so effective with mothers does

not seem to resonate with fathers. Tom, a canvasser and organizer, expressed puzzlement about the difference as he recalled how men would hear about potential dangers to their children—even those that were documented within their community—and would not react. Yet, when mothers heard about environmental hazards, especially imminent ones, most would become concerned and often decide to give a donation, sign a petition, or put a sign in their yard.

Unlike some skeptical audiences, Dave describes mothers as eager for information about how to protect their children. When explaining why the organization pursues them, he started by describing women who have never shown any interest in their food, “but then as soon as they get pregnant, you see them in the grocery store aisles reading every label.” He believes this phase of heightened environmental awareness in some mothers is one in which the organization should become involved. In his experience, women who become connected with the organization while they are pregnant or have young children stay involved for years.

One way the organization fosters relationships with mothers is by hosting educational events for children, many of which take place in local public and private preschools and elementary schools. Such events put children, and in turn their mothers, into contact with the organization and make it more approachable. Kelly, the administrative assistant, described this by saying that instead of being the “person from that environmental group,” she was known as a “person from my daughter’s school,” which makes her more approachable. I saw this in practice one Wednesday during a CSA pick-up at the office.²⁴ A woman walked in to collect her box of produce and recognized the name of the organization from fliers she had seen at her daughter’s school. She introduced herself to Debbi and asked if she had taught the lesson that caused the woman’s daughter to be so excited. Debbi used this opportunity to explain some of the organization’s causes and projects, all in a frame conducive to this woman’s status as a mother of young children. The woman seemed genuinely interested in what Debbi had to say—especially the parts that pertained to child health and safety—and asked where she could find more information about protecting against toxins and ways to volunteer. The organization’s approach to interacting with this woman, which was based on parental status and gender, seemed to resonate with her.

Implicit in the quest for mothers of young children is the idea that the mothers should be of a certain socioeconomic background. Making sense of most of the information necessitates a certain level of education. Phrases like “endocrine and hormonal disruption” are used with the expectation that the audience does not need further explanation. There is also a presumption that the audience has the money to make the suggested environmental changes, such as replacing plastic containers with glass, eating organic foods, and ensuring that children do not play in grass that has been sprayed with pesticides. It hardly seems reasonable that a mother who accepts food stamps, works a low wage job, and lives in subsidized housing could afford to affect her children’s environment in these three ways, let alone in response to the host of other recommendations. Given that the organization must also ensure its survival through donations, its pursuit of mothers from more affluent backgrounds makes sense. Though the leaders of the organization may want to protect vulnerable populations and promote environmental justice, aggressively pursuing those goals is unlikely to be financially feasible.

Self-Identified Environmentalists

In attempting to define people who have been consistently active in championing a variety of causes associated with the wider environmental movement, I use the term “self-identified environmentalists.” It would be incorrect to say that the organization’s marketing efforts target “environmentalists,” broadly defined as anyone who is concerned about the environment. Instead, the messaging is meant to resonate with those who have taken on “environmentalist” as a part of their identity. Though I was not able to ask every person targeted by the organization under this umbrella whether they self-identify as an environmentalist, every person I spoke to who had been consistently involved with environmental causes for a number of years claimed the title of “environmentalist.” They used phrases like, “Well, I’m an environmentalist, so...” or “As an environmentalist...” in describing themselves and their work. Because this trend was so strong among people with whom I spoke, I felt comfortable using the term “self-identified environmentalists” to describe the type of person the organization seeks to reach when framing their messages.

Those who are self-identified environmentalists offer time and money to the organization with rela-

tively little convincing about the importance of issues. In order to make their front stage official messages resonate with this demographic, employees try to appeal to the values that environmentalists hold dear. Because the environmental movement has been established for several decades, this often means evoking phrases or arguments that may not make much sense to outsiders. Many of the self-identified environmentalists with whom I spoke give their time and money to several organizations whose goals they see as a benefit to the larger movement. This group is much more interested in the well being of the movement as a whole than any other group to which the organization directs its efforts. Therefore, it is important for endeavors to be framed in the context of the larger movement when targeting self-identified environmentalists.

In order to make their organization's work personal to the self-identified environmentalists, employees attempted to convey a sense of ingroup status. To do so, they used language with which environmentalists would be familiar. For example, they would start a sentence with a phrase like, "If we're ever going to have clean water..." with the knowledge that another environmentalist would not consider the current water quality to be satisfactory. They often also expressed the imperative to "speak for the environment," which has no voice. Several times, I heard such sentiments shared between environmentalists but never when talking to any other groups. They also freely referenced past environmental issues when discussing current projects with the assumption that no contextualization was necessary. For example, when a woman discussed with Dave how people tend not to believe facts that are inconvenient for them, she matter-of-factly stated, "like with DDT." He immediately agreed, the two shook their heads in dismay, and then went on with the conversation. By communicating in these ways, employees at the organization are able to engage a demographic of people with a proven record of active involvement in causes like theirs.

Once on board, the self-identified environmentalists tend to engage with the organization in a unique way. In general, they were much more open to attending rallies, joining in canvassing efforts, distributing marketing materials, and volunteering in positions that made them a voice or face of the organization than were other groups. One could imagine that their activist experience would make them more confident in such a role, though my data does not of-

fer an explanation for this difference. Regardless of the reason, the contrast between actions of self-identified environmentalists and all other groups is significant. For example, where many types of people may shy away from rallies, this group thrives on them. People from other backgrounds seemed less convinced about the effectiveness of rallies while the environmentalists saw them as important ways to energize activists, foster community within the movement, and have their message heard by lawmakers.

Faith Groups

When leaders in the organization decided to reach out to faith groups, I witnessed them pursuing a new demographic from the early developmental stages through implementation. This presented a unique opportunity for me to see the backstage strategizing process of framing from its infancy. The idea to market the anti-fracking campaign to faith groups came about when an acquaintance from a neighborhood anti-fracking organization approached Dave at a rally. She asked him to film a few interviews with faith leaders about their reasons for opposing fracking.

His first objective for interview preparation was to get information about faith groups involved in environmentalist efforts. To do so, he had me do an online search of such groups with the express purpose of pulling quotes from their websites that were representative of the ways they communicated the importance of the issue. He explained, "I want to be sure to use the right language when I talk to them." After my data gathering, he, Debbi, and I met to discuss what I had found. Both of them were keen to understand how the faith groups themselves frame environmentalist issues, so that they could understand what made it personal to them. Dave and Debbi used this insight when generating questions for the interviews, which would be their first front stage testing ground with faith groups.

After conducting the interviews, it was deemed that marketing to faith groups offered a promising chance to reach a new demographic of people with the anti-fracking message. Debbi and Dave felt that they had a firmer grasp on the types of issues that were important to faith groups and seemed confident in their ability to convey their message through this frame. For the next few weeks, Kelly, the administrative assistant, worked to compile a list of hundreds of local faith leaders representing a broad range of religions:

varied denominations of Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus. While she worked on that task, Debbi, Dave, and Helen made an effort to connect with a number of religiously affiliated volunteers to do more backstage strategizing and to get a sense of what was important to them. The organization planned to start their outreach by mailing a request to faith leaders to post an anti-fracking letter in their church bulletins or local newspapers, which would be their first foray into front stage official messages for this audience. Enclosed with the request would be a sample form letter that discussed the moral imperative to care for God's creation, to ensure quality living conditions for future generations, and to protect vulnerable populations from environmental injustice. All of these were arguments they had isolated during their backstage strategizing and front stage testing grounds: research, interviews, and subsequent discussions with religiously affiliated volunteers.

Debbi and Kelly seemed especially excited about the opportunity to recruit new supporters from within the religious community. They believed their success or failure would depend on their ability to recruit faith leaders and to effectively convey, or frame, the anti-fracking message in a way that felt personal to those who heard it. At this point, it remains too early to know the results of their efforts.

Pet Owners

Pet owners may be the most unlikely group that is actively pursued by the organization, as they are not a group traditionally sought by environmental organizations. Debbi conceived the idea while trying to figure out how to reach more people with their message about ill health effects associated with lawn pesticides, and immediately began the backstage strategizing process. Upon realizing that many of the same health risks that pertained to humans were also threats to pets, she pursued the idea. Further research led her to a local veterinarian who agreed to review scientific articles about health effects of pesticides. After doing so, he concurred with Debbi that many common cancers in dogs could be caused—or at least exacerbated—by repeated exposure to lawn pesticides. Because dogs will likely encounter lawn pesticides while on a walk even if their owner does not use them, the issue becomes personal to every caring pet owner. The organization plans to target pet owners with a similar frame for their anti-fracking messages once research

is released about radioactive chemicals making their way from wastewater to land.

The caretaker role of pet owners means that effective frames are often remarkably similar to those used for mothers. As Debbi explained, “These dogs aren’t just walking through the lawn barefoot on a summer afternoon, they’re out there every day of the year with their mouths and noses right in it. They are at as high a risk as a baby whose hands are always in his mouth [while he plays outside].” Throughout the marketing materials carrying front stage official messages, facts from scientific studies are intertwined with appeals to the need for pets to be protected. In the same way that children need to be safeguarded by their parents, pets need their owners to ensure their health and safety.

Adding legitimacy to the campaign is the fact that veterinary offices are the main space for marketing to pet owners. Approximately ten locations allow informational pamphlets to be distributed within their offices. Though there is no way to be sure how effective these campaigns are at changing the prevalence of lawn pesticides, veterinarians (unofficially carrying out front stage testing on behalf of the organization) report that people take the pamphlets and ask unprompted questions about the information they contain. After learning about the threat, most pet owners seem concerned with the potential risks of pesticides where they had not previously recognized them as dangerous. The environmental group recognizes this as the first step toward compelling pet owners to share the information with their friends.

VII. CONCLUSION

The Future of the Anti-Fracking Movement

Though it has not been widely circulated, people with whom I spoke foresee another evolution in the anti-fracking debate as more is understood about what happens to the massive amounts of wastewater left over from the process. Recent testing on wastewater in Pennsylvania found high levels of radium, a radioactive substance. Those at the environmental organization where I conducted my research worry that legal loopholes could allow this wastewater to be repurposed and used as water to spray public roads or salt to deice them. Whether or not this is a legitimate possibility remains to be seen, but it serves as an example of how those involved in the anti-fracking debate continue to constantly seek information about unexplored dangers. In doing so, they hope to both

protect the environment and to uncover framing opportunities that could make the anti-fracking cause salient to a wider audience.

Active frame creation has been and continues to be central to the anti-fracking movement's expansion. Though conditions preceding the genesis of the movement sparked conversation on the topic, organizations were necessary to shape discourse in a way that galvanized people and then funneled their efforts into purposeful action. The organizations studied in this paper have a clear process for generating the frames they deploy in their campaigns, and the public dialogue constantly evolves in large part because of their work. Only time will tell whether this will be enough for them to reach their overarching goal of banning fracking nationally.

Further Implications

Additional research should be conducted to determine whether and how the process of frame creation employed by anti-fracking organizations might be at work within other grassroots movements. Doing so would increase the knowledge about how targeted audiences actually play a role in shaping the messages they will receive, thus ensuring their resonance and relevance. If it is found that purposeful consideration of the intended audience in the frame creation process improves the effectiveness of resultant frames, organizations may want to implement a more interactive model. The frame creation process outlined in this paper could serve as a template for grassroots groups who want to involve their audience in generating compelling messages.

VIII. Methodological Appendix

Gaining Entry

My goal was to find an environmental organization within the greater New York City area that was involved in some way with the movement against fracking. I pursued several avenues before eventually achieving entry to my site. I first tried to find someone within my social network who might be able to help. In doing so, I found that a friend of a friend worked for one of the largest environmental groups in New York City. However, upon meeting in mid-August, it became clear that his foremost priority was in protecting proprietary information about the organization, and as an outsider, I would not be welcome there.

My next approach was to send blind emails to

anti-fracking organizations I found online. The emails succinctly requested that someone contact me, a student interested in learning more about fracking. Following the advice of a friend who works at a nonprofit, I contacted the volunteer coordinators at each group, as they are accustomed to receiving and responding to inquiries from those outside their organization. The emails resulted in several responses, one of which brought me to the place where I ultimately conducted my site visits.

Introduction to the site

The site is located on the bottom floor of a brick building on the main street of a suburban area within an hour of Manhattan. After entering through the main door, visitors walk up four flights of stairs and then pass through a doorway that brings them to the main office area. To the left is a receptionist desk large enough to comfortably supply three to four computer workstations. Approximately ten feet behind the reception desk sit two standard office desks that face each other but are separated by a four-foot divider, so that those seated in each desk can see each other when standing. Kelly, the administrative assistant, and Sarah, the policy administrator, use these two desks.

To the left of the reception area is a door that leads to Debbi's office, which she generally left open. Only twice during my visits did I see her door closed, and even then, it was for no more than half an hour. Inside her office was a large corner desk and bookshelf set where she worked, which faced another desk that was often used by people with whom she met or collaborated. Most meetings with employees and/or volunteers, phone calls, and spontaneous conversations involving Debbi happened here.

Walking to the far end of the reception desk from the main entrance would bring one to an open kitchen and break area that is easily visible from and within earshot of the reception area. An oblong table that can comfortably seat eight people is located at the center of the break area, with a kitchen sink, dish drying rack, countertop, stove, oven, and refrigerator along the far wall. It was common for different combinations of employees to congregate here during lunch from about 12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. At least three of my initial introductions to the recording studio employees happened after meeting them in this break area.

Despite the availability of workspace in the reception area, it was quite common to walk into the

building and find no one in the immediate area. On several occasions during my visits, people would come into the building looking lost and uncomfortable as they attempted to locate an employee to announce their presence for a meeting. Twice when Debbi happened to be in her office and notice such a visitor, she welcomed them by yelling from her desk, an act representative of her informal approach to interacting with others.

Recording Studio Effect

The ability to create free media messaging makes directed audience-targeting possible for the organization. Where other organizations have to pay for every new radio spot, podcast, or video, this one does not. Professional quality media is regularly produced for free in the on-site recording studio with virtually no turnaround time. In one instance, I saw an idea go from a point of discussion to a precise concept to a finished product in the matter of an afternoon. Such capabilities make this organization an outlier in some senses. They are likely able to be more liberal with the number of approaches they try in their media messaging than other organizations would be, as there is no sunk cost associated with anything until it moves to print. Even then, part of their mission as an environmental organization is to minimize waste, so they will only print thousands of pamphlets for very specific, thoroughly tested purposes.

It is worth noting that while at the holiday fundraising party, several people told me that one of the main reasons they give to the organization is that Debbi and Dave are exceptionally good at expediently bringing ideas to fruition. Those who mentioned this attributed much of the organization's success to this skill. Though this speaks to their managerial and administrative skill, having a free, professional quality, in-house recording studio certainly makes this process easier than it would be for organizations that do not have access to such a facility.

It is possible that this organization pursues an above average number of projects carrying front stage official messages due to their access to a free recording studio. Even if this is true, it does not alter the structure of the frame creation process as outlined within the paper. If anything, the frequency with which the organization brings frames to an official front stage position may have allowed me to view the process enough times to recognize it during my relatively

short research timeframe. Evidence for a similar process was presented during interviews with employees of different organizations, substantiating the claim that what I witnessed is generalizable to other organizations within the anti-fracking movement.

On Site Research Limitations

My initial intention for my research was to visit an organization working exclusively on fracking issues, a plan I had to drop after difficulty gaining access to such a site. Though this organization does spend the majority of their time working on their anti-fracking campaign, they also focus energy on projects related to other causes. As a result, my research could not focus solely on fracking as I had intended, but instead followed the interests of those within the organization while I was on site. The objectives of the organization forced me to shift the scope of my research interests so that they would align with the reality of the site.

I attempted to focus my research on the entirety of the organization and each of its employees, but this was not possible in practice. Three of the employees were often in and out of the office, making it difficult for me to connect with them during my short visits, and another employee rarely talked to others in the building and worked almost exclusively in his office. This meant that the majority of my interactions were with five employees: Sarah, the policy administrator; Kelly, the administrative assistant; Helen, the field coordinator; Debbi, the director; and her husband, Dave, who owns the recording studio that operates in the same building. Despite being proactive about talking to other employees, most of the data about framing involves Debbi or Dave in some way. If I had more time at the site, I would have aggressively pursued ways to engage with other employees on issues pertinent to the project.

The most significant ethical issue I faced as a researcher came unexpectedly in October, when Dave asked me to assist with audio editing for podcasts and offered to pay me for my services. The prospect of working on the project was intriguing because in distilling information for podcasts, I would likely receive a backstage view of the process by which the group decides what to present to the audience they want to reach. However, as an audio editor, I would be expected to make decisions about what content to include, which would give me more influence in the decision making process than I felt comfortable having. At the

time, I worried that this could compromise my role as a researcher in a few ways. My goal was to understand more about the organization, and I did not want to be in a position where I could steer the process in a direction it would not have normally gone or to open the door for conflicts-of-interest between my role as researcher and hired worker. I also worried that outright declining the request to help in an area where everyone knew I had expertise could damage my relationships with those on the site.

Ultimately, I decided to work on the project with a few caveats. The first was that I would help with the technical aspects of audio editing, but I would not make any decisions about content. Instead, I offered to go through the existing audio with someone from the environmental organization and would edit according to his or her wishes. By using this approach, I hoped to create space for dialogue about why certain clips were chosen, thus giving me insight into the backstage formulation of front stage presentations. Additionally, I refused to accept any funds from the organization and in doing so reiterated that my primary function in visiting their organization was as a researcher. Because the approach I proposed for editing the podcasts would make the process considerably slower than it would have been had I made content decisions, it made sense that they should not to pay me at a standard rate.

The directors of the environmental group received my proposal in good spirits and eagerly moved forward with the editing project. Looking back, I believe this was the best possible outcome. Working as an audio editor gave me insight into the logic behind front stage presentations of the organization that I do not believe I would have otherwise had, especially in my limited time there.

Interview Participants

My search for a place to conduct field research brought me into contact with people at anti-fracking organizations beginning in August 2012. Though these people were not able to help me find a site for fieldwork, they expressed a willingness to be interviewed for my project at a later date. During the fall, I attended three additional anti-fracking events where I made potential interview contacts. Once my site visits concluded, I emailed each person I had met over the past few months to schedule an interview. Seven of these people obliged. One additional interview was

conducted with someone referred to by an interviewee.

Interview Schedule

The following interview schedule was used as a guide for topics to discuss with participants as time permitted. Interviews ranged from one to two hours and were conducted in a place of the interviewee's choosing.

Tell me about fracking.

- (The goal here and in other questions is to get them to frame for me.)

What are the biggest dangers of fracking?

How did you find out about fracking?

Who do you work with on this issue?

How do you mobilize people for this cause?

- Do you target different types of people?

Have you worked on other issues?

- How do you envision your role within the organization/fracking movement/environmental movement/something else I haven't yet considered?

How did you become involved in this organization?

What do you think makes this organization successful at engaging the people it seeks to reach?

- Could be volunteers, policymakers, general public, etc.

Who does your organization try to reach?

- Why does the organization try to reach these people?
- What types of people usually volunteer/donate money/attend events/write letters/etc.?

Why does the organization choose to devote attention to fracking?

- How is fracking similar/different when compared to other environmental issues?

In your experience, what arguments against fracking seem most compelling to people you meet? Why do you think this is?

- Ask whether other groups of people find that argument compelling

Are there any strategies the organization uses to make the message about fracking resonate with different types of people?

- Can you give some examples?
- Why do you think these messages are effective with these people?

Tell me about a time when you explained the dangers of fracking to someone who hadn't heard about them.

- Why did you decide to explain it that way?
- Was there anything in their response that caught you off guard? If so, why did it surprise you?

Have you ever been surprised that a certain argument against fracking did(n't) resonate with someone?

- Why was this surprising to you?

Do you think there are any underexplored opportunities that could shape people's perception of fracking?

- Why do you think this could be more effective than the current strategy?

• What do you think prevents this from happening?
Are there any groups of people your organization has reached out to but did not have success in engaging?

- Why was this group targeted by your organization? Why were they attractive/important to your organization?
- What do you think accounted for the lack of responsiveness from this group?
- Is there anything you think the organization could have done differently to engage them?

What do you think is the greatest roadblock to shaping the public's ideas about fracking?

- Why do you think this is?
- Have you seen examples of this in play? Tell me about an example.
- What do you think could be done to get around this?

Have you seen anyone pursue an idea like that?

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- CSA stands for "community supported agriculture." In CSA programs, members buy "shares" in a farm's harvest at the beginning of a growing season and then pick up a box—usually a bushel of produce—once per week of whatever is harvested thereafter. The popularity of CSAs has risen in recent years among people who believe they provide the freshest, highest quality produce at lower prices than one would find at a supermarket. Every Wednesday, the environmental organization serves as a pick-up location for CSA produce boxes from a local organic farm.

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